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Abstract 
This thesis has two parts. The first part is a development of Dionysius the 
Areopagites' theophanic notion of being, what I call his notion of the mystery of 
being-as-ikon, in relation to his epistemology and theory of language. The second 
part is an application of this notion to certain epistemological and linguistic issues 
in western philosophy. The purpose of the thesis is to develop a Dionysian 
philosophical theology through the notion of being-as-ikon in dialogue with 
western philosophy. 
Declaration 
I hereby confirm that I have not previously submitted this thesis, or any portion 
thereof, for a degree in tllis or in any other University. 
Signature: .,..//?--?C--·------L---
Date: u•J . Cit,. o1 
ii 
Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge my debt to my academic supervisor, Prof Andrew Louth 
and to various 'readers', in particular Dr. Simon James and Fr./Dr. Melchisedec 
- • .;.·n..orvl_N 
tPlfi!Jla~ Furthennore, though I have used various translations of Denys' 
writings in my research, the texts which appear in the thesis are my own 
translations from the De Gruyter critical edition, often done with Luibheid' s 
translation as an aid. Thus, any translation errors are entirely my own. 
lll 
Abbreviations 
CD Corpus Dionysiacum 
DN Divine Names 
CH Celestial Hierarchy 
EH Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
lvfT lvfystical Theology 
Ep. Epistles 
IV 
Abbreviations 
CD Corpus Dionysiacum 
DN Divine Names 
CH Celestial Hierarchy 
EH Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
MT Mystical Theology 
Ep. Epistles 
IV 
Henty Edward Rhodes, Jr. 
11 March, 1949- 19 February, 2001 
Prolegomena 
The great thing is that there is a mystery here, that the fleeting aspects of earth and eternal 
Truth have come into contact here. 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 
1. General Overview 
This thesis is a development of a Dionysian philosophical theology which 
focuses, primarily, on Denys' theophanic notion of being, what I refer to as 
Dionysius' notion of 'being-as-ikon'. I examine his position in the first two 
chapters (Part I), and then apply the notion of being-as-ikon in the following 
chapters (Part II) as a favorable interpretation of certain related issues in western 
philosophy. This allows me to address the following problems, presented here in a 
broadly construed manner: the problem of varieties of mystery (as I shall call it), 
the problem of the relationship between theistic proof and theology (which I also 
treat cursorily in the final section of chapter One), the problem of the relationship 
between science and theology and the problem of the relationship between 
language and theology. 
The notion that emerges as a central element of my examination of Denys' 
thought, and of my application of his thought to western philosophy is, as has 
been stated, that of 'being-as-ikon'. What, then, is implied by this term? 
2. The Mystery of Being-as-Ikon 
For Denys 'being' (ova/a) is rational, empirical, and linguistic. He does 
not directly define 'ikon' ( dxdJv), but in accordance with his usage, I define it as 
follows: 'ikon is an image which itself contains as a unity-in-distinction that of 
which it is an image.' The notion of being-as-ikon, therefore, implies that rational, 
empirical and linguistic being, distinct from each other and from their archetype, 
contain in themselves the unity of their archetype. For Denys, to put it differently, 
being-as-ikon affinns that the beyond-being is fully present in being, but it is not 
being and being is not beyond-being. The notion of being-as-ikon, furthermore, 
whenever it is used in this thesis shall, therefore, imply a double mystery, as it 
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were, a mystery of being, on the one hand, and a mystety of beyond-being, on the 
other. 
3. The Mystery of Being-as-Ikon and Western Philosophy 
In terms of applying the notion of being-as-ikon to western philosophy, I 
shall here offer the general structure of my argument. I assume that each of the 
positions that I treat reveals, in some sense, the mystery of being. If these 
positions do reveal the mystery of being, then the mystery of being, as I take it, 
refers us to Denys' conception of being, and can, therefore, be understood through 
the notion of being-as-ikon. It is my contention, therefore, that the notion of 
being-as-ikon, in general, and the notion of rational-ikon, empirical-ikon and 
language-as-ikon, more specifically, provides a plausible approach to doing 
philosophical theology. 
3.1. A Brief Look at the 'Philosophical' Chapters 
The first issue that I treat in the third chapter concerns, as was noted 
above, the variety of claims of mystery in contemporary western philosophy. I 
look, specifically, at three claims of mystery regarding 'mind', 'matter' and 
'language', reflecting my primary interests in Dionysian thought, offered, 
respectively, by Colin McGinn, Shimon Malin and Martin Heidegger. This 
chapter is a brief foray that is intended as a defense of the kataphatic aspect of 
Denys' thought, namely its kataphasis as regards the mystery of being conceived 
of in terms ofbeing-as-ikon. 
Furthermore, using Descartes' 'ontological' proof, I apply Denys' position 
to the issue of a priori proof for the existence of God in chapter Four. My 
approach to Descartes' Fifth Meditation is critical, but, given a Dionysian context, 
I ultimately see his 'proof in a favorable light by arguing for an apophatic 
conception of his reasoning in the Fifth Meditation, generally, and of his 
'ontological' argument, specifically. As such, this chapter, therefore, is a defense 
of Denys' notion of rational-ikon, i.e. the rational component ofbeing-as-ikon. 
I apply Denys' position, in the next chapter, to a notion of the sense of the 
beautiful, which I develop using Steven Weinberg and Werner Heisenberg's 
2 
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treatments of beauty in science. The intent here is to argue for an apophatic 
conception of the sense of the beautiful as applied to the work of science, and to 
offer, therefore, a defense of Denys' notion of empirical-ikon, i.e. the empirical 
component of being-as-ikon. 
The last chapter is an application of Denys' thought to Merleau-Ponty's 
claim that linguistic meaning is silence. I accept Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
language, in general, and his theory of meaning, more particularly, and to it I 
apply Denys' theory of apophasis. The interest of the chapter is, therefore, to offer 
a defense of Denys' notion of language-as-ikon, i.e the linguistic component of 
being-as-ikon. 
Part II of this thesis, then, suggests that an epistemology which approaches 
the cosmos via the notion of being-as-ikon, specifically in terms of rational-ikon, 
empirical-ikon and language-as-ikon, provides a context within which to deal 
meaningfully and responsibly with discemable limitations of reason, while 
avoiding the slippery slope of utter mysticism. Such an epistemology recognizes 
and affirms the nebulous nature of being, namely that it is at once strictly 
linguistic, rational and empirical, yet beyond language, reason and sense-data as 
well, i.e. it affirms the role of the mystery of being-as-ikon in the knowledge 
process. Furthermore, it is a defense of being-as-ikon in a western philosophical 
context that offers a Dionysian response to the positions examined by delineating 
the epistemological implications of this notion, particularly with regard to 
rational-ikon, empirical-ikon and language-as-ikon. 
3.2. Rational-Ikon, Empirical-Ikon and Language-as-Ikon 
When I refer to a rational, empirical or linguistic ikon, therefore, I refer to 
a certain element of being which is derived either from mind, matter or language 
and, understood in terms of being-as-ikon, seems to convey both the mystery of 
being and the mystery of beyond-being, either in a kataphatic manner (as with 
chapter Three) or in an apophatic manner (as with chapters Four-Six). 
3 
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4. Conclusion 
Gabriel Marcel's distinction between 'mystery' (or the 'meta-
problematical') and 'problem' might be a heuristic one for us at this point. The 
former he defines as follows: "A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its 
own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple 
problem." As examples he sites "the union of the body and soul", "the problem of 
evil", "love", "an encounter which has left a deep and lasting trace." "To postulate 
the meta-problematical" Marcel argues, "is to postulate the primacy of being over 
knowledge ... to recognize that knowledge is, as it were, environed by being ... "1 
Revising Marcel's terminology just slightly, it could be said that Denys' position 
postulates the primacy of being over knowledge in a certain refined sense: namely 
as the primacy of being-as-ikon over knowledge. Thus, for Denys, it is the 
mystery of being-as-ikon which 'encroaches upon a.tid invades its own data', and 
therefore, 'environs knowledge'. 
Let us turn, now, to an examination of the CD to see how it is that being-
as-ikon, for Denys, 'environs knowledge.' 
1 
"On the Ontological Mystery" in The Philosophy of Existence, trans. Manya Harari (London; The 
Harvill Press, 1948), 8-9. 
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Denys' Mystery of Being-as-Ikon 
1 
Knowledge, Being and Ikon: Kataphasis in Denys' Epistemology 
1. Introduction 
'In him we live and move and have our being' (Acts. 17.28). Dionysius, 
purportedly, heard these words preached by St. Paul at the Areopagus. And 
although scholarly opinion does not accept that the Dionysius whose writings 
shall here concern us was the Dionysius of whom St. Luke speaks in the final 
verse of chapter seventeen, this notion seems, nevertheless, to be a fitting place at 
which to begin our analysis of the Corpus Dionysiacum because, whoever the 
author of these texts is, he seems to have been captivated by just such a vision, 
namely that 'in him we live and move and have our being.' 
The mystery of which St. Paul speaks is a great one. It would, indeed, be 
quite marvelous and awe-inspiring if he meant only that God is the cosmos, and 
that since we make our home in it, then we therefore live and move in him. 
However interesting this position might be, it is nevertheless not in agreement 
with what St. Paul intends to convey. That which he intends to convey here is a 
mystery of such greatness that it is, ultimately, unknowable and indescribable, as 
he himself says elsewhere. 1 It is not, however, a mystery about which nothing at 
all can be known and said. 
Denys' epistemology seems to capture this aspect of the mystery of God. 
For him, there is a burden which being bears, a tension with which intellect 
contends, concerning two distinct and seemingly separate modes of reality: the 
empirical and rational, on the one hand, and the trans-empirical and trans-
rational, on the other. This chapter deals with Denys' epistemological method of 
rational apprehension of the reality of God: it treats the issue of knowing at least 
somewhat about a mystery that at the end of the day is utterly inconceivable and 
unknowable. Such a task cannot fail to at least seem like a fruitless endeavor, but 
Denys seems to provide quite an ergonomic epistemology, blazing an apparently 
1 
cf. Rom. 11.33-36. 
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sure but precarious trail along the precipice of senselessness, his great strength 
being, in my opinion, that he seems never to fall. 
His method is discernible within the context of the procession and return 
of the beyond-being; it has two cmcial parts, the rational (or a priori) and the 
empirical (or a posteriori), and, as opposed to the later aspect of unknowing, is 
exclusively bound within the confines of reason and sense-perception. It is a 
method of rational apprehension of God that is, therefore, fundamentally 
empirical2 and rational, but not in a philosophical sense ofbeing, on the one hand, 
a constmct of a strict empiricist, or, on the other hand, a constmct of a strict 
rationalist. Denys' method has as its locus of investigation the empirical-rational 
mode of reality, but is ultimately concerned with something quite other than and 
distinct from this cosmos and its mode of reality. Put differently, it is a cosmo-
centric method, but has as its ultimate telos the cosmic-Cause. 3 Knowledge, for 
Denys, is always consequent, therefore, to the unknown and unknowable, yet the 
process of knowing is anterior to that of unknowing. 
2 The term "empirical", as defined by The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 226, means "Based on experience. An idea or concept is empirical if it is 
derived ultimately from the five senses, to which introspection is sometimes added ... the data 
supplied by the senses may need to be processed by the mind, and indeed may not count as data at 
all until some activity by the mind has taken place." And regarding empirical language: "A 
statement, proposition, or judgment is empirical if we can only know its truth or falsity by appealing 
to experience, but it can contain empirical concepts without being itself empirical. Red is an 
empirical concept, but 'Red is a colour' is not empirical: we do not find its truth by looking." The 
subject of Denys' empirical investigations is one that is itself utterly non-empirical; so his method is 
empirical only because it requires empirical data; but it is not empirical in that it uses processed 
sensory data for the purpose of making inferences and knowledge claims about something (i.e., 
God) which is not in any way an empirical object. Furthermore, Denys' method is not empirical in 
the sense that all the data with which the mind must deal is given as sensory data; his position 
requires input from the thing (i.e., God) with which the method is primarily concerned: i.e., 
revelation. 
3 
"[I]f indeed we may speak of goal or ending ... this infinite goal is not a nature or an essence, nor 
is it a person; it is something which transcends all notion both of nature and of person: it is the 
Trinity" in Vladimir Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: 
S.V.S., 1976), 44. 
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2. Being and Knowing 
What is knowledge? When it is said 'I know that x' what is being referred 
to by means of the verb 'to know'? We shall turn here to the CD to aid us in trying 
to develop a Dionysian response to this line of questioning. 
In DN I, 4, 593A, Denys says this: "For if all knowledge is of beings and 
has its limit in beings, then that beyond all being and all knowledge is 
transcendent ( t~llPlJf..livrl)." Whatever else knowledge might be, then, it is at 
least, for Denys, 'ofbeings' and 'has its limit in beings.' Between knowing and 
being, there is then,. for Denys, a close relation: 'knowledge' (yvwm,) and 'to 
know' (yl(y)YcbO'Xw) are taken to refer exclusively to the realm of caused things, 
i.e. the 'cosmos' -the ainar6,('caused thing') ofthe a/rfa('cause'). Denys' use 
of 'knowledge' or 'to know' to refer to anything beyond being is, therefore, 
always qualified. The preposition iJJTtp ('above', 'beyond') or the adverb 
brtxnva ('beyond') is commonly used, distinguishing between 'knowing', on the 
one hand, and 'knowing beyond all knowledge', on the other, to refer to that 
which is beyond knowledge and being; ayvwafa ('unknowing'), or some variant 
thereof (e.g. yvwm, Jj ot' ityvwaiC4\ is also common.5 That which is being is 
that which is (or can be) known. Knowing: of being, in being. The sole subject 
matter of knowledge, for Denys, is being, and the limit of the function of 
knowledge is being. A response to the question 'What is knowledge?' must treat 
to some extent, then, the nature of being. Thus: how does Denys understand the 
notion of being? 
In making this reference, he uses a few Greek terms, which while not being 
synonyms are often semantically interchangeable.6 The term that he uses most 
often is ovaia, the first appearance of which in DN occurs in 588A with two 
variations in usage: 'For it [God] is beyond word, mind and being ( ova{av): 
4 DNVII.3.872a. 
5 See nex1 chapter. 
6 Eg., ro dvm; r6 6v. 'the being,' 'that which is'; ra 6vra 'the beings', 'those which are'; dJv. 
'being', 'that which is'. 
7 
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unknowing beyond being ( un£povm6raro,).' Just below this passage, in 588B, 
Denys uses the same term in a similar manner: 'the beyond-being ( v:r£povaw,) 
infinity is above beings ( TCVV ovmwv).' More specifically, he speaks of God as 
'the beyond-being being' (588B, 13-14), and similarly: 'but it is not being, as it is 
beyond all being' (588B, 16). But in 589B, we read: 'Therefore, because it (the 
First Cause) is the ground, origin, being (ova! a) and life of all things, ... ,' in 
which case Denys seems to use the term being, without a qualifYing term such as 
v:rtp, as a referent for God. And in 593C, he plainly suggests that it would be 
problematic 'to praise' God as 'being', yet that 'since it is the ground of all being' 
it 'must be praised from all created things' (593C). ('Praise'( vpvtw), then, is also 
closely connected to knowledge.) In 645A, Denys touches on this point again: 
'Therefore if we name the beyond-being, hidden God either 'Life', 'Being' 'Light' 
or 'Word,' we are discerning nothing other than activities (either deifYing, 
creating (being), granting life or giving wisdom) proceeding from it to us' (DN, II, 
7, 645A). Denys uses the notion of the Sun as an analogy to express the manner in 
which these activities come 'from it to us': 'by existing it (the Sun) gives light to 
all to partake of its light, according to the proper logical faculties of each' (DN, 
IV, 1, 693B). Thus do the activities of the beyond-being 'proceed from it to us'; 
yet Denys carefully distinguishes the Good as being beyond the Sun: 'the Good is 
beyond the sun transcendently, as the archetype beyond an indistinct ikon' 
(693B). The beyond-being proceeding to being as the light of the Sun proceeding 
to being: Denys' careful distinction is an implicit recognition of the inherent 
rational weakness of such an analogy, the main point of which being the fact that 
the Sun itself would be part of the realm of being which it is lighting, whereas the 
beyond-being is itself emphatically not part of the realm of being into which it 
proceeds. 7 "It is not a question ofunderstanding the Good on the basis of the sun, 
but of situating this impossible relation within the distance of Goodness, and 
therefore of admitting that the light of the sun would have no right to the 
7 
cf DN, IV, 4, 697b-c. 
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iconography of the Requisite, if it did not come to us from the Requisite as a gift; 
"for light comes from the Goodness, and therefore finds itself to be an icon of 
[the distance of] Goodness." Not to name the unthinkable in the image of the 
world, but indeed to receive the world as an icon of God -to relate the world back 
to Him."8 
In 696C-D, the notion of being is qualified a bit more precisely in terms of 
itself rather than in comparison to the beyond-being: 'But also if we must speak 
concerning these things, of the irrational souls, both of living things which fly in 
the air and those which walk upon the earth as well as those which dwell within 
the earth and the ones that live in the waters, or those having an amphibian-like 
lot, and those which have been called to live under the earth, and ... ' 9 Denys' 
understanding of being includes rational as well as irrational animals, plants and 
inanimate matter. Knowledge then is of animals (both rational as well as 
irrational), plants and matter; and knowledge has its limit in animals, plants and 
matter. 10 
In 7050-708A, it is said that 'all things, whatever is and whatever 
becomes, is and becomes through the Beautiful and the Good. All things look to 
it, and are moved and maintained by it. . .all beings ( ni ovra) are from the 
Beautiful and the Good ... Therefore all things are aiming for, desiring and loving 
the Beautiful and the Good.' Being then has a certain inherent relational-
communal aspect: it is from the Beautiful and the Good, and aims for, desires and 
loves the Beautiful and the Good. The nature of being is understood through the 
activities of the beyond-being, which Denys seems wont to express by means of 
the Sun analogy (used again in 697C-D). By means of having been created, and 
8 Marion The Idol and the Distance (Fordham, New York: 2001), 178. Quote from DN, IV, 4, 697 
b-e. Marion's rendering of the Greek alrfa with the French Requisit, which Carlson maintains as 
Requisite, insightfully captures Denys' notion that being having come from this Cause requires it for 
the purpose of returning to it (cf. Carlson's note 21, 151). Marion's notion of distance remains by 
his own admission necessarily undefined. 
9 See also Ep. IX. 
10 It should not be understood that Denys' theory of knowledge is of a solely empirical sort. For 
example, in 980c-d he speaks of number as being as well. 
9 
Knowledge, Being and Ikon: Kataphasis in Denys' Epistemology 
by means of being preserved, each being has an innate connection with the 
Beautiful and the Good. Denys seems to understand this as a sort of faculty or 
ability (whether actively or passively employed): each being by means of being a 
being naturally acts as an ikon of the Beautiful and the Good. For this reason it 
would seem that certainty as a philosophical bench-mark for truth is a goal that 
could never be properly achieved, according to Dionysian thought: to know a 
being certainly would be also to know certainly that to which it by nature relates 
and communes -the beyond-being Beautiful and Good. As the Sun is a 'dim ikon' 
of the beyond-being, so too is each instance of being, and as such each being 
stands in readiness to be known in relation to its Cause. 
2.1. Being-as-Ikon 
Being is all animals, plants and matter, and whether a being is known or is 
acting as knower, it stands in relation to its Cause as Its ikon. Knowledge, then, is 
being as ikon of the beyond-being in communion with being as ikon of the 
beyond-being: it is a self-giving communion. It is a communion because in this 
dynamic act of knowing the beyond-being gives itself to and through knower and 
known, the known-being gives itself to be known and the knowing-being gives 
itself to know: the process is defined by an interdependent, cooperative 
participation. Both the knowing-being as ikon as well as the known-being as ikon 
participate in this process. The Cause and Purpose of this process is the beyond-
being Beautiful (and Good, 704B). As ikon, each being participates in Beauty, 
and by means of participating is itself beautiful, the process of participation being 
'beauty.' 11 Hence, to know is to participate (commune) with the beyond-being, by 
means of the unique ikonic capacity of each being: an epistemology of beauty, as 
it were (cf 701C-704C). Hence, 'I know that x' would, for Denys, seem to mean: 
'As knowing-being-as-ikon I participate with the Beauty of the beyond-being by 
means of the beauty of the known-being-as-ikon.' 
2.1.1. Rational-Being-as-Ikon and Empirical-Being-as-Ikon 
11 I deal with the notion of beauty below more thoroughly in section five. 
10 
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If being is inherently ikonic, then the ikonic nature of being is dual: 
empirical and rational. In often speaking of 'things of perception', nt alaBTJrci, 
and 'things of reason', ra VOTJrci, Denys seems also to accept a hierarchy of 
being. At the beginning of DN, the rational ( nt YOTJra) is spoken of as being 
'unapproachable' and 'unobservable' by means of perceptions ( rol{; aiofJTJrol{;): 
empirical being is, in its own way, hierarchically prior to rational being (cf. 588B). 
And if being is hierarchically ikonic, xar·avaA.oyfav ('according to capacity'), 
whether empirical or rational, then knowledge too is, on the one hand, ofboth ra 
alofJTJra (the empirical) and of ra voTJra (the rational), and (therefore) 
hierarchical, on the other: participation with the Beauty of the beyond being by 
means of the beauty of the known-being would be hierarchically beautiful 
(because it participates in beauty) in both an empirical as well as a rational 
manner. Denys' theory of knowledge, then, would be neither solely empirical, nor 
solely rational. As ikon of being, which is ikonic of the beyond-being, knowledge 
as such would ikonify the nature of that with which it communes (being-as-ikon-
of-beyond-being), and as such would be both rationally and empirically beautiful. 
Thus, it would seem that knowledge oflin being, as communion with beautiful-
being-as-ikon-of-Beauty-beyond-being, is knowledge oflin both empirical and 
rational being, as communion with beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-Beauty-beyond-
being. The more philosophically acceptable way of putting this, post Kant, might 
be to say that Denys' theory of knowledge would seem to be both a posteriori as 
well as a priori -with an emphasis on beauty, hierarchy and ikon. (This theory of 
knowledge, then, is exclusively rational and empirical in the sense that it does not 
transcend reason and experience; it functions firmly within the realm of the 
rational and the empirical though its main influence and inspiration remains 
other than either the empirical or the rational-as noted in the Prolegomena). 
2.1.1.1. Being-as-Ikon as Gift of the Beyond-Being 
The CH opens with a quote from the Epistle of James, "6 at5E:J.rp6Bco(}' 
(DN, III, 3, 681d): «llaaa o6mq aya()lj xai JTav OriJTJpf..La rtkwv avw()tv tart 
II 
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xara{Jafvov ci.Jro roiJ :rrarpo~ rwv rpdJrwv.» ('Every good gift and every perfect 
gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights. ')12 Here we have a 
good expression of what might be called an 'epistemic limit' that is operative in 
patristic philosophy: xara{Jafvov ci.Jro roiJ :rrarpo~ rwv rpr!Jrwv. The capacities 
of reason (both 'pure' and 'practical'), experience (both direct and indirect), and 
language (syntax, semantics and pragmatics) are employed as 'gifts from above,' 
within the context of the 'coming down from the Father of lights.' This 'coming 
down,' is inherent both in the nature of these gifts (thus, 'perfect' being 
understood in the sense of 'relatively perfect') and in the nature of the subjects 
with which these gifts consort. The cosmos -i.e. all being- is a personal and 
intimate context within which God can be known. Denys speaks of it as the 
procession (:rrpo6bo~) 13 of God from the unity of beyond-being to the distinction 
of being. St. James is here referring to God's activity of intimately relating himself 
by means of being Cause of all being: procession is a sort of love-ethic, effecting 
being and the respective epistemic, empirical and linguistic 'gifts.' The procession 
of the beyond-being is the cause of being, and thus of knowledge, the source of 
which is the beyond-being-eros. 14 Speaking to this issue, Denys says this: 
even the Cause of all things itself, because of an extraordinary character 
(superabundance) of goodness for all things, loves all things, makes all things, 
perfects all things, holds together all things, returns all things, even that the divine 
12 CHI 120b(l-2). Italics mine. St Denys often makes reference to Holy Scripture: «rtva xavova 
xaMwrov CV..TJ()da;;» (640b, 9). As an admonition for doing so, see DN II 640b(8-12). Cf. Js. 
1.17. 
13 cf. Proclus' henotheism in his Elements of Theology, trs. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963), Prop. 113-165(101-145), especially ll6; in the latter, Proclus argues that "the One is 
imparticipable." 
14 
cf. S. Gersh From Iamblicus to Eriugen£l (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 17-ll3 and 193-288. These two 
sections are a study of Neo-Platonic and Christian Neo-Platonic thought, respectively, wherein the 
notions of 'procession' and 'return' figure prominently. 
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desire is Good of Good on account of the good. For the Good-working desire15 of 
all things itself, by means of the Good (according to its extraordinary character) 
did not permit itself to remain in itself without issue: but it was urged to produce 
according to (its) productive extraordinary character for all things (DN IV 
708b). 16 
But also one must venture beyond truth to say this: that even the cause of all 
things itself with a beautiful and good desire for all things, on account of an 
extraordinary character of benign desire, is carried outside of himself by means of 
the forethought 17 he has for all beings (712B). 
The beyond-being proceeds by means of what seems to be an internal necessity 
that is at the same time a free action. St. Denys uses the present, active, indicative 
to convey the processive actions; but he uses the aorist to speak of the eros not 
remaining in itself alone. 18 The actualization of the 'eros' which is interior to the 
Good,19 is conceived of as a temporally unique and distinct past action, as 
opposed to the continued present processive action. In this way, St. Denys seems 
to be attempting to convey the unalterable essential nature of God and the free 
15 
"Note that one must not ascribe to God inconsistent names, unless indeed they be contained in the 
divine Scripture, as even now he says concerning 'eros."' John of Scythopolis Scholia 261.4 in Paul 
Rorem and John C. Lamoreaux John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press: 1998), 206. See also DN IV 708c-709a and note 150 in Luibheid and Rorem, 80. Here Denys 
says 'It would be irrational and silly, as I see it, to not look at the power of the meanings, but at the 
words only' (708c, 3-4); and DN 709b-712b. See also Hieromonk Alexander Golitzin Et Introibo 
Ad A/tare Dei (0eaoW.Ovlxrt: TiaTptaxtxov lbpii!J.a Timtptxwv Md.tTwv, 1994), 61ff note 
168; and 82. See also Ysable De Andia Henosis: L 'Union A Dieu Chez Denys L 'Areopagite 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 145-64. «L'amour est Ia puissance de generation au sein du Bien. »And 
Louth Denys, 94-6. 
16 llapplJUtaCJaat t5t xal roiJro dncTv 6 aAlJ(h}~,- AdytJ~,--; Jrt xal a&ro~,- 6 navmw arrw~ t5t' 
<iya(}OTTJTO~ V1TCpfJoA1'/V !TGVTOJV Cpij, !TGVTQ noel, !TGl'Ta TE:Actol, !TGVTQ avvtxa, !TGVTQ 
tmOTptrpn, xal fOTt xal ecro~ fpw~ aya(}O~ ayafJoiJ /jut ro ayafJov. A(m:~· yap 0 
aya(}oc~ Wl' 6vmw f{XIJ~ tv raya(}Q} xa(}' (Jncp/]oA.l'Jv npoVnGPXWV ovx daCJCV alirov 
<Jyowv tv tavrl[J ptvnv, CX{VlJClC t5t alirov d~ ro npaXTlxt:VaJ()m xara Tl'/V GnGl-70>11 
}'l:Y17Ttx7'/v 6JrcpfJoA.ljv. Cf Andia, op cit., «Le Divin Amour.»; Golitzin, op cit., 66. 
17 This is more literal; Luibheid has loving care for 'raT~ npovofat,'; normally taken as 
'rrovidence'. Here 'fore thought' seems to capture Denys' notion of movement a bit more clearly. 
1 cf. Golitzin, loc cit. 
19 De Andia, loc cit., «L'ultime audace de Denys est de montrer que le «divin amour» est interieur 
au Bien» 
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processive activities: his freedom of action is defined by his essential nature?0 
Thus, to use different terminology, this paradoxical conception could be put like 
this: the necessary nature of God necessarily effects the free activities of God's 
erotic procession. 21 The latter passage makes an important point about God being 
'carried outside of himself in the procession. St. Denys' purpose is to distinguish 
the unity of God (as God is in himself) from the manifold differentiations of his 
processive activities. For Denys, the focus of the knowledge process seems to be 
the rational and empirical discernability of such manifold differentiations -to 
know the manifestation of the beyond-being in/through being.22 The procession of 
the beyond-being is an action of free relation to and free communion with being, 
being completely unified but effecting distinct instantiations:23 the movement of 
the beyond-being from union (the thearchic union of three in one24) to distinction. 
This is not a theoretical paradigm, an idea or some kind of semantic play, for 
Denys; it is an action on the part of the beyond-being, which implicates an array 
of spatio-temporal activities. 25 
Expressing this notion, Denys uses an analogy, comparing the nature of a 
circle with the intimate action of the beyond-being in procession. 
20 Dom Illtyd Trethowan says this: "God is not, if we are to speak properly, free to choose . 
. 'possible worlds' .. .is anthropomorphic. God's plan for creation is what it is because he is who 
he is. This is freedom in the fullest, most positive sense. . .God is super-generous love" in his 
"Irrationality in Theology and the Palamite Distinction" Eastern Churches Review 10 (1977), 21. In 
a discussion on the question of God's "agency or will" in the creative process, Golitzin also uses 
Trethowan, op cit., 83 and note 51. 
21 cf. Golitzin, op cit., 59-61 and 66-70, esp. 56: "Dionysius uses this term to signifY the presence 
of God as "outside" his essence. Its use in the singular refers to the unified quality of the procession 
as a single out-flowing, as well as to the unity of its source. The plural usages doubtless point to the 
varied effects to which the procession gives rise, and to the multiple causes (aldat) of the 
creatures. " "God in relation is God in his 7tpo6oot." (Ibid., 83). 
22 cf. John D. Zizioulas Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: 1993), 91; "ekstasis" (standing 
outside) is a result of God's eros (desire) 'responding' to the created order. 
23 cf Golitzin, op cit., 47 for a brief discussion of similarities between St Denys and Neo-Platonism 
on this point. Cf. Proclus, op cit., Props. 25-39 (29-43), 56-65(55-63), especially Props. 62(59) and 
64(61). See also Props. I 00-3(91-3) 
24 
"as a monad or henad, because of its supernatural simplicity and indivisible unity" and "as a 
Trinity, for with transcendent fecundity it is manifested as 'three persons' ( Tljv rptovn60Tarov)'' 
as grounded in Scripture (cf DN I 589D-592A). 
25 Golitzin, op cit., 62. See also note 133; and Proclus, op cit., Prop. 87(81), 48-9(49), 52(51), 
55(53), 33 (37). 
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By means of the Divine desire is shown especially both the unending and 
unbeginning as a kind of eternal circle26 ... always both proceeding, remaining and 
being restored to itself. 27 
In procession, the beyond-being as transcendent and as immanent are connected 
by the tenuous thread of space-time: the 'divine circle' speaks concurrently of the 
non-spatial and timeless unity of the transcendent as well as the spatial and 
temporal duration of the immanent. Thus, it both always is, yet always is 
becoming. 
2.1.1.2. Cosmos as Ikon of the Cause of the Cosmos 
How does such a position affect the way that the cosmos is to be 
understood? Denys' reasoning in response to such a question could be formulated 
as follows. Assume28 that this cosmic order is eternally what it is. First, this 
assumption would at least imply that the cosmos is necessary. If it is necessary, 
then it exists by means of itself. Secondly, it would seem also to imply that space-
time is necessary. If space-time is necessary, then it is self-existent. Each of these 
cases would imply, respectively, that the cosmos and space-time are on a 
metaphysical par with the beyond-being. 29 Such reasoning would be untenable for 
Denys because in such a context, there would be no procession. There is evidence 
of procession. Therefore, the cosmos is contingent. Hence, procession does not 
imply the eternality (supra spatio-temporality) of the cosmos. God's procession 
effects the cosmos to the end that he might be discursively discerned within it and 
2G {[)anep Tl(; afiJLO(; XVXAo(; 
27 Italics mine. DN IV 712d-713a; having been 'shown' (Va7JYJjaaro) by 'our illustrious one' (6 
xktW(; lj,ucoV) in his Hymns of Yearning,' Joe cit., 713A. On St Denys and Hierotheos, se.e I. P. 
Sheldon-Williams "The ps. Dionysius and the Holy Hierotheos," Studia Patristica 8, IT (1966): 
108-17. Cf Proclus, op cit., Prop. 33 (37). 
28 cf. Proclus, op cit., Prop. 34(39) and 55(53). The cosmos, in the sense of being an everlasting 
duration, or 'perpetual process', is eternal 
29 This turns out to be the case on pain of incoherence because if there are two self-existent and 
necessary things (God and the Cosmos) which are asserted as the source of the cosmos, then there 
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by means of it, not so that there is an ontological identity between God and the 
cosmos. 
Denys has put it this way: 
All the causes found in the divine scripture, 30 both of the umons and the 
distinctions,31 each of which having been treated, as far as possible, by my 
account in my Theological Representations, I put forth, having unfolded32 and 
expounded33 these things by means of the true word34 ... For example, if to the 
hyperousia hiddenness we give the name of 'God,' or 'Life,' or 'Being' or 
'Light' or 'Word,' then that which we are discerning is nothing other than 
guiding35 activities from it for us, which deify, cause being, bear life, and grant 
wisdom. .. [T]his is the work of the divine Spirit, which is located beyond all 
conceptual incorporeality and all divinity, and also of the Father and the Son 
eminently transcendent of all divine fatherness and sonness. For there is no exact 
relationship36 between the caused (things) and the causes; but, on the one hand, 
the caused (things) are in every possible way ikons of their causes; and, on the 
other hand, the causes themselves are transcendene7 and established beyond38 the 
caused (things), according to the logic of the source-relationship?9 In this way 
also, joys and woes are said to be the cause of joy and woe in us, without 
themselves being the possessors of such feelings. Also, fire warms and burns, 
[but] is not said to be burned and warmed ... <\nd if someone said life itself lives or 
light itself is enlightened, according to my logic he has not spoken correctly, 
unless he says somewhere in some different manner [than at] first, so that the 
is an equality regarding the mode of hyparxis and ousia of both, i.e. G =C. In other words, reason 
seems to require that there can only exist one SE and N being. See the discussion to follow. 
30 c5aa(; tvrof( ..Wyfot,· Oronpmt:f( 
31 lvr!JaafJ1~ lhaxpfat:mv 
32 aw:.u~m~ 
33 avwrnJ~avrt:, 
34 ro/ CtJ.l]On AOJ-YP -possibly a reference to 'scripture'? 
35 
npoayof1Ll'f4"- 'proceeding'? 
36 l!l(fJt!pna. 'likeness'. 
37 t~dPTJTal 
38 vnt:pft5pv:rrrm 
39 Tij' olxda(; apxfl' 
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caused things are sufficiently and essentially in the causes beforehand (DN II, 
644d-645d). 
St. Denys goes to great length here, reinterpreting the notion of cause even in a 
spatio-temporal sense in effort to ensure that the cosmic-Cause is not mistakenly 
identified with the caused-cosmos.40 Such an identity would implicitly result in the 
affirmation of the eternality of the cosmos, and it would imply the being of God 
(rather than the beyond-being of God). The emphasis here is on the mystery of 
what God really is, and thus on the mystery of the relationship between what he 
really is and what he actually causes; this type of mystery for St. Denys, is not 
merely theological in nature. There are psychological mysteries of this ilk: the 
question of the connection between what joy is and the experience of the feeling 
of joy. There are natural mysteries of the sort that St. Denys points out with 'fire' 
and 'light,' and there are biological mysteries ('life'). So whatever attributes the 
cosmos might exhibit, the Cause of the cosmos is none of these; though they 
might provide us with some information about the Cause, being ikons of it, yet the 
Cause itself is something other than these cosmic attributes. For St. Denys, as well 
as for other Greek Fathers, notably St. Athanasius, using temporal terminology is 
necessary not because in God there is a succession of time (e.g. action a precedes 
effect b and action c, et cetera) but because of the limits of our predicative 
abilities; these 'temporal' notions are used as 'notional icons'41 to affirm an 
ontological, rather than a temporal, truth (and in this sense, they are used, as well, 
to affirm truth itself, i.e. the beyond-being). 
3. Predication and Praise: Language-as-Ikon 
We turn now toward the role of language. Denys' theory of knowledge 
sets knowledge in an inherent reiation with the beyond-being; so too does 
40 
cf Proclus, op cit., Prop. 11. Here, he says this (which I take to be the expression of a key notion 
for a Procline epistemology): «1] yap 'lWv a{T{(J)V yvwm'" tma-njJ.L'I/b tcrrlv tpyvv, xal ron: 
AfyoJ.LEV tnfaraafJm O'Tav 'Tl'i afrta }'1Wpfaww:v1Wv 6VTWV.» 'The work of science is knowing 
the causes, and then when we know the causes of beings do we claim to J..rww.' 
41 Golitzin, op cit., 45-74. 
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language stand in such a relation.42 Language in communion with knowledge-in-
communion-with-being-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being bears therefore the same 
empirical and rational nature. As such, language, for Denys, could be used 
synthetically or analytically, as ikon of beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-Beauty-
beyond-being: 'But now, as it is possible for us, we make use of whatever 
appropriate symbols for the Divine' (DN I, 4, 592c).43 This notion of symbols, or 
ikons, incorporates the notion of a process of predication, which functions by 
means of a priori analytic/synthetic propositions, and a posteriori synthetic 
propositions.44 The 'symbols' for the Divine, also exhibit a hierarchical structure 
as well: a hierarchy of kataphasis. It speaks with a dual hierarchical purpose: to 
speak empirically and rationally about the Beauty-beyond-being by means of 
beautiful-beings-as-ikons-of-beauty-beyond-being. And in so speaking, "the 
inexpressible is bound up with what can be articulated" (589d-592a) in a 
decidedly philosophic (and 'theosophic' DN, II, 2, 640a) sense. Thus, an 
inescapable tension exists in Denys' theory of language usage because that which 
is 'bound up' is, by nature, inexpressible, while that in which the inexpressible is 
bound is by nature expressible. The speaking of language is therefore a speaking 
that speaks what cannot be spoken by means of what can be spoken: 'bound up' 
within empirical and rational being is the beyond-being -that 'being', as it were, 
which is beyond the empirical and the rational, though bound by it. Speaking 
about the beyond-being in a demonstrative manner while the attempt is to achieve 
42 cf. Balthasar The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetic, II, 172-78; and Marion, op cit., 
180-95. 
43 I use Luibheid and Rorem's rendering of 'o/xdot, ... avp{JOA.ol( as 'whatever appropriate 
symbols' (53). «NOv&, dJ' 1jpTv trpLxrot~ olxdoi!.-IJ.tv d' ra OE:Ta avp{JOJ.m, xpr.(JpcOa » 
44 A variety of propositional forms seems to play a role in this process: tautologies of the form 'All 
bachelors are unmarried men' (e.g., 'God is one'); axioms of the form 'All bodies are extended' 
(e.g., 'God is the Beautiful'); identity statements of the form 'a = a' (e.g., 'God is God'), or 
inferences of the form '(x)(Px '7 P 'x)', or '(x)(Px (} P 'x' (e.g., 'God is beautiful iff God is good' or 
'if God is beautiful, then God is good'); laws of the form '(x)(Px v ;;;;:Rx)' and '(x)~Px 3 ,;?Px)'44 
(e.g., 'Either God is light or God is not light' and 'It is not the case that God is both light and not 
light'); observations of the form 'All bodies have magnitude,' 'Socrates is a man,' 'Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon,' 'Kelsie is a child' (e.g., 'God is all in all', 'God is being-beyond-being', 'God 
became a man', 'God became Incarnate'). 
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explicit clarity is partially a spoken silence by virtue of the beyond-being's being 
'bound'. 
Denys speaks to this distinction in Ep. IX: 
There are two ways to the tradition of theology: on the one hand, the ineffable 
and mysterious, on the other the manifest and made-known; on the one hand 
symbolic and perfecting, and on the other the philosophical and demonstrative. 
Thus is the inexpressible bound up with what can be articulated45 The one 
persuades and proves the truth of its conclusions, but the other achieves and 
establishes [one] in [truth] by means of unteachable mysteries (11 05d). 46 
If language is by nature ikonic, then distinguishing between the 'ineffable' 
function of language, on the one hand, and the 'demonstrative,' on the other, 
speaks of the dual and inseparable nature of language. For as ikon it cannot but be 
as ikon-of-the-beyond-being; and as speaking ikon, it cannot but speak ofbeing-
as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being. As the human cannot be spiritual apart from the 
corporeal, nor corporeal apart from the spiritual, so too language cannot be 
ineffable apart from the demonstrative, nor demonstrative apan from the 
ineffable: taciturn in eloquence, and eloquent in being taciturn. 
'In the Divine Names it was shown the sense in which 'Good,' 'Being,' 
'Life,' 'Wisdom,' 'Power,' and whatever other (predicates) are rational names for 
God' (1033a) (DN XIIi presents the predicates 'Perfect' and 'One' as being 'more 
enduring' than these). A philosophical process of predication, beginning with such 
a priori notions (DN, XIII, 2, 977c-984a), attempts to speak rigorously of the 
beyond-being as 'Good,' 'Life,' etc., because 'this 'One', 'Good' and 'Beautiful,' 
is uniquely the Cause of the multitudes of the good and the beautifuL' It speaks 
demonstratively as if in answer to an invitation to speak -because it has the 
responsibility to do so- of the ineffable by means of the effable (being). To speak 
45 xal avp!tlnN.:xrat np f)qnp ro tippqro. 
46 
cf. Louth Denys, 24-6; Rorem, op cit., 24-6. 
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ofthe beyond-being, therefore, is 'to praise' (v,uv£fv) it in two senses ofthe word: 
because language-as-ikon celebrates the beyond-being, and because it recites over 
and over the presence of the beyond-being. 
After his lengthy discussion of the problem of evil, Denys turns (in chapter 
five of DN) to a discussion of the predicate 'being', distinguishing between 
showing and praising: 'Let us move to the theological name 'being', the true-
being of the really-real. But we should remember that the focus of the discourse is 
not to show the beyond-being being as the beyond-being, for this is something 
beyond words, something unknown and wholly unrevealed, something above 
unity itself; but (the focus of our discourse is) to praise the being-making 
procession of the thearchic being-source into being' (DN, 5, 1, 816b). 'Not to 
show the beyond-being as the beyond-being' but 'to praise' it the aim is not to 
explicate the essence of what it is to be 'beyond-being,' but to continuously herald 
the thatness of the beyond-being. Denys continues this line ofthought in section 2 
of the same chapter: 'Therefore, this discourse intends to praise the divine names 
of the shining forth of Providence. For (it is not intended) to describe the beyond-
beingness for the 'goodness', 'being', 'life' and 'wisdom' of the beyond-beingness 
of the Divine. It announces the beyond all goodness, the beyond all divinity, the 
beyond all being, the beyond all life and the beyond all wisdom, hidden, as the 
Scriptures say, beyond-image ( vn£pu5pv,ufv77); but manifesting the good-making 
Providence (superabundantly goodness and the cause of all good things), it 
praises even as 'being', 'life', 'wisdom' that being-making, life-creating, wisdom-
giving Cause of all those participating in being, life, mind and perception' 
(816c).47 'To announce the shining forth of the beyond-being as hidden beyond-
image,' being recognizes that which it finds to be necessary for its own existence 
as standing in relation to the beyond-being, and in so doing praises the beyond-
being as such:" ... for every x, there is ay that characterizes it in such a way that, 
in stating "I praise you, Lord, as y," x makes request to it as its Requisite ... the 
47 
cf Louth, op cit., 93-4. Brief yet insightful discussion of the notion ofpronoia (providence). 
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proposition of the language-object "x states p, where p = I praise you" becomes 
explicit and correct only if a metalanguage locates in "praise as ... "the mark of a 
status of enunciation, which itself announces the relation of request between x and 
the Requisite under a certain relation y."48 Praise 'enunciates' and 'announces' a 
relation between praiser and Praised by means of praising. \\'bat does it mean, 
then, to praise the beyond-being by means of (rational and empirical) being? 
What is the relationship between the one who praises and that by means of which 
praise is offered? 
3.1. Praise and Rational Being 
'I praise you, Lord, as 'One': 'The name 'One' means that God is uniquely 
all things through the transcendence of one unity and that he is the cause of all 
without ever departing from that oneness' (DN XIII, 977c).49 Hence, to praise 
God as 'One' is to praise him as, e.g., 'Good', 'Being' or 'Life;'50 but 'God is 
Good of good', 'God is Being of being', 'God is Life of life.' 51 It is to recognize 
that 'everything, and every part of everything' (977c), stands in a unique 
relationship with God, that the 'One' is necessary for being and that all that the 
'One' is requires further predication. 'I praise you, Lord, as 'One' instantly 
implies 'I praise you, Lord, as 'uniquely all things' and 'I praise you, Lord, as 
'cause of all things.' The 'One' is all things by means of being the Cause of all 
things on account of its self-extension of Goodness to all things. 'TI1ey name the 
thearchic mode of being ( iJJTap~tv) 'goodness,' because goodness extends to all 
beings, on account of being the Good as essential Good' (693b). The self-
extending of the Good from the unity beyond-being to the multiplicity of all 
being, as being, requires that the 'One' as the 'Good' be named with other 
appropriate predicates. 
48 Marion, op cit., 187-8. 
49 
« "Ev tit, tJrt mil-ra tvwtw, ten'/ xara pta(,' tv6r1Jro, vnt:poxr'Jv xal nal'lr.VV terri rov tva, 
dvt:XQJOtnjTW' afrtoV.>> 
50 
cf DN IV-Vll; esp. V 816c-8l7a. 
51 . 52 ' A.. , • h , t. , 
cf. Proclus, op Cit., Prop. 53(52-3). OJ(; c v E:lXOVl TO liPXETVJTOV xrpatVOI1£VOV 
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For light comes from the Good, and is an ikon of Goodness. Therefore, the Good 
is also praised by the name 'Light,' just as by an ikon the archetype is being 
revealed (DN IV 697b-697c). 52 
The image of the self-extension of the beyond-being to all being is captured well 
in the ikon of 'light.' Thus, the 'sun' analogy: the sun gives its light to all being by 
means of creating, enlivening, holding together, perfecting, and as such is the 
measure of being, number, order, part, cause and purpose. The Archetype is so 
revealed in the ikon. 
But also it53 gives light to all things being enlightened; 54 it creates, enlivens, holds 
together, perfects, and is the measure of beings and of eternity; it is both number, 
order, part, cause and purpose (697c). 
In 'One', being finds what is necessary for being: meaning and purpose. The 
statement 'I praise you, Lord, as 'One," therefore, silently praises God as 
'Beauty' as well. 
But the beyond-being Beautiful is spoken of as 'Beauty' because of the beauty 
relationally sharing itself with all things. 55 And as the harmony and splendor of 
everything, it is the 'Cause,' in the way that a flashing light will share its beauty-
making 56 ray with everything from its own source. . .From this Beauty all things 
are, according to the relational logic in every beautiful thing; 57 and because of the 
beauty, harmony, love and communion of all things, and by means of Beauty, all 
53 Ot::6T7]TO?; aya()6rq~ 
54 My rendering for ra lJvv<if.Jt::lU navra Instead of taking it as 'to all things having the capacity' 
or something like this, I want to try to emphasize that being in the position of receiving light from 
the Divine assumes the element of existence; thus /Jvv<if.Jt::Vaas 'things being enlightened'. 
55 olxdw~ txaarrp 
56 xaUOJTOIOV~ 
57 xara TOV olxt::Tov A6yov lxaara xl7Aa 
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things are united; and the Beautiful as the poetic cause~8 stimulating and holding 
together the whole (cosmos), by means of the desire for relational beauty, is the 
beginning of all things. . . Therefore, this Beautiful is the Good, so that in 
everything the Beautiful and the Good is spoken of as the Cause of all things, and 
there is nothing without its share of the Beautiful and the Good (70 1 c-704b ). 
"Just as every number participates in unity. . .so everything, and every part of 
everything, participates in the One" (DN977c): good, light, creativity, life-giving, 
perfecting, measure, number, order, part, cause, purpose, beauty. So whatever 
predicates are derivable from the notion of 'One' as, eg., either mathematical 
singularity, logical truth or metaphysical 'being' are applicable to God in the sense 
that all things participate in him as their Cause; in this sense, i.e., the sense of 
participation, "God is uniquely all things," an ikonic identity that does not equate 
being with the beyond-being. Thus is the way of rational praise. 
3.2. Praise and Empirical Being 
Language has an empirical nature and purpose as well. Predicates of the 
empirical sort are more mundane than rational predicates, and being derived from 
the perceptual are much more various. Denys' reminder to Timothy about his DN 
focuses attention on the rational names for God: 'In the Divine Names it was 
shown the sense in which 'good,' 'being,' 'life,' 'wisdom,' 'power,' and whatever 
other (predicates) are rational names for God.' 59 In the ST,60 the concern shifts 
from the rational to the empirical, of which he says: 'But in the Symbolic 
Theology metonymies (!J.CTWVV!J.fat) of God from what we perceive (were 
discussed).' 61 God is spoken of as, for example, having 'eyes', 'ears', 'hair', a 
'face', 'hands', 'back', 'wings', 'arms', 'a posterior' and 'feet' (DN597a-b ). 
And in Ep. 9 Denys speaks to the issue at some length: 
58 JTOLTJTIXOV afrov 
59 MJ' III I 033a (8-11 ). Italics (for "sense" etcetera) mine. 60 The Symbolic Theology is, alas, not 
an extant work. It is probably a work that has been misplaced, like our author himself, somewhere 
in the annals of history; for there seems to be no good reason to assume it to be a fictitious work. 
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I thought it was necessary for him (Timothy) as well as others among us that we 
purpose to unfold, as far as we were able, the manifold signs62 concerning the 
common divine form of God63 For apart from this, will it not have been recast as 
being as unlikely as a ridiculous fabrication even't4 Regarding the manner of the 
beyond-being generation of God, God's womb bodily brings forth being forn1ed 
anew. The Word is described as coming from a human heart like air being 
breathed out. It describes the Spirit as being breathed out from a mouth. It 
presents to us in a bodily manner the divine bosom embracing the Son of God. 
Either being formed anew through these things, both (as) certain trees and 
suckers, blossoms and foundations, or being exposed as a strong gushing of 
waters, or as a reflection of a guiding light-source, or by many other (predicates) 
in the holy writings telling of the beyond-being of the God-logic. 65 But on the 
mind's perceiving God whether of gifts, appearances, powers, attributes, 
complaints, abodes, processions, distinctions, or unions in human form, God is 
also formed anew concerning various forms66 even of wild animals and other 
living beings, and of plants, and of stones; he has been presented in women's 
adornments or in the armor of barbarians, and if as one working with fire, then 
both as a potter and as a refiner. He is put on horses, chariots and thrones. Some 
banquets of well-prepared gourmet foods67 are put on (for him), and he has been 
represented as drinking, inebriated, sleeping and as someone hung-over. 
What might we say about the anger, the grief, the various oaths, the 
changes of mind, the curses, the ragings and the various and equivocal sophistries 
of (his) promises: the war of the giants in Genesis, during which it is said that out 
of fear God was contriving against those strong men, even though the tower was 
not being designed for injustice to others, but for their own salvation, that council 
But, nonetheless, it is a work wherein Denys dealt with perceptual predication (see Luibheid and 
Rorem, op cit., notes 72 and 89; and E£_. 9 and the final chapter (15) of CH). 
61 MTIII 1033a (11-12). Italics mine. 2 ni :ravroba:rra f.J.opqx.vf.J.aTa 
63 Tfj' n£pl (}mfJ avp{Jo}.txfj' IE:pon).aarf(4 
64 n).aapan:Mov, n:par£1(4 
65 (}m).oyuvv 
66 notxt}.opoprpfav n£purA.arrovmu; 
67 oaiT(4 rtva, o¢onouxC!{; tmaxroa{;ovmK 
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in heaven for devising to cheat and deceive Ahab, and the very passionate songs 
of prostitutes and companions? 
Skipping just a small portion of the text, he sums all of this up with a very 
insightful and telling conclusion: 
These are to enable one to see, having disciplined oneself, the hidden beauty; 
mystery will be found, all divine, having been reformed from much theological 
light. Let us not suppose the appearance of these symbols to be reshaped beyond 
themselves, but to expose the ineffable and invisible ... (Ep. LX, 1104c-ll 05c).68 
The beyond-being spoken through the 'manifold signs' of empirical being. 
Speaking of God in this manner might well seem to be 'ridiculous fabrication'; for 
it is nothing less than contradiction, and reason fully resists language use of tllis 
sort whether it be about God or round-squares. But being-as-ikon-of-beyond-
being makes such language not only possible, but necessary. It is nevertheless 
irrational to speak of 'finding the hidden beauty' in language that is overtly 
contrary to beauty of any sort. What is beautiful, e.g., about speaking of God as a 
'drunkard', as being 'lazy', 'angry', 'jealous' and 'grieved'; as 'waging war', 
'cursing', 'lying' and 'cheating'? Such things are not expected of even tl1e best of 
men. Some sense can be made of speaking of God as a 'breath', 'bosom', 'tree', 
'sucker', 'blossom', 'foundation', 'strong gushing of waters', 'light', 'potter', 
'refiner', 'guest of honor,' 'water,' 'milk,' 'wine,' 'honey' and as 'riding horses 
and chariots', 'sitting on tlrrones' and being an 'animal', 'plant', or 'stone'. All of 
these predicates speak of God as empirical being. The strength of the former 
predicates lies in tl1eir utter impropriety; these emphasize, in a kind of inverted 
sense, the beyond-beingness of God. 
68 
rJiv t:r Tl( /&tv t5vVT](}£fT] n}v b'TO( WrOXE:XPV/1/.Ifl'T}V c07rpfR£tav, ropTjat:t /.IVaTIXa xa/ 
(}mctt5fj mivra xal no..Uoii roD (}m).oyfxov (/K.IJTO( avaJracA1Ja!1fva. Ml] yap o/6p£(}a ra 
qmtv6pt:va 1Wv avvfiT]pmwv V7rt:p tav1WY avant:nJ..aafJat, ;rpofkfJJ..fjafJat t5t Ti]( 
&roppljrov xai aOt:arov. See also CH ll. 
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At 1112b-1112c Denys treats the notion of God's being 'drunk.' A 
'drunkard' is taken to be one who is lacking in moderation and stability: one who 
imbibes too much and who, as a result, cannot think or walk straight. It implies 
the notion of being improperly and unhealthily overfull. But as referring to the 
beyond-being, it implies an excess of moderation and stability, a proper and 
healthy overfullness. The beyond-being does not drink an overabundance of 
whiskey or wine, but is an overabundance of goodness and beauty, being and life, 
knowledge and understanding (etc.). To speak of God as being 'drunk' is not 
intended to imply that God is a being which has weaknesses and limitations, but 
that he is outside of being, having no weaknesses and no limitations: it doesn't 
express lack, but over-abundance. Such is the case with God's being 'lazy', 
'angry', 'jealous' and 'grieved,' or as 'waging war,' 'cursing', 'lying' and 
'cheating,' which Denys promises to have dealt with in his ST. 
While overtly kataphatic, these predicates find their semantic value in a 
fundamental apophatic notion -that God is not a being. Their beauty seems not to 
be in their truth-value, but in the process of participation and praise: the end of 
Denys' usage of empirical predicates is not simply to express some truth, but to 
become one who participates in Truth -not simply to say something beautiful, but 
to commune with the 'hidden beauty.' Whereas it could be argued that Denys' 
rational theory of language usage has a decidedly metaphysical feel about it, his 
empirical theory has a decidedly existential feel. Praise 'enunciates' and 
'announces' a relation between praiser and Praised by means of praising: rational 
praise 'enunciates' and 'announces' a metaphysical relation between being and 
beyond-being; empirical praise 'enunciates' and 'announces' an existential 
relation. This seems very much the case when the discourse turns to the beyond-
being as empirical being: the Incarnation. "And out of love he has come down to 
be at our level of nature and has become a being. He, the transcendent God, has 
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taken on the name of man" (DN II 648d).69 The beyond-being enters into the 
womb of a fair Jewish virgin, fonns himself therein and, with undiminished glory, 
comes forth from her as a helpless and pitifully weak little baby. Such is God's 
foolishness. 70 
4. Hierarchy 
What is the role of hierarchy in the processes of participation and praise?71 
'As I see it,' Denys reasons, 'hierarchy is a holy order ( T~tq lt:pa), and a science 
( tmOTJjf.LlJ) and a work ( tvtpycta) being formed as much as possible to the 
Divine-fonn ( 8cocu5t0; and illuminations from God, being given to it 
proportionately, lead up to the Divine-imitation ( 8cof.L{f.L1JTOV)' (CH III, 1, 
164d). 72 Denys speaks explicitly of heavenly and ecclesiastical being in terms of 
each respective hierarchy, and thus of a general hierarchy of being. Distinguished 
as three sets of threes, celestial being is: seraphim, cherubim, thrones ( CH VII); 
dominions, powers, authorities, (CH VIII); principalities, archangels, angels (CH 
IX). 73 And ecclesiastical being is distinguished in a similar manner: baptism 
( ecoycvcO'fa), Eucharist ( m)va£tq), oil (TO f.lVpov); 74 hierarchs, priests, deacons 
69 Denys is quoting or paraphrasing Hierotheos, from his Elements of Theology, throughout 
fcaragraph 10. See also 644a-c. 
0 cf ICor. 1:25 (NRSV); see also Clement, op cit, 37. He draws attention here, as well to the 
foolishness of God's "kenosis." In dealing with Heidegger's position on 'Being' as a non-
theological term, Marion, op cit, 63, presents the following Heideggerian definition: ""Foolishness" 
here indicates much more than an error, a divergence, a conflict; foolishness indicates the 
irreducibility of two logics that neither can nor must , in any case, comprehend one another: faith 
cannot comprehend thought, or thought faith; no third position will ever present itself to reconcile 
them, to the extent that "in the face of a final decision, the ways part."" See his notes 20-2, 62-3. 
71 Denys' notion of hierarchy alone has been quite influential, notably with Aquinas' notion of ordo 
(Dalthasar, op cit, 166); the term, fl:papxda, furthermore, seems to be uniquely his own (Marion, 
op cit., 164, note 45). Concerning this see Gersh, op cit., 125-92. 
7 See also 165 b-e; EH 373c; 500d-504a; Roques L 'Univers dionysien, 35-131; Marion, op cit., 
162-80; Louth Origins, 16R-I 72, and Denys the Areopagite, 33-77; 84-87; 105-09; Rorem 
Commentary, 57-9; Golitzin, op cit, 119-66; and concerning avaM}'W~ and the Dionysian notion 
of 'analogy,' cf Roques, op cit., 53-67; Lossky "La notion des "analogies" chez le Pseudo-Denys 
I' Areopagite"; Andia, op cit, 101-08. 
73 See Roques, op cit., 136-47; and his intro to his La Hierarchie Celeste, xlvii-lvii. 
74 On baptism (fkoyrwrwfa), Eucharist (mJva~tg, oil (To !JVpoV) (cf. EH II, III, IV, 
respectively); cf. Roques, op cit, 246-78. Roques sees these as the 'work' of the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy, not as constituting a 'level' thereof(cf. 174-75). Louth differs with Roques on this (cf. 
op cit, 168). The obvious problem would seem to be that the other three ecclesiastical mysteries 
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(N:trovpyo(); monks, baptized, and those who are not organically part of the 
Church (EH II-VI, 392a-537c).75 Each being is being formed according to its 
capacity to the Divine-likeness. The formation is achieved in so far as each being 
within the hierarchy is so formed, and becomes itself a living ikon of the order, 
science and work of the beyond-being: each being becomes a 'song of praise' to 
the beyond-being by means of the formation of its being to the likeness of the 
'being' of the beyond-being. Hierarchy is, therefore, the proper manifestation of 
the beyond-being in being, and so is itself the source of this process for being, 
while being the process as well: hierarchical participation with being-as-ikon-of-
beyond-being, and the process of praising the beyond-being-by-means-of-being 
has as its goal participation with the beyond-being, yet is itself that process of 
participation. Each being participates, with the beyond-being by means of its 
proper hierarchy and its proper place within that hierarchy, and thus partakes of 
and manifests the harmony of the beyond-being as much as is possible. 
Denys' view of being in general is hierarchical as well. The extension of 
this conception to include all being, and every part ofbeing,76 his notion of being-
as-ikon together with his notion of ascent77 into the beyond-being, is the 'holy 
order, science and work' of the empirical and rational (in terms of 'knowledge') 
and the kataphatic, apophatic and silent (in terms oflanguage usage -'praise'). To 
know is to participate hierarchically with the beyond-being by means of being-as-
ikon-of the-beyond-being. To praise is to speak hierarchically the beyond-being 
by means of the being of language-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being. The beyond-
(cf DN V, VI, Vll) of 'ordinations,' 'initiations,' and 'burials' are not treated in like fashion. The 
mystery of oil is a curiosity lending credence to Denys' Syrian roots: see Louth Denys, 53 and 63. 
75 cf Roques, op cit., 176-99. 
76 
cf DN, 825a-b; 952a 
77 
cf. Marion, op cit., 165f on 'ascent' and 'emanation.' "Not that the two movements succeed one 
another or compensate for one another, but they overlap one another, or even are identical to one 
another ... each member receives the gift only in order to give it, such that this gift, in the same 
gesture, regives the gift in redundancy ("emanation") and, giving, sends the original gift back to its 
foundation (ascent) .. "(cf CH 165a; 168a; EH 372c). 
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being gives itself to being, and being gives itself to the beyond-being.78 This 
interdependent process is what Denys speaks of as procession and return; 79 the 
action of the process is what Denys speaks of as beauty. Hierarchy is, therefore, 
the action of the beyond-being giving itselfto being, and of being giving itself to 
the beyond-being: it is the movement of beautiful-being-as-ikon proceeding 
(Jrpo6c5ot;) from the beauty-of-the-beyond-being as source and returning 
(brtOTp6cp7J) to the beauty-of-the-beyond-being as goal. 
The beyond-being makes itself known as the Unknowable which is the 
source-cause of all being, and being according to its proper capacity (in hierarchy) 
is both the making known and the coming to know the Unknowable beyond-
being. "If, on the one hand, any manifestation makes itself known as the 
manifestation of the One-and-Only not merely contingently (as is often the case 
with members of a class) but rather of necessity, then indeed this One is truly 
visible, everywhere announced, in the all which is his manifestation, but only as 
the eternally One and therefore eternally mysterious, hidden One who can never 
be fully comprehended in any of his manifestations; and therefore the wondering 
admiration of his beauty -as manifestation, as relation between manifestation and 
non-manifestation- is grounded in the worship of what is not manifest. "80 Rather 
than eschewing being, Denys takes it to be essential; there is no place for an over-
spiritualized mysticism in Denys' thought which undervalues the role that being 
plays in its own desire to be in a right relationship with the beyond-being; spatio-
temporal being is not illusion which needs to be overcome, for Denys, but an 
ever-active self-manifestation on the part of the beyond-being, a self-
manifestation which calls all that it manifests (all being) to become what it has 
been manifested to be: a manifestation of the beyond-being, i.e. being-as-ikon. 
78 Ibid., 'receiving the gift in order to give it': the gift is the giving through being given back to the 
beyond-being. 
79 cf. DN 916c-d; CH 260b; EH 392b; 393a; Ep. IX, 1105a ('tmr:rrporprj' is not used in this 
~istle); neither tem1s are used inA,fT, nor is the term ft:papxfa 
Balthasar, op cit., 165. 
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Being's failure to become a manifestation, to see all of being as 
manifestation is, therefore, an essentially spiritual misappropriation of the gift of 
being:81 "Everything lies in the circular movement between procession and return, 
the cataphatic and the apophatic, nothing can find fulfillment except by entering 
this movement. "82 Yet while the process of procession and return allows for being 
to actualize a relationship of manifestation, it remains impossible for being to 
become that which it manifests: 83 hierarchy does not establish a 'corporate ladder' 
upon which being can ascend into something other than being, 84 but establishes 
the proper relational dynamic for being-as-ikon-of-beyond-being to properly 
commune with the beyond-being.85 Therefore, "[t]he same knowledge of God 
demands both a deeper penetration into the image and also a more sublime 
transcendence beyond it, and the two are not separated one from another but are 
the more fully integrated, the more perfectly they are achieved. For if it is true that 
God goes out of himself 'ecstatically' -because all things really are, and would 
not be if God were not in them all in all- then it is also equally true, and even more 
true, that he need not go outside of himself to know the world, for he knows it in 
himself in an archetypal fashion, which is the same as to say again that God does 
not simply -as creative causa efficiens- set a 'second thing' alongside himself, but 
that the mystery of creation because of its intimacy cannot dispense with the 
category of participation; that God, like the sun, imparts being through his being 
and is present to every being, so that now no being or form can be -or may be-
excluded from those which can help us to find him. "86 In so far as hierarchy and 
participation are defining elements of Denys' position-defining in terms ofbeing, 
knowledge, language- then it seems therefore that if the form of truth is 
necessarily hierarchical and therefore participatory -i.e., it is not fundamentally 
81 
cf. Ibid., 171. 
82 Ibid., 166. 
83 EH VIII, 896b. 
84 
cf. Louth, Denys, 105-09, and Origins, 171-72. 
85 
cf. Andia, op cit.; Golitzin, op cit., 77-118. 
86 Balthasar, op cit., 169-70. Cf DNIX, 912d-916a. 
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essential but existential- and as such it is infinite, as is for example the relation 
between numerals (ikon) and numbers (ikoned), then truth is process; not process 
in general, but the process of becoming holy. Such a notion oftruth must form the 
unwritten preface to Ep. VI. 
Sosipater seems to have fmmd truth to be emboldening, something which 
he can use to refute an opposing position, something which he has learned and 
therefore now possess within himself; but Denys suggests that truth is the sort of 
thing that should humble, not embolden; that it should define one's entire being, 
not simply one's thought and speech; that it reveals, but does not refute. Denys' 
hierarchical notion of truth seems to have the tell-tale signs, therefore, of being a 
verb, rather than a noun: it is a doing, an ethic, not a thing, that unites being and 
the beyond-being. Moses has his Siniatic vision on account of his humility, by 
means of his participation with truth ( cf Ep VIII, 1 048bff), so too of David's 
being spoken of as 'a man after my own heart,' of Job's ultimate justification, 
Joseph's lack of vengeance toward his brothers, Abel's trust in Cain (cf. 1085b). 
Such too is the manner in which Christ himself deals with all mankind: he does 
not reject those who have rejected him; he is not vengeful toward those who 
accuse him. Christ, the beyond-being-in-being, lives amongst being as Truth 
because he is the archetype of proper participation with the preeminent hierarchy, 
the most holy Trinity (thearchy).87 This process of becoming holy88, as I dubbed it 
above, is realized more fully as one approaches more closely the Light of the 
beyond-being: for the beings who are closest to this Light "are more capable of 
receiving light and of passing it on" ( 1 092b ). The capacity for 'nearness' on the 
part of being has nothing to do with spatial location but with the hierarchical 
position of each (type of) being: an archangel manifests the true light of the 
beyond-being more effectively than does a holy monk. 89 But it is not a matter of 
87 cf DN III, 680b; Ep VIII, I 085c-l 088a; EH 428c. 
88 
cf Marion, op cit., 164-180. 
89 cf EH I, 373b; II, 400d; 404c; IV, 477d; VII, 568d; and CHI, 164d. See also Andia, op cit., 
101-3; Lossk;y, op cit. 
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order only; one must function according to the 'science and work' of one's place 
within the hierarchical order (cf. 1092B and 1093A), and in so doing become true 
being. 90 
5. Beauty and Being 
What is 'beauty' or the 'beautiful' for Denys? A response to this question 
will require a bit of synthesis and supposition; for he never actually defines these 
terms, apart from affirming that there is an identity between the Beautiful and the 
Good. They remain necessary, but undefined throughout the CD. His treatment in 
DN IV of 'beauty' and 'beautiful' is the lengthiest (by which he clarifies what is 
called 'beauty' and 'beautiful' 701c-704c), rivaled in importance by the 
conceptual value of his sculptor analogy that appears in MT II; the role of beauty 
is referenced in the EH in particular in terms of looking into the beauty of an 
ecclesiastical mystery;91 and in CH I, he speaks of beauty as having an ikonic 
function, at least in terms of the hierarchical orders of the Church reflecting those 
of heaven.92 By means of these passages Denys' conception of beauty is slightly 
tmveiled but in no way terminologically defined. 
The beautiful participates by means of calling back to the calling, which is 
beauty itself(701c): 'we say the beautiful is the partaking in Beauty, but beauty is 
the partaking of the Beautiful Cause of All Things Beautiful: the beauty beyond-
being is said to be beautiful because of its participation with all beings ... calling 
all things to itself.' That which is discerned by the theologian is this synaxis of 
beauty and that which is beautiful: this synaxis is Source and End of being in 
which being participates by virtue of being; it ikonifies this Source-End 
participation, calling being to itself and is hidden in the beauty ofbeautiful-being-
as-ikon.93 It might be said that this dynamic beauty-beautiful process of 
90 EH II, 397D-400a; 896b. 
91 
eg., III, 428c; IV, 476b 
92 cf 12ld. 
93 cf Plato Cratylus, 416a-d. 
32 
Knowledge, Being and Ikon: Kataphasis in Denys' Epistemology 
participation is for Denys the beyond-being in being and being in the beyond-
being: the unrnanifest manifested, the unknown known, the ineffable spoken. 
Heisenberg's experience with a text written by Leopold Kronecker would 
seem to be instmctive here (I return to this example in chapter Five). 94 Having 
read a Latin treatise in which Kronecker treats 'the relation of the properties of 
whole numbers to the geometrical problem of dividing a circle into a number of 
parts,' Heisenberg was deeply impressed by a sense of beauty. 
I sensed a quite immediate beauty in the fact that, from the problem of 
partitioning a circle, whose simplest cases were, of course, familiar to us in 
school, it was possible to learn something about the totally different sort of 
questions involved in elementary number theory ... The impression of something 
beautiful was, however, perfectly direct; it required no justification or 
explanation.. . But what was beautiful here? Even in antiquity there were two 
definitions of beauty which stood in certain opposition to one another ... The one 
describes beauty as the proper conformity of parts to one another, and to the 
whole. The other, stemming from Plotinus, describes it, without any reference to 
parts, as the translucence of the eternal splendor of the "one" through the material 
phenomenon. 95 
By his own reckoning Heisenberg's was an experience of beauty regarding the 
relation of parts to one another and to the whole. 
Denys' position suggests a similar experience, yet not with this or that text, 
but with the 'text' of being. Being as manifestation-of-beyond-being experiences 
its own relation to other beings and to the whole of being, but also comes to 
experience being as the radiance of the beyond-being in and through the whole of 
being. Knowing and being are responsive processes which respond to the self-
manifestation of the beyond-being in and through being: beauty is not simply an 
94 See chapter three. 
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aesthetic quality of a certain thing, it is the aesthetic process of being relating to 
the beyond-being and of the beyond-being relating to being, an ever-active 
process of 
reciprocal participation, exemplified by the hierarchical process of truth and 
holiness. Hierarchy is to Denys what whole numbers and the geometry of the 
circle are to Heisenberg in the sense of parts relating to parts and to the whole; but 
it itself is the process of the whole manifesting the immanence of the beyond-
being. The key element of Denys' thought would seem to be this notion of the 
beauty-beautiful process of participation, as indeed the notion of beauty in 
Heisenberg's sense is fundamental to modem science. Holiness is the existential 
aspect of this process of participation, of which Heisenberg's was an experience 
of number as the mathematical aspect. 
But this paradigm becomes problematic quite quickly if it is assumed that 
the parts (being) fit together to become the whole (beyond-being): though being is 
manifestation of the beyond-being, the essential nature of the beyond-being is not 
manifested into being.96 Theosis is not the process of being's becoming the 
beyond-being, but of being participating in the beyond-being as its Source and 
Purpose by means of a love-response to the creative love of the beyond-being: it 
is the process of being's being manifestation of the beauty ofthe beyond-being as 
ikon and of becoming a partaker of the beauty of the beyond-being. 97 Denys' 
position includes a Heisenbergian-type of conception of beauty, but it is a much 
more all-encompassing notion, by means of underscoring the beauty of the reality 
of being as ikon, of which Heisenberg's is a foretaste: chapter Five on this score 
can be viewed as a microcosm of Denys' macrocosm. 
Denys' notion of beauty is interested not simply in discerning beauty 
whether empirical or otherwise, but in being and becoming beauty and beautiful: 
95 
"Science and the Beautiful", in Ken Wilber, ed., Quantum Questions (Boston: Shambala Press), 
57-8. 
96 
cf DN II, 645c-d; 11, 649a-649b; 4, 817c-825c. 
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the theologian for Denys is not an observer like the scientist who discerns the 
relation of the manifold nature of whole numbers to the unified nature of a system 
of axioms; instead, he sees all of being as standing in such a relation to the 
beyond-being by means of a response to the beauty of the beyond-being in all 
being. This is not simply a matter of the elegance of numerical relations; the 
concern of theological beauty is the elegance ofbeing-as-ikon itself. 
Heisenberg, in reflecting on his experience, concludes that "without any 
reflection, we feel the completeness and simplicity of this axiom system to be 
beautiful." His was an experience powerful enough for him to speak conclusively 
about the nature of mathematics itself; it was not an experience that was 
interesting but fleeting and ultimately unimportant. Years later he wrote these 
words reflecting on an experience from his boyhood. Something so basic and 
fundamental as the completeness of the axiom system of mathematics needed only 
to be 'felt' by a child. 
An enigma that surfaces here is that such an experience as Heisenberg 
describes and comments on leads ultimately to knowledge claims: emotive-based 
feeling seems to be basic for the way that knowledge works in such a position. On 
feeling the relation between whole numbers and the axiom system, Heisenberg 
makes claims about the system itself: the sense of participation between number 
and axiom seems itself to have been utterly convincing. This seems a good analog 
for Denys' take on knowledge as ofbeing and in being. 
Denys does speak of 'experiences' that certain people have had which 
would press the similarity a bit more thoroughly, but these are not crucial for the 
point at hand. 98 His notion ofknowledge as being ofbeing and in being centers on 
the notion of participation: being in communion with the beyond-being, the 
harmony of being and beyond-being. Thus, the splendor of the beauty of the 
beyond-being is the beckoning voice to being, calling it toward an experience of 
91 cf. DN VIII, 892b-893a InCH 208d, the 'theosis' is spoken of as 'a fully fulfilled science of the 
theurgies' (cf. EH 372b); EH l, 372c-373b; 376a-377b; 393a; 429c-432a; 7, 433b-d; 5, 536b-c. 
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itself in and through all being, a voice to which Heisenberg would have 
necessarily (albeit unknowingly) hearkened, and ultimately to an experience of 
itselfbeyond-being. Crucial in this is being's sense of being's connection with the 
beyond-being, an existential conviction, part beckoning and part response: the 
sense itself of participation between being and beyond-being seems to be utterly 
convincing. 
In both cases, that which is believed most firmly, that which issues in 
knowledge claims, is organically part of a relational context, mathematical on the 
one hand, existential on the other, and it is this context of sensing beauty-beautiful 
which allows for knowledge, scientific on the one hand, theological on the other, 
devoid of proof 
Such an analogy would for Denys be an ikon of the greater truth of 
synaxis (Holy Eucharist): the ecclesiastical mystery of the 'drawing together' of 
all being into the beyond-being. 99 Science aims to discern empirical phenomena in 
terms of 'laws' of nature, a part to whole approach to understanding the natural 
world: theology aims to discern the beyond-being in terms of being, a part to 
whole, many-in-one approach to understanding the activities of the beyond-being. 
But neither science nor theology achieve their respective goals by means of this 
approach alone; being led by beauty both of them reckon with the presence of the 
Beautiful. The scientist asks 'What is beautiful in terms of natural phenomena?' 
and seeks to 'draw together' the truth of the natural world by means of discerning 
the laws of nature. The theologian asks 'What is Beautiful?' and seeks to 'draw 
together' all of being by means of discerning its presence in being (properly the 
theurgic work of the hierarchies). Denys' approach, it would seem, could well 
conceive of the former as a hierarchical level of theology; this is a suggestion 
however that is very far afield from anything that he himself ever actually 
addresses. 
98 cf. Ep. VIII, l97bff; DNII, 648a-b; HI, 68lc-684a;MTI, 1000 c-d; Louth Denys, 99-109. 
99 
cf. EHITI. 
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His notion of relational beauty, the dynamic beauty-beautiful process of 
participation, is still, however, more encompassing: that which is dissimilar too 
has a place in the part-whole relation, and it too is an image of the beyond-being. 
It can be assumed that a Heisenbergian experience of beauty could not have 
resulted from an experience devoid of particulars and unifYing principles that 
were not similar to one another. Not only are those closest hierarchically to the 
beyond-being beautiful beings, but those who are hierarchically even at the 
farthest remove from him are as wel1: 100 all being participates in this process of 
relational beauty. The hierarchical structure of being while leading ultimately to 
unknowing communion with the beyond-being is necessarily a graded structure in 
which those beings that are closer to the Source and End of the hierarchy bear a 
stronger resemblance to it, whereas those that are farther away are less similar: the 
degree to which being participates with beyond-being detennines the degree to 
which being is either more similar to the beyond-being or less so. Nevertheless, 
given the ikonic nature of being, whether more or less similar to that which it 
ikonifies, there follows no distinction or separation between being as similar to 
beyond-being and being as dissimilar to beyond-being in which the former 
participates in the process of relational beauty whereas the latter does not that 
which is similar as well as that which is dissimilar by virtue of being participates 
to some degree in the process of relational beauty, so that even that which is most 
unlike the beyond-being is a part of the whole and manifests the beauty-beyond-
being in so far as it is able. This notion of dissimilar-similarity is not one that is to 
be found overtly in positions such as Heisenberg's. Even if this is granted, Denys' 
position remains uniquely distinct in that it overtly treats this notion as a part of 
being that cannot be ignored; it does not arise by accident, but is established from 
the beginning. The process of relational beauty for Denys does not simply achieve 
a state of knowledge, but by means of the dissimilar-similarity ofbeing is called to 
praise that in which being is united, that which is manifested in and through 
100 
cf. DNIX, 913c-916a; CH l40d-l4lc. 
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being. 101 Praise, as has been noted, has an empirical dimension as well as a 
rational one, and is hierarchically ordered: the spoken word of the process of 
relational beauty is, therefore, the hierarchy -from nature to nous- of praise. 
An experience of the Heisenbergian sort, Einstein's GTR conviction for 
example, 102 might well result in scientific advance by way of proof that 
substantiates an experience of beauty. But the theologian however is called not 
simply to demonstrate beauty by proof but to become as a being a more distinct 
dissimilar-similar ikon of it: his is the work not ofproofbut of being praise (both 
in the adjectival as well as the verbal sense of the term). 103 
6. Excursus: Participation by Proof as Praise 
As the forgoing discussion might well imply, Denys is usually taken as a 
mystical theologian, and is, thus, interpreted and applied as such. It is commonly 
assumed that proof, therefore, has no place in his position. But does this follow? 
Denys seems at times to be opposed to it. For example, 'But we should 
remember that the focus of the discourse is not to show the beyond-being being as 
the beyond-being, for this is shameful and unlearned and completely not 'making-
known' -union transcends; but (the focus of our discourse is) to praise the being-
making procession of the thearchic being-source to all beings' (DN, 5, 1, 816b). 
Here he seems to be opposed to assuming that the whatness of the beyond-being 
can be treated in any sort of a conclusive manner. But the implication of his 
thought seems to be that proof would indeed have a role provided it itself was 
'being formed as much as possible to the Divine-likeness.' It would seem, 
therefore, that in so far as discourse is centered upon the procession of the 
differentiated activities of the beyond-being, then proof would have a place in 
Denys' position. Denys' work, however, is void of proofs; his treatment of the 
101 The image that Denys' position seems to conjure might well reflect his Neo-Platonic, rather than 
his first century roots. His is a position which seems tacitly to play with a musical paradigm so that 
the theological art of being and becoming part of the process of relational beauty seems very much 
like music-making: Denys' theological concern is being's harmonizing with the beyond-being. 
102 
see chapter Five. 
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problem of evil alone comes closest (DN, IV, 716aff). 104 It can only be hoped 
here, however, to formulate a few thoughts that would agree with Denys' theory 
of knowledge by looking at the nature of proof itself within some other contexts. 
Proof it seems is important within such a system not because of its deductive 
sufficiency, but because of its ikonic value. Though Denys himself might not have 
found any significant role for proof in his writings, his position, in my opinion, 
seems amenable, nevertheless, to demonstration. In Ep. IX, as was noted above, 
he explicitly refers to two types of theology: the symbolic and the demonstrative 
(1105c). Denys, it seems, at least clearly recognizes the need for proof. Here we 
shall look at two proofs, a rational (or a priori) one and an empirical (or a 
posteriori) one, namely Anselm's ontological argument and Paley's teleological 
argument, suggesting that if these 'proofs' are interpreted as examples of praise, 
in Denys' sense, then there would seem to be no incompatibility between his 
position and the usage of proof. 
We turn first to Anselm's ontological argument: 
(First reductio) 
Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding at 
least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he 
understands it. And whatever is understood exists in the understanding. And 
assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the 
understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it 
can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than 
which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the 
very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a 
103 On 'participation' in Marcel: cf. Joe McCown Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the 
Phenomenology of Human Openness (Scholars Press: 1978), 45. 
104 Anselm's 'argument' is two arguments, the first deriving from chapter two of the Proslogium, 
the second from chapter three. Cf. Proclus, op cit., Prop. 13(15). Cf. DN XIII 977b-977c. "He is 
perfect, not only because he is absolute perfection, both defining perfection in himself and because 
of his singular existence and total perfection, but also because he is far beyond being so" Italics 
mine. 
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greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no 
doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and 
it exists both in the understanding and in reality. 
(Second reductio) 
And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is 
possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is 
greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, ifthat, than which 
nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable 
contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be 
conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being 
thou art, 0 Lord, our God. 
Standardizing these arguments results in: (first reductio) (i) 'God' is conceivable. 
(ii) 'God' is coherent. (iii) 'God' does not exist in the mind alone. (iv) Assume that 
'God' exists in the mind alone. (v) If 'God' exists in the mind alone, then there is 
a greater mode of existence than that which is realized'by 'God'. (vi) Thus, 'God' 
is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. (vii) This premise (vi) is 
contradictory. (viii) Therefore, 'God' exists both in the mind and in reality; and 
(second reductio) (i) 'God' does not exist contingently. (ii) Assume that 'God' 
does exist contingently. (iii) If 'God' does exist contingently, then there is an 
Other upon whom 'God' depends for his existence. (iv) Thus, 'God' is not that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. (v) This premise (iv) is 
contradictory. (vi) Therefore, God exists necessarily. 105 St Anselm deductively 
shows that 'God' exists both in the mind (the term is coherent) and in reality (has 
a legitimate ontological status, i.e., he is something external to any mental reality), 
and also that he exists necessarily (i.e. he is not dependent on anything for his 
105 St. Anselm Proslogium in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, ed. Sidney N. Deane (Open Court, 1903), 
chs. 2-3, 145-47. ln symbolic notation: first reductio: (i) U (ii) C (iii) ;;;:2A (iv) A (assmp.) (v) R (i.e. 
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initial and/or continual existence). The argument(s) makes no sense if the term 
'God' remains unclear. His definition of 'God' (as a term) is that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived, which could be restated as follows: God is AP 
(absolutely peifect) with regard to both his mode of hyparxis and his attributes, 
i.e. he exists in the greatest conceivable modal state and enjoys the highest 
conceivable perfection of all his abilities. Ifthe term 'God' is defined in this way, 
then the conclusion that 'God' is a mental construct cannot follow; neither could it 
be that he is a contingent being. 106 This line of reasoning can be used to show as 
well that if God is an APB ('absolutely perfect being'), then he is so uniquely, i.e., 
he is the only one in the 'class' of APB 's. This can be done as follows. An APB 
would be AP in its existence, knowledge, goodness, power and productivity. 
Assume that there exist two APB 's: APB1 and APB2. On the basis of this 
assumption, then, it will be required by reason to affirm that the following identity 
statement holds true for these two APB 's: APB1 = APB2. The reason for this is 
simply that these two distinct and separate beings, if they are identical, cannot be 
distinct and separate from one another at all: they are identical. This type of 
argument could be made with any number of AP B 's; for no matter how many we 
;;2A) 0 (vi) A e ;;2A (vii) I 0 (vii) A 3 R second reductio: (i) ;;2T (ii) T (assmp.) (iii) N (i.e. ;;2T)O 
(iv) T e ;;2T (v) I 0 (vi) N. The italicized portions of the above text are mine. 
106 For criticisms to this argument, see, for example Norman Malcolm's "Anselm's Ontological 
Arguments" in Hick and McGill's The Many Faced Argument. Here, Malcolm calls into question 
the assumption which goes back at least to Descartes that 'existence' is a perfection, in contention 
with premise (v) of the first argument. His reflections are quite interesting, for example "The 
doctrine that existence is a perfection is remarkably queer. . .A king might desire that his next 
chancellor should have knowledge, wit and resolution; but it is ludicrous to add that the king's 
desire is to have a chancellor that exists. Suppose that two royal counselors, A and B, were asked to 
draw up separately descriptions of the most perfect chancellor they could conceive, and that the 
descriptions they produced were identical except that A included existence in his list of attributes of 
a perfect chancellor and B did not. One and the same person could satisfY both descriptions. More 
to the point, any person who satisfied A's description would necessarily satisfY B's description, and 
vice versa!" This point seems to hold going from A's description to B's. But moving in the opposite 
direction, what ifB no longer exists, that is what ifhe is dead? See also C. Hartshorne's "What Did 
Anselm Discover" in the same volume. Alvin Plantinga's well known treatment of this argument 
also demands mention: "The Ontological Argument", The Analytic Theist, ed. James F. Sennett 
(Eerdmans, Grand Rapids: 1998). And lastly, Immanuel Kant's objection is to be found in his 
Critique of Pure Reason Pt.2.2, bk.2.3.4. See also my chapter Four. 
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posit, it turns out to be the case that reason requires an ontological equality. Thus, 
there can exist exactly one APB. 
Whether or not this argument is successful as a deductive proof, however, 
does not concern the value of the argument, according to Dionysian thought, 
insofar as it praises 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' 
What of praise by empirical induction? Paley's teleological argument and 
Hume's criticisms may serve well. Paley's argument proceeds as follows: 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked 
how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew 
to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to 
shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the 
ground, and it should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I 
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I 
knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer 
serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the 
second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we 
come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) 
that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are 
so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to 
point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts had been differently shaped 
from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after in any 
other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no 
motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would 
have answered the use that is now served by it. . .[E]very indication of 
contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in 
the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater 
and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the 
contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtility 
[sic.], and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go 
beyond them in number and variety: yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less 
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evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently 
accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect 
productions of human ingenuity. 107 
For the argument to work in terms of providing grotmds for believing that there is 
a Cosmic Designer, the analogy must establish links both between each 
teleological system as well as between each teleological system's designer. The 
argument is quite simple, consisting of three premises only and a main conclusion: 
(i) The cosmos is similar to a watch. (ii) Both exhibit signs of having been 
designed. (iii) The watch has been designed. (iv) Thus, it is probable that the 
cosmos has been designed. This argument is of interest because it is an analogy 
which speaks of the Cause through the caused. The analogy is stimulated by the 
purposeful means-end adaptation that, on the one hand, the watch exhibits in 
telling time, and that, on the other hand, the cosmos exhibits, in a limited sense, in 
such instances as the seeing of the eye, and more broadly in its means-end 
adaptation as a whole. There are, obviously, two essential parts, or analogs, to this 
analogy: the watch-cosmos and the watchmaker-cosmosmaker. A crucial point of 
critical attack concerns the watchmaker and cosmosmaker. This part of the 
analogy expresses analogical similarities and dissimilarities between the human 
being and the beyond being. In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
Hume has 'Philo' as the theistic critic against 'Cleanthes' the classical theist. Philo 
sees that if such an argument is to have any strength at all, then the analogical 
relationship between the attributes and existence of watch-designers and the 
attributes and existence of a cosmos-designer (conceived of in the classical 
theistic sense) must be a similar one. 108 If such a relationship can be well 
107 William Paley Natural Theology (Ibis: 1986), ch. 1-3. 
108 It will be remembered that Philo is actually responding to Cleanthes' teleological argument 
which is of a slightly different ilk. A standardization of that argument would be as follows: (i) 
Machines are created by means of intelligent design. (ii) The cosmos is machine-like. D (iii) The 
cosmos was probably produced by intelligent design. The primary difference in the two arguments 
resides in the fact that Paley employs a watch, whereas Cleanthes employs the notion of machines. 
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established on inductive grounds, then the argument is successful (inductively 
speaking, i.e., it does not prove the existence of a cosmos-maker, but provides 
some probability, though it might not be a high degree thereof, for such a belief). 
The following text centers criticism around the principle 'like effects prove like 
causes.' 
But to show you still more inconveniences, continued Philo, in your 
Anthropomorphisms, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like e./frets 
prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, you say too, is the 
sole theological argument. Now it is certain, that the liker the effects are which 
are seen, and the liker the causes which are inferred, the stronger the argument. 
Every departure on either side diminishes the probability, and renders the 
experiment less conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you 
reject its consequences ... Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and 
triumph, mark the consequences. First, by this method of reasoning, you 
renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause 
ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under 
cognizance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions that 
attribute to the divine? . .Secondly, you have no reason, on your theory, for 
ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his capacity, or for supposing him free 
from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. . .At least, you 
must acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, 
whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, 
if compared to other possible, and even real systems .. .And what shadows of an 
argument can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? 
A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in 
framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and 
framing a world? ... But farther, Cleanthes: Men are mortal, and renew their 
species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great 
The mechanical component remains the same, one emphasizing the point initially at a specific level, 
the other at a general level. 
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sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the world. Why must this 
circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and 
limited deities? Behold, then, the theogeny of ancient times brought back upon 
us ... And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity 
or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c? 109 
First of all, a watch is made (usually) by many watch-makers, each presumably 
specializing in a certain aspect or aspects of the design process. Furthermore, 
watch-makers are contingent entities, i.e. a watch-maker begins to exist at one 
point or another, and at some later time will cease to exist. By implication from 
these two points, a watch-maker(s) is relatively perfect at least in terms of 
knowledge and existence, and it is safe to assume the same in an ethical sense as 
well. Watch-makers also are dependent upon a certain set of materials for their 
creative activities; a watch-maker creates from stuff, but he/she does not also 
create the stuff. It is also the case that watch-makers are corporeal, and are, 
therefore, subject to all kinds of corporeal needs and weaknesses, not the least of 
which would be his/her limitation in terms of spatial location. These are at least 
some of the more important dissimilarities or disanalogies that for Hume create 
huge problems with this type of analogy. For God is not a multiplicity but a Unity, 
not contingent, but necessary, not relatively, but absolutely perfect; furthermore, 
God does not create ex hulas, as it were, but ex nihilo, and is neither corporeal nor 
merely knowledgeable and skillful, but incorporeal, omnipotent, omniscient and 
omnipresent. A Humean style counter-argument, then, working from a classical 
notion of God, proceeds to show that a cosmos-designer is not at all analogous 
with a common notion of a watch-designer. 
Though he would accept Hume's ultimate point that the analogs 
cosmosmaker and watchmaker are not as similar as the argument might at face 
109 cf David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hackett: 1980). My treatment of his 
criticisms closely resembles his presentation, but I insert creatio ex hulas where Hume's intent is to 
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value imply, Denys' position suggests that these differences do not provide 
evidence against analogical predication. The linguistic incapacity of language to 
accurately analogize would only serve to emphasize the limits of language. For 
what these disanalogies show is not that the classical notion is erroneous (which is 
not what Hume has shown either, nor even, necessarily, what Denys would 
ultimately want to affinn), but that it is incomplete. The analogy is not weak, 
according to Dionysian thought; it is ikonic. Pragmatics takes precedence for 
Denys: the fact that such an analogy might not accurately map the beyond-being 
only shows that the beyond-being cannot be so mapped, not that there is no 
beyond-being. Analogy, therefore, seems to be used to show in an inverted sense 
that which cannot be analogized directly. Its semantic value is somehow hidden in 
its pragmatic value. 
Insofar as being is ikonic, then proof would seem to be quite comfortably 
received by Denys' position, and in both of these arguments this is the case. From 
a Dionysian perspective, rational being ikonifies the nature of the beyond-being, 
for Anselm, and empirical being does so for Paley. Each argument speaks the 
beyond-being by means of praising that which is hidden (the beyond-being) within 
that which is known (being). Thus, although Denys himself may not address the 
issue of proof, his position, nevertheless, seems to be amenable to it. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued, ftmdamentally, three things. First of all, I 
have argued that knowledge, for Denys, is participation in the process of 
relational beauty. Secondly, I have argued that language usage is praise. Both of 
these points are hierarchically conceived, for Denys, the basic structure of which, 
as opposed to the specific structures of the ecclesiastical and celestial hierarchies, 
is his distinction between the rational and the empirical. Furthermore, I have 
argued that 'proof is not incompatible with Denys' position if it is interpreted in 
point out the problem in terms of creatio ex Deo. Since our discussion centers around a 'watch,· 
however, the creatio ex hulas point seems more appropriate. 
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terms of his notions of 'ikon' and 'praise'. Let us turn now to Denys' notions of 
'unknowing' and 'apophasis'. 
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1 . Unknowing 
But it is necessary to inquire into this: how do we know (ytvdJaxopcv) God [who is] 
neither a rational thing nor an empirical thing, nor some being of the general [class] 
of beings? Thus it is perhaps tme to say that we know God not from his nature, for he 
is unknown and above all logic and mind, but from the order of all being, as certain 
ikons and likenesses of his divine paradigms having been presented by him, moving 
into the beyond all things by means of a method and order, according to ability: 
a'lcending hy means of the denial and transcendence of all things, and hy means of the 
Cause of all things. God is perceived as both in all things, and apart from all things: 
God is perceived both by means of knowing and unknowing. And of him there is 
reason, logic, science, empirical awareness, perception, opinion, display, name and 
other things; yet he is neither discerned nor spoken nor named. He is not a certain 
being; neither is he known in a certain being. He is 'all in all' and nothing in nothing: 
from all things he is known to all things and from nothing he is known to no one. For 
we speak about God tmly praising him from all being according to the analogy of 
being for he is the Cause of being. And again the most divine knowledge (yvwal{;') of 
God is perceived by means of unknowing according to a union beyond mind when the 
mind is withdrawn from all being, and having been set free itself, is then united with 
the brightness beyond light, being enlightened then and there by the unsearchable 
abundance ofwisdom (DNVII, 3, 869c-872b). 1 
The q:>vat,('natme') of the beyond-being is not spoken of in the same sense as the 
nature of humans, or animals, i.e. it is not spoken of as a being. The question is 
then 'how do we know something that is unknowable?' The nature of the beyond-
being is something that is other than being and cannot be known as being is 
known. The beyond-being is perceived, according to Denys, by means of rational 
and empirical ikons, by means of their denial, and by means of its leading the 
knower up beyond knowing to itself as that which being requires. Dy means of the 
analogy of being the beyond-being is known by being; by means of knowing the 
beyond-being, being knows that the beyond-being cannot be known; by means of 
Unknowing, Being and Ikon: Apophasis in Denys' Epistemology 
knowing that the beyond-being cannot be known, the knower opens himself 
humbly to the nature of the beyond-being, and to unknowing. 
What is this 'unknowing'? 'For unknowing ( ayvaJO"fa) of the beyond 
beingness ( v:rt:povm6nrror;)', Denys maintains, 'is beyond logic, mind and 
being; by it one necessatily refers to a science beyond-being' (DN 588a)_2 
'Unknowing': science beyond-being. Denys' MT is devoted to this topic entirely, 
and, interestingly, is his only treatise commencing with prayer: 3 
Trinity beyond being, beyond god, beyond goodness; guide of Christians in 
divine wisdom. Lead us up beyond unknowing, beyond light to the most extreme 
summit of the mysteries of scripture4: there the mysteries of theology are simple, 
undivided and unchangeable according to the splendid darkness having been 
veiled by the hidden silence among the darkness, shining the supreme light 
exceedingly brightly; and among the altogether insipid and unseen, they 
abundantly fill sightless minds with beauty beyond beauty~ (MT I 997 a-997b ). 
The defining characteristic of 'unknowing' centers on being's existential need to 
move outside of itself and into the beyond-being. Yet this 'seeking' on the part of 
being is not one-sided: the beyond-being 'leads.' Being's recognition of its need 
to be led, of the actuality of its being led, blends the grace of the beyond-being 
with the knowledge of being: the result is unknowing. In seeking to get beyond 
itself, being seeks the interior nature of being, no longer the exterior appearance of 
being: the inner nature of being as the erotic and creative presence of the beyond-
being and the essential union of all distinctions. Unknowing realizes the utter 
transcendence in the immanence of the beyond-being, and the unavoidable 
mystery of affirmative and negative predication: whether descending by means of 
kataphasis into the immanent presence of the beyond-being or ascending by 
means of apophasis into the transcendent presence of the beyond-being, 
1 cf. CHII; and Louth Origins, 167-8. Golitzin Et Introibo, 105-108. 
2 
cf. CHII. 
3 cf. DN 680b-680d; EH III, 428c. This is odd because he has suggested it elsewhere, but never 
actually done it. See Rorem Commentary, 184-5. 
4 nVliJlVaTtxmv .MJyfwv. 'mystical words', 'mystical oracles', 'sayings with hidden meanings'. 
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knowledge meets its limit in being, yet is led beyond mind, matter and language, 
beyond the mystery of logic, to a celebrative silence of the beyond-being. The 
mystery of theology, of God-logic, is veiled by this reality of the beyond-being 
wearing no longer the garb of being: being is man's theology tutor, for it is within 
the mystery of -beings' participation with and praise of the beyond-being- that the 
hidden mysteries of theology are to be fmmd.6 
Ep. I to Gaius speaks to this issue from an epistemological perspective: 
The unseen darkness is with the light, even more so with more light: knowledge 
hides the unknowing, even more so with more knowledge. These things are 
transcendent, not according to privation, but in a way which is beyond-truth; for 
the unknowing concerning God eludes the ones having being, light and 
knowledge of being. And being beyond, his darkness is covered with light, 
hidden in all knowledge. And if having colT).e together some one sees God, the 
one having seen him has not really seen him, but knows some being of his: he 
himself is beyond being firmly established, beyond mind and being. In general, 
with him there is no knowing and no being; he is beyond-being, known beyond 
mind. And the unknowing according to the greater whole is knowledge of the one 
beyond all things being known (I065a-1065b). 7 
Denys seems to speak of unknowing as knowledge which knows what it itself is: 
knowledge is of being and in being, which is ikonic of the beyond-being, and is 
therefore neither strictly of and in being (because ofbeing's ikonic nature) nor is it 
5 Tmll v:rcpxaJwv QyAaiwv 
6 Denys turns from addressing God to addressing Ttpo8EX, presumably the Timothy of the New 
Testament From this point forward, the treatise has the feel of being a theological synopsis which 
might have been composed particularly for the purpose of instructing a younger and less spiritually 
erudite disciple, though the inscription tp the work seems to have been something like Awvvafov 
'Apl:onayfrov tm(7)(6Jrov 'A817vtiJV Jr~ Ttp68mv brfaxrmov 'ErptamJ, which suggests a 
hierarchical equality (Heil and Ritter CD II, 141, critical apparatus). Nevertheless, the treatise 
seems to be dedicated to the task of explicating, as much as possible, his understanding of the work 
oftheology, primarily in terms ofepistemic and linguistic advice. 
7 cf. Rorem, op cit., 7-8. "On the one hand, this kind of verbal gymnastics, like oxymorons and 
multiple negatives, seems designed to stretch one's language and thought, and sometime to hinder 
and to still the natural conceptual process. On the other hand, the author does work with a coherent 
and comprehensive view of knowledge that can embrace and reconcile these apparent 
contradictions" (R) 
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completely devoid of ambiguity. The darkness of unknowing is within knowing as 
the soul of knowledge, as it were; the beyond-being is all in all. Thus he is known 
in what he is not -in being as beyond-being, in knowledge as beyond-knowledge; 
and, therefore, the nature of being and knowledge is essentially ambiguous being 
part affinnation and part negation. 
Ep. V treats this as well, referring to the manner in which Paul knew God 
unknowingly: 
being truly among that which is beyond sight and knowledge, kno\Ning this alone: 
that he is after (meta) all things empirical and rational. . .in this manner it is said 
that the Divine Paul knew God, knowing him beyond all being, thought and 
knowledge ... because having found the one beyond all he knew this beyond 
mind· that being the Cause of all things he is beyond all things (1 071a-1 07fia)8 
Denys very clearly presents unknowing as fullness: unknowing is not an epistemic 
void, but the ultimate height of knowing culminating in the assertion that God as 
Cause is beyond all that he causes. Unknowing is not 'release' from the process of 
knowing but the end result of knowing being as the ikon of the beyond-being, of 
the process of relational beauty. 
Continuing with the MT, Denys begins instructing Timothy on achieving 
this result: 
On the one hand I pray these things for me; but you on the other hand, Timothy 
my friend, forsake both the empirical and the rational activities by means of an 
earnest study concerning these mysterious sights,9 everything empirical and 
rational, and all non-being as well as all being. Regarding the union, unknowingly 
raise10 (yourself) as much as possible, to the one beyond all being and knowledge: 
you will be uplifted11 from yourself and from all things by means of an 
irrepressible and insipid utter astonishment regarding the beyond-being of the 
8 Rorem, op cit., 11. 
9 Tclf a/afhjm:u;, Tclf YO£~ tw:pyd<4 
10 avarci81]Tl 
11 al'ax(hjan 
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divine in splendid darkness, 12 having pardoned all things and been freed from all 
things .. .It is proper to reckon 13 and to affirm all being against It, having affirmed 
lt14 as Cause of all things; but it is even more valid, to negate all these, as [the] 
beyond-being against all things; not supposing that the affirmations are in 
contradiction with 15 the negations, but [being] much prior, the Cause of all is 
beyond privations, beyond all negations and beyond all affirmations (MT I. I, 
997b-l OOOa). 16 
Denys' prayer requests that the Trinity lead 'us' to the mystery of the scriptures, 
then he advises Timothy on the method of doing so: unknowing is achieved, so it 
seems, both through grace and through grit, the result of a synergistic process 
entirely at odds with any notion of logic. Denys emphasizes two notions: 
'forsaking' and 'raising'. 
:4Jr6Al:t.7Tl' ('forsake') seems to be used so that the tension between the 
need to forsake and the impossibility of forsaking is not at all veiled. There is an 
existential angst that must be accompanied by faith. Yet the image that Denys 
intends to carve with tllis tenn might be of a dying man who is by means of his 
death leaving llis possessions to someone else. Rather than implying 
irresponsibility as though the man were forsaking his family contemptuously or 
out of greed, it would imply a sober responsibility: 'Put yourself in order Timothy, 
as a man who must put llis household in order before Ius death.' It is as though 
Denys sees this as something that needs to be done, but done well and responsibly. 
'Forsake': not to deny the nature of being as though it were mere illusion, but to 
participate properly and more fully with the beyond-being who is revealed in and 
tlrrough it as an archetype in its ikon. 'Forsake': not to earn favor with t11e beyond-
being, but to more fully accept tl1e gifting of the beyond-being itself in and 
tlrrough being. Just as one must die in a spatio-temporal manner to live 
everlastingly, so too one must 'die' in a rational and empirical manner to 
12 axorovr d:lcrfva 
13 rt6tvm: elsewhere this is taken as 'to establish.' 
14 etaa(; 
15 avrtxnptv(l{; 
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unknowingly-know the beyond-being: Denys' ecstasy seems intentionally to be an 
ikon of death, 'death' to knowledge. This dying to knowledge seems to be what 
Denys conceives of as 'raising,' avarafJrrn These seem to be one action, of 
which the forsaking is the apophatic aspect of the action, and the raising is the 
kataphatic. Both aspects of tllis action are required because of tl1e ik01lic nature of 
being. 'Forsake' because of ikon. 'Raise' because of ikon. Being-as-ikon is 
concerned with tllis existential tension, not with whether or not language when it 
speaks of ikon is speaking univocally or equivocally because an ikon as a symbol 
which reveals in part tl1at from wllich it issues as an effect cannot contradict 
another ikon because neither can be utterly univocal nor equivocal: this could only 
be tl1e case either if at least one of them contained completely the whole of the 
Cause of which they are both effects or if at least one of them was completely 
devoid of it. The notion of being as ikon disallows both suppositions, and since 
ikon is posterior as effect of the beyond-being-Cause-of-being, then the Cause 
itself is anterior to the logic of being, and therefore anterior to contradiction. It 
follows then that it must not be assumed that negations are in contradiction to the 
affinnations wllich they deny; for the subject is not a being, nor therefore is it 
something that can be known: the beyond-being is unknowingly perceived by 
means of knowing, and so is hymned in ignorance (unknowing). 
1.1. Being-as-ikon and Logical Contradiction 
In De Intelpretatione, Aristotle presents an argument tl1at might be seen as 
taking to task such an approach. 17 But llis is a propositional approach that is 
concerned with what propositions state: propositions that are contradictory, 
therefore, state nothing. Denys, however, sees the issue in terms of being-as-ikon, 
rather than strictly in terms of propositions, i.e. for Denys affirmations and 
negations are not propositionally contradictory, but rather ikonically 
complimentary utterances, as it were, wllich 'state' the beyond-being by means 
speaking it in praise. An utterance which 'states' the beyond-being, for Denys, is, 
16 cf. Rorem, op cit., 185-6; Rorem and Lamoreaux, SchMf, 417.2, 243; Louth, Origins, 175 (as 
regards 'ecstasy'). 
17 
cf. Luibheid and Rorem, 136, note 6. 
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therefore, revelatory, rather than propositional: as ikon, it reveals the mystery of 
the beyond-being. For Aristotle, kataphasis and apophasis are contradictory. 
Assuming, for example, that A is a kataphatic proposition and -A is an apophatic 
proposition, Aristotle posits that these two propositions are opposites of one 
another, i.e. both of tl1em cannot logically hold: one is logically true, the other is 
logically false. Depending on the subject of the propositions, time might well be 
crucial, but for propositions having to do with logical relations, which are not at 
all dependent on time, such as '1 + 1 = 2', time is inconsequential. If the concern 
is the location of a cardinal at time t 1 and t 2, we might well derive propositions 
such as A and -A, each proposition being equally true without contradiction. This, 
however, is not Aristotle's concern. A and -A each have an identical subject and 
predicate and are logically, not temporally, incompatible. Hence, such statements 
would be contradictory just in case they are simultaneous, i.e. A · -A at t, here 
now. Take 'Andromeda' as subject and 'our closest galactic neighbor' as 
predicate. Either it is the case that Andromeda is our closest galactic neighbor, or 
it is not. Let A be the affirmative of these two propositions, and -A the negative. If 
both A and -A are maintained, then the conclusion A · -A is unintelligible, and 
therefore meaningless; it amounts to nothing more than sophistry. Thus, together 
with the principles of reason, the law of excluded middle and the law of non-
contradiction, it is maintained that one statement rises to the level of bearing tl1e 
truth-value 'true', and that the other, therefore, by default, bears tl1e trutl1-value 
'false': '-(A · -A)' (law of non-contradiction), and 'A v -A' (law of excluded 
middle). Proper thought and speech hinge, therefore, on these two principles, for 
Aristotle. 
Denys' position seems to suggest that such adherence to these laws 
misrepresents the nature ofbeing-as-ikon. 'Forsake': neither to deny nor to affirm, 
but to praise the beyond-being by means of being. Aristotle's is a position that is 
thoroughly in and of being, seeing no need to get beyond being: his is not an 
ikonic theory of being, knowledge and language. The method that Denys is 
sharing with Timothy is one that demands a redefining of the parameters of reason 
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and experience and a high degree of epistemic vulnerability, a methodological 
element which has no place in Aristotle's system. 
[I]t is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every 
denial an opposite affirmation. We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of 
contradictories Those positive and negative propositions are said to be 
contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject 
and predicate must not be equivocal. 18 
The proximity of Andromeda to our galactic neighborhood cannot be both nearest 
and not-nearest. It is senseless to affinn an equivocal identity between the subject, 
'Andromeda', and the predicate, 'closest galactic neighbor.' With this much 
Denys would most likely agree: but there is an essential difference between being 
and the beyond-being-Cause-of-being, not that the former is subject to the laws of 
logic whereas the latter is not, but that contradiction can only have a place in 
being; for since being is consequent to the Cause of being, which transcends the 
logic of being, then the notion of contradiction, relative only to being, inherently 
misrepresents the nature of being-as-ikon-of-beyond-being and is in this manner 
applied to the beyond-being. Negation is not simply the opposite of affinnation 
for Denys, it is the result; the ikonic nature of being requires both the affinnation 
of the beyond-being according to being as well as the negation of the beyond-
being according to being. 19 As the beyond-being is inseparably related to being, so 
too is unknowing inseparable from knowing; and the contrary is true as well: as 
being is inseparably related to the beyond-being, so too is knowing inseparable 
from unknowing, a sort of Dionysian principle of inseparability. 
The Uflknowing aspect of Denys' theory ofknowledge being quite distinct 
from the former, discursive approach, which employs all the faculties of sense 
awareness and reason, is decidedly non-discursive. But this difference in fonn 
only accentuates their functional similarity. The manner in which being is dealt 
with has a direct result on the mrumer in which the beyond-being is dealt with: 
18 Aristotle De Interpretatione 17a (31-36). 
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without discursive participation in the downward procession, non-discursive 
participation in the upward return would be impossible. And, vise versa: without 
the· possibility of upward participation, the notion of downward participation 
would be meaningless. The manner in which being relates to beyond-being as 
transcendent is dependent upon the way that being relates to it as immanent (i.e., 
in and through being-as-ikon of the beyond-being). Likewise, the manner in which 
being relates to beyond-being as immanent is dependent upon the way that being 
relates to it as transcendent. The discursive pursuit of the beyond-being thus 
continues, according to Denys' non-Aristotlian form of 'logic', non-discursively. 
For example, by means of rational analysis the conclusion that the 
predicate 'cause' is applicable to the subject 'God' can be determined because 
causation terminology is used kataphatically to convey statements about causes 
and effects. Given certain circumstances, eg., empirical analysis can lead to the 
conclusion that wind causes a tree's leaves to fall. Thus, it might be said 'The 
wind is the cause of falling leaves.' But when speaking ofthe beyond-being as the 
Cause of all being, the predicate is applied differently. Both wind and trees exist 
spatia-temporally, and are themselves spatio-temporal. Denys assumes t11at the 
beyond-being is not spatio-temporal and that being is. The predicate 'cause' as 
applied to the beyond-being can be applied only in an analogical sense: 'God is 
the Cause of all things' has meaning because it is known what it means for 
something to cause something else; yet it has meaning unknowingly because it is 
not known the manner in which the beyond-being is Cause of being. Getting 
beyond statements such as 'God is the cause of all things' requires an unknowing 
move that translates into something like this: 'God is not the cause of all things in 
the way that the wind is the cause of a tree's leaves falling.' Unknowing is tl1e 
result of having been led by perception and reason to the beyond-being. The 
journey of getting beyond these things epistemically is one which progresses 
linguistically by means of apophasis, and there are two parts of the apophatic 
process: (i) empirical apophasis, and (ii) rational apophasis. 
19 cf Rorem, op cit, 188. 
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2. Apophasis 
Whatever becomes known by means of sense-awareness and reason is 
spoken of kataphatically, and according to the method of unknowing such 
statements are apophasized, 20 a process which is illustrated in MT by reference to 
Moses' Sinaitic ascent. 
The divine Moses is commanded first to purify himself and to be separated from 
the ones who are not purified. And after every purification, he hears the 
polyphony oftmmpets, he sees many pure lights flashing and many-flowing rays. 
He is then separated from the many; and with the chosen holy ones he arrives at 
the summit of divine ascents: and in these he does not come to God himself, but 
contemplates not him (for he is unseen), but the place where he is. (But this I 
believe shows that the most divine and highest of the things being seen and 
discerned are certain hypothetical expressions21 about the things which have been 
substituted for the one beyond all things. And through these his presence is 
shown beyond all thought, having taken his stand upon the perceptible heights of 
his most holy places). And then he is set free from the ones seeing and from the 
things being seen and slips into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing, 
according to which he shuts away all known objections, becoming invisible in the 
altogether unseen, beyond every being of all things. And he is nothing, neither 
himself nor the other, uniting himself entirely by the unknowing inactivity of all 
knowing according to that which is more excellent to perceive: knowing beyond 
mind (MTI, 1000c-1001a)?2 
20 E.g., assume that 'nine-ness' is a metaphysical entity, meaning that it might well be an object of 
either perception, conception or both, but that it is neither merely empirical nor merely rational. 
'Nine-ness', then, could be spoken of in a perceptually kataphatic manner as follows: 'There are 
seven loaves and two fishes.' This is a particular instantiation of 'nine-ness', assuming elementary 
arithmetical skills of addition. Using this example, one could further assert that '7 + 2 = 9', which 
itself is an abstraction of the mathematical qualities of the first statement; thus making this latter 
statement by nature conceptually kataphatic. The next step requires a belief in something like 
Plato's ideas, in which case a statement like this would be accurate: '9 is not nine-ness.' What has 
happened here? Having begun with a perception, the perceptually kataphatic statement is 
apophasized, resulting in a kataphatically conceptual statement 
2 cf Andia, op cit., 344-48: 'les raisons hypothetiques' for Myot vno8ntxof 
22 cf. Rorern, op cit., 189-92; Louth, Origins, 173-4, Denys, I 00-0 I; Rorem and Lamoreaux, 
SchMT, 421.1, 244; AndiaHenosis, 341-54. 
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Moses' ascent accents three existential elements of unknowing, forming together 
an epistemic ethic of unknowing, as it were: purification, illumination and union?3 
Moses forsakes all things empirical, then all things rational and finally entrusts 
himself to union with the beyond-being: first empirical apophasis, then rational 
apophasis, then the union of unknowing. The paradigm that Denys is workit1g 
with is an obviously hierarchical one. Moses, 'purifies himself of the empirical 
elements of worship: i.e. by means of them he goes into them to contemplate the 
One who dwells within them, and so is united with the beyond-being. The process 
of achieving unknowing is a synergistic one because being and knowing are 
essentially relational and communicative processes. Moses rises to the level of 
unknowing; he is not, however, passively translated to these spiritual heights, but 
chooses both to begin and to continue the ascent, being in no way compelled to do 
so. It must be assumed though that such an unknowing height has its trough as 
well: for Moses indeed does descend from his experience, back into the rational 
and the empirical. Theology, for St. Denys, is not a 'head-game' only, or as 
Lossky puts it, it is "not simply a question of a process of dialectic,"24 but a way 
of life, a way of leading one's life. If Denys' theory remained solely concentrated 
on knowing God, then theology could be rightly described in this manner, but 
with his emphasis on unknowing union it cannot. His is a notion of theology 
which sees the process of participating with the beyond-being as being a 
fundamentally existential process: tl1e purpose of theology is union with God. 
Thus, Moses does not merely think on the things of God, but gives himself over 
totally to him: his ascent is not a thought experiment in which he ascends only in a 
mental capacity, via abductive, inductive, deductive argumentation, symbolic 
notation et alia, but one in which he fully participates: he (the person 'Moses') 
makes the ascent. Denys' theory ofknowledge is not one that allows knowledge to 
23 
cf. "Moses as the Paradigm for the Liturgical Spirituality ofPseudo-Dionysius" Studia 
Patristica 18.2 (Peeters: 1989), 275-79; and J. Danielou "Morse: Example et figure chez Gn!gorie 
de Nysse" Cahiers sioniens 8 (1964), 262-82. 
24 V. Lossk.-y 111eMysttcal111eology of the Eastern Church (New York, SVS: 1976), 27. 
57 
Unknowing, Being and Ikon: Apophasis in Denys' Epistemology 
be an end in itself, therefore. It is a means to an end: the end of becoming 'a 
partaker ofthe divine nature.'25 
2.1. 'Sculptor' Analogy 
A ve:ry apt analogy which Denys uses in chapter two of MT characterizes 
this point well. If we could be like Moses, the analogy suggests, then we would be 
'just as the ones creating a statue of natural things, removing everything that is an 
obstruction to the true sight of that which is hidden, and revealing tllis hldden 
beauty by means ofnegation alone' (MTII, 1025b).26 The idea seems evidently to 
be of a sculptor creating a sculpture; but although the analogy nlight seem to work 
best by taking it in this sense, it is no less effective, albeit not as explicit, if taken 
to refer to the creative process in general. 27 Its chief import lies in its emphasis 
upon apophasis as a necessary methodological aspect of the creation process. 
Denys' prima:ry interest is in a 'theological' creativity, rather than some artistic or 
scientific form, but his theo:ry seems to recognize these other forms to be ikons of 
the theological: they would tell the same sto:ry of negation. 
The question arises then as to what it is that Denys is referring to in terms 
of a medium of theological creation? The sculptor uses marble, metal or some 
such material; the painter, paints; the writer, words; the musician, music; the 
scientist, nature (Einstein used nature in terms of light, gravity, time, et cetera)?8 
Denys' take on the process of apophasis in terms of theological creativity would 
indeed differ from these other modes in at least one important manner. His is an 
apophatic creative process that does not create something which is at all external 
to the creator: the analogy cannot be pressed so far as to imply that theological 
creation as creation in any other sense produces that which has been 
mentally/emotionally conceived. In a sense, tl1eological creativity does not 
produce anything: it does not realize a final product. For the theologian's subject 
is God, and if he is to faithfully represent this subject, then he cannot represent it 
25 II Pt. 1.14. 
26 cf. Rorem, op cit., 193-4; Louth Denys, 106-07, Origins, 174 (in both places Louth refers to 
Plotinus' usage ofthis analogy in Enneads 1.6.9). See also Plotinus The Enneads 1.6.9. and 
Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Moses. 
27 Luibheid makes this clear in his trans., taking ;rowfJVTE{;as 'sculpting.' 
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at all; to do so as does a poet or a musician is not to produce a creative 
masterpiece but to produce an idol.29 Denys emphatically does not mean for the 
analogy to convey the meaning that the theologian would be sculpting the beyond-
being. The sculptor, the scientist, the poet, the musician, the painter each creates 
the thing of which it is his/her occupation's purpose to produce -a sculpture, a 
physical law, a poem, a piece of music, a painting- each revealing a beauty that 
prior to the creative process was hidden, which is indeed the purpose of the 
theologian as well. That which is revealed by the artist, scientist, poet, musician, 
painter however is empirical and rational (at least partially so), while that which is 
revealed by the theologian is utterly beyond being either empirical or rational: it is 
beyond-being. The theologian (Moses e.g.) doesn't have anything to show for his 
labors: Moses doesn't descend Mt. Sinai with a fine representation of the One 
whose back he has just seen, as the sculptor, the scientist, the poet, the musician or 
the painter might do after having an 'inspirational moment'. Beauty in these latter 
instances is mediate-able through material, language and mathematics. But beauty 
in the theological sense, however, the beauty with which Moses met on the 
mountain, is not at all mediate-able through material, language and reason: no 
matter what Moses is ever able to write, draw, paint, compose or calculate with 
regard to his experience of beauty none of it will ever capture the fullness of the 
beauty of the beyond-being in toto, as a sculpture might well be said to have 
captured the beauty of an ox pulling a plow, a child kissing her mother, or as a 
scientist might well be said to discern the beauty of gravity or electromagnetism, 
or other such things with the poet, the painter, the musician and other 'creators.' 
For Moses has met not with a certain aspect of the process of relational beauty, 
but with the source and end of the process itself. His is a dilemma that is not so 
confounding as it is awe inspiring: he is to become synergistically a pure, 
illumined and united ikon of the infinite presence of the process of relational 
beauty. The scientists' worth, or that of the painter, the sculptor, the poet or the 
28 See chapter 3. 
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musician, is measured by that which he creates; a theologian's, however, is 
measured by that whom he is becoming (in terms of growing into the likeness of 
the beyond-being). 
With what does this 'removal' take place? The theologian's task is to 
remove himself as that which obstructs the view of the beyond-being, and in doing 
so he synergistically creates his true self. The primary tools of the sculpting trade, 
or those of painting, making poems, being a scientist or painter, are not difficult to 
discern. For example: Michelangelo used a chisel to reveal his La Pieta; Einstein 
used Riemannian geometry, the Ricci tensor, Newton's gravitational constant and 
more to sculpt the general theory of relativity; Joyce used words, acute 
observation, reason to write his Dubliners. For Denys the tools that the theologian 
uses are language (synthetic and analytic judgments) and knowledge (a priori and 
a posteriori). Like the sculptor's chisel or the scientist's blackboard, however, 
language and knowledge are dispensable for the theologian. But, like the chisel 
and the blackboard (or whatever -a chip of bone and the sand on the ground), 
language and knowledge are likewise necessary. In each case the work for which 
these tools are employed is apophatic: each specialist uses the tools of his trade to 
deny in order to reveal affirmatively that beauty which is hidden. 
2.2. God-logic {8t:oAoyfa): Theological Creation 
Apophatic truth and synergism, 30 are crucial aspects in Denys' notion of 
theological creation. The synergistic element emphasizing relational response 
ethically colors his epistemology, both in terms ofthe way that he views the work 
of theology as well as in terms of the way that he views the ontological movement 
of theology. 
Denys illustrates with Moses that the focus of his theory of knowledge is 
not on knowing about the beyond-being, but on freely becoming a partaker of it: 
participating both by knowing and by unknowing. The analogy illustrates this, but 
29 Marion's work is indispensable on this point. See Dieu sans l'etre and L 'idole et la distance 
(esp. 139-95 of the latter). Both are available in translation (trans. Thomas A. Carlson), from 
Chicago and Fordham, respectively. 
3° Concerning this notion of working with God, see CH III, 2, I 65b, 3, I 68a; VII.4 2I 2a; EH II, 4, 
393c. 
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emphasizes the unique nature of unknowing. A material is knowingly chosen to 
sculpt, but the act of sculpting achieves unknowing: the material must be denied to 
reveal the beauty which is hidden within its appearance. Moses might have 
remained at the bottom of the mountain affirming God according to empirical and 
rational perception; but apart from denying himself unknowingly and 
synergistically he could never have ascended to the heights of his Sinaitic 
experience. As one who creates in terms of God-logic (theology) he knowingly 
affirms the beauty of the beyond-being in himself, and is then required to sculpt 
that same material (his own being) in which he has seen the beauty of the beyond-
being by means of synergistically conforming himself to It rather than conforming 
It to himself The Moses paradigm is crucial for the theologian 'so that we may 
know in an unhidden manner that unknowing, being hidden from all knowing 
amongst all beings, and might see that beyond-being darkness, being hidden from 
every light amongst beings' (1025b).31 Moses achieves this 'know[ing] in an 
unbidden manner, that unknowing being hidden from all knowing amongst 
beings,' and 'see[s] that beyond-being darkness, being hidden from every light 
amongst beings' 32 not unlike the manner in which a sculptor looks at a chunk of 
marble and sees the beauty which is hidden inside or the scientist looks at a 
mathematical equation and sees the beauty of some aspect of nature hidden inside. 
The theologian sees the beauty of the beyond-being hidden inside of all 
knowledge and language: prior to sculpting, the beauty (of the marble, equation or 
knowledge and speech) is known in a hidden manner, concealed in the darkness of 
the inner nature of the marble, the equation or the knowledge and speech, but 
when the work is done, it is known in an unhidden manner, and that darkness is 
revealed. Apophasis requires a process of unlanguaging and unlearning: 
kataphasis allows for a plethora of assertions and the theologian as the knowing 
subject is called to unjorget the knowledge of the beyond-being (the known 
subject) as being totally other than and outside of his/her predicative abilities by 
31 fva ancptxaA.v:!TT~ yvm,ucv txdvrrv 11)v dymJafav 11)v mro .mivrwv n:Vv ywvan:Vv tv mim 
rolf OWl :!tt:ptXt:XaAV/1/ltvrJV xai rov V:!tt:povowv txclvov Yc5W/ll:l' yYOqJOV rov V:!tO :TtaVTO{; roD 
tv rolf oom (/)WID~ emoxpV:!TTO/lt:VOV. 
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means of the process of apophasis. That which has been affirmed must be denied 
in participation:33 short of being content with what can be known about the 
beyond-being, the theologian must move beyond knowledge of him and further 
into participation with him, laying aside the empirical and the rational 
epistemically, and ethically as well: the habits of the mind, according to Denys, 
cannot, therefore, be divorced from the habits of the body. 
2.3. Language-as-ikon and Theological Creation 
Why both modes of theological language? Denys' reasoning would seem 
to be quite simple, though subtle. His is an attempt, so it seems, to point out and to 
avoid two very extreme positions, which could be referred to as kataphatic 
literalism, on the one hand, and kataphatic symbolism, on the other. If one or the 
other of these is assumed to be the seed from which all theological truth grows, 
then consequences ensue which preclude any possibility for epistemic symmetry, 
which seems to be epistemologically axiomatic for Denys. Assuming the limits of 
kataphasis to be that of the literal results either in denial of the reality of God, at 
worst, or in a very shallow pool of theistic statements. On the other hand, 
assuming the limits of kataphasis to be that of the metaphorical and the analogical 
results in the problem of untaylored verbosity: theistic speech without limits. 
Neither of these assumptions results in an adequate environment within which a 
philosophical theology that demands accurate knowledge and worshipful union 
finds any soil within which to root itself. The fonner disallows tmfotmded 
speculative thought, and the latter in turn is ultimately defined only by 
speculation. In both cases, the epistemic want of symmetry is abundant. However, 
making apophasis part of the locus of truth, creates a built-in corrective criterion 
for eitl1er of the above two consequences, and tl1e final apophatic result affirms 
something of the beyond-being, at least in an inverted sense: either 'God is 
32 MI' l025b (11-14). 
33 Apophaticism, viewed in this manner, is not unlike the way that Mark Twain unlearns the 
American notion of the 'nigger slave' as a commodity. At one point, for example, Huck recognizes 
that 'nigger Jim's' mourning for his family is just like the way a 'white man' would mourn for his 
family. No longer was 'nigger' the opposite of 'white man,' nor was the 'white man' now the only 
truly human specimen. 'Hunum' took on a new meaning for Huck, and 'the nigger' was now part 
of it. 
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beyond our rational, empirical and linguistic faculties' or 'There is no God.' The 
former ensues from an apophatic endeavor that is working with a kataphatic 
endeavor; the latter from an apophatic endeavor which is working against a 
kataphatic endeavor. Thus, by implication it follows that to approach the work of 
theology as though a decision must be made between kataphasis and apophasis is 
to misconstrue the issue. Such an approach sets up a false dilemma, either 
theological kataphasis or theological apophasis (either the via positiva or the via 
negativa), and fails to recognize that the processes are both metaphysically, 
epistemologically (both rationally and empirically), linguistically, and, thus, 
philosophically and theologically, essential. Neither kataphasis nor apophasis can 
be rightly employed at the expense of the other: theology is dependent upon both 
modes of theological language usage for its ascent to the 'Sinaitic' heights. 
But why, you might ask, having established the divine affirmations from among 
the first things do we begin the divine negation from the last things? Because to 
establish the one beyond all establishing from that which is more related to it, it is 
necessary to establish the hypothetical affirmations in order to negate the one 
negated beyond all negations from the ones being more different from it. For is it 
not more truly 'life' and 'goodness' than 'air' and 'stone'? And is it more truly 
not 'debauchery' and 'wrath' than not 'spoken' and not 'discerned'? (MT III, 
1 033c-1 033d)34 
The end of Moses' ascent is union with the beyond-being, achieved by means of 
moving epistemologically, linguistically and existentially away from the heights 
of kataphasis down to its lowly depths, and from these depths back again to the 
same heights in an apophatic manner. Beyond the frontiers of knowledge and 
kataphasis by means of being-as-ikon is apophasis and unknowing beyond being. 
Denys' position, so it seems, is therefore the methodological inverse of St. 
Anselm's fatuous dictum (notionally, but not terminologically, filched from St. 
Augustine): fides quarens intellectum. The theologian, for Denys, descends into 
34 cf Rorem, op cit., 194-205. 
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knowledge and ascends into faith in and union \vith God. But there is also a 
constant interface between the two: kataphatic propositions are constantly being 
challenged by the apophatic propositions, and vice versa. The theological 
endeavor is antinomic, constantly being confronted with propositions which 
Aristotle would classify as contradictories. To take this path, for Denys, is to use 
logic as our philosophical scapegoat. From the very beginning, he has not 
attempted to mince words: God is v.m:poumoq('beyond-being'). Thus, by logical 
implication, such a position requires that empiricism and rationalism be cast 
ultimately as insufficient, albeit necessruy, tools of the theological endeavor. 
2.3.1. Empirical Apophasis 
This is not optional, for Denys; rather, it is logically and rationally 
necessary. Rather than requiring that the Subject be reduced to the scope of the 
tools, Denys' position requires the theologian to entrust himself to the scope of his 
Subject. If God is beyond-being, then it follows that a philosophical examination 
of such a reality would require a greater degree of precision than empirical 
kataphasis is able to provide. Thus, to that which is seemingly known about him 
in a.1 empirical manner and to the empirical affirmations made about him 
apophasis must be applied. 
This is the case for two reasons. First, apophasis must be applied because 
the nature of the analysis is philosophical. If our analysis was of an exclusively 
systematic, historical or practical bent, for example, rather than one which has as 
its primary focus a critically constructive mapping of the beyond-being, then a 
recourse to apophasis would be dictated by the context of our analysis, not by the 
nature of the analysis, as with philosophical analysis. Secondly, apophasis must 
be applied because the nature, or oust a, of the thing being analyzed is empirically 
indistinct: it is not discernible via sensory perception (i.e. by empirical means), 
except by means of analogy. Thus, for a refined analogical understanding of God, 
apophasis must be applied to these analogies. 
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This is the subject of AfT IV, quoted here in full. 
Thus, we say that the cause of all things is beyond all being: it is neither beingless 
nor lifeless, nor logicless, nor mindless; it is neither body nor form; it has neither 
shape, nor quality, quantity or mass; it is neither a place, nor is it seen, nor does it 
have empirical senses; it is neither sensed nor empirical; neither does it have 
disorder and perplexity being disturbed by passions of physical things; it is 
neither powerless on account of being subject to empirical calamities; nor is it 
light in deficiency; neither is it nor does it have other things such as corruption, 
division, privation, diminution; nor is it something else of the empirical things 
(1 040d). 
This chapter begins with what might seem to be some ironic kataphatic assertions 
couched as double-negatives. But these affirmations are of the rational sort: they 
are more accurate affirmations than the analogical, empirical affirmations. It is 
more accurate, both with regard to the ontology of the beyond-being, as it were, 
and with regard to the attempt to map accurately the ontogeography of the 
beyond-being, as it were, i.e. both metaphysically and epistemologically, to deny 
the latter affirmations in favor of maintaining the former. The apophatic process 
begins by means of discerning degrees of accuracy, a hierarchy of truth, between 
empirical and rational predication. It is affinned that God exists (goodness?),35 
lives, speaks or has linguistic abilities and has a mind. It might, then, be less irony 
than it is pedagogy that Denys opens this chapter with these rational affirmations: 
it seems merely an emphatic way to show the nature of the process of relational 
beauty with regard to the notion of truth (i.e., the manner in which the apophatic 
process works in relation to the kataphatic process). 
Following these opening affirmations, a list of empirical qualities is denied 
of God. Some of what is denied bears an obvious air of accuracy. For in a 
monotheistic position, one would be hard-pressed to affirm of God, the hyper-
35 An implicit connection with what he says at the end of chapter three? cf. DN IV; eg.: 'all beings, 
as many as there are, are good and come from the Good' (720b, 9). 
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Cause, for example, that he has a body.36 But some of the rest of what is denied 
might not seem so obvious. However, if the rest of the denials are understood with 
reference to this first denial, then this seems to be a whole series of accurate 
denials. If it is the case that God is a bodiless entity or being, then he would not be 
of any shape, form, quality, quantity or mass: he could not be seen with the eyes 
nor touched with the hands, etc. And if the notions of 'disorder' and 'perplexity' 
are taken in reference to the lack of a bodily existence, these might well be found 
to be accurate denials. For it seems senseless to affirm that a bodiless being could 
have some sort of bodily disorder or be perplexed over his physical condition.~7 
The same may be said, furthermore, of 'passions:' this can seemingly be 
understood only with reference to the bodily desires and where there is no such 
body, it would seem as well that there would be no such passions. It would seem, 
moreover, that the pseudo-affirmation of power with regard to 'empirical 
36 This is, however, taken quite seriously in process thought. Cf., e.g., Alfred North Whitehead 
Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1969) and Charles Hartshorne Omnipotence and 
Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: SUNY, 1984). Although their versions of process theism do 
differ significantly, the 'body' of God in each of their systems turns out to be nothing other than 
the cosmos. Constructing a theistic system such as this has, in my opinion, dire implications for 
traditional theism, the most uncanny of which is that God is reduced, at least partly (ie. in his 
'consequent' or 'contingent' nature) to the confines of cosmological design. And this, in turn, has 
quite a profound effect on the other part of God (i.e. his 'antecedent' or 'necessary' nature), such 
that divine necessity is constrained by divine contingency. Respecting the merits of this position, it 
is, in my mind, nevertheless, a mistake to take process thought to be anything more than a 
contemporary effort to make theology systematically respectable in the face of the scientific 
systems of the day. Process theism seems to me to be a departure from the divine mystery in favor 
of deductive methodology. 
37 But such a being could plausibly experience bodily disorder and perplexity, especially an 
omnipotent, omnipresent, incorporeal 'being'. For example, such a 'being' might, in some manner 
that does not necessitate his being bodily, experience the undue suffering of an innocent toddler 
who is dying a slow an arduous death hecause ofthe ruthless whims of his own country's political 
leader (e.g., Saddham Hussein's usage of chemical warfare upon his own countrymen in the early 
1990's). The broader point here is that the disturbance and perplexity which might refer to what is 
commonly known as the problem of evil (both of the moral as well as the natural sort) is not the 
sort of thing that God would be devoid of by necessity of his essential separateness. Thus, though 
he might not have a body which itself would undergo such disorders and perplexities, he has our 
bodies within which to do so. Moreover, though this is even further afield than the present point, it 
is nevertheless the case that the problem of evil was experienced quite keenly when the Second 
Person of the Holy Trinity took on a body himself, dwelling here and meeting his own demise at 
the hands of those who wrongfully accused him and required that he be punished by crucifixion. 
This is no small issue for Denys, either, though he does not touch on the matter here. His DN treats 
this 'problem' at length (IV, 19, 716bft). Cf. DN 713D-736B. His discussion, nevertheless, does 
not treat the notion of divine participation as here noted; it is, however, a notion which is might be 
implied from his metaphysics as a whole. 
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calamities' could be taken in the same manner. For where there is no sense 
perception, there would be no calamities caused by sensing things. Nor would 
there be any power, nor powerlessness, regarding the lack of such experiences. 
Again, if 'light' is to be understood in reference to body, as, for example, 'light 
perceived by the eye,' then this too would seem to be an accurate denial: for 
lacking eyes, such a being as the 'Cause of all' would not be deprived of light.38 
And finally, a bodiless 'Cause of all' would neither undergo corruption, division, 
privation, diminution, at least in the way that these terms would be understood in 
reference to 'body, or sense perception. Thus, given this manner ofrelating each 
ensuing denial to the denial of embodiment, it seems that this is an accurate series 
of denials: it refines the scope of the beyond-being, and approaches a more 
accurate mapping of the ontogeography of the beyond-being, as it were. 
Denys has accomplished his task: he shows both that the supreme Cause is 
very different from all other perceptible entities and beings, and that perceptual 
terminology cannot be consistently and accurately applied to the hyper-Cause. 
Furthermore, whatever we affirm of God by means of perceptual analogy must, 
therefore, ultimately be denied: such affinnations must, because of ontological 
necessity (i.e., because of the epistemic and semantic burden to more accurately 
map the ontogeography of the beyond-being), be transcended by negation. 
2.3.2. Rational Apophasis 
Denys turns next to rational apophasis. Here too he continues by means of 
degrees of accuracy. The rational affirmations at the beginning of chapter four 
have provided the framework for the way in which the apophatic process is to 
proceed (or ascend), and are themselves not excluded from the process: these 
affirmations must be denied as well. A similar pattern emerges here as with 
chapter four: a higher degree of affirmation set against a lower degree of 
38 The eye is only one example of many that could be offered. We might speak of 'light' as a life-
giving element of nature (understanding nature to be composed of all sorts of 'bodies'). With this 
example as well, God would not be deprived of such a life-giving element; for he is bodiless. And 
this life-giving element would seem to be life-giving only in reference to bodies. Thus, deprivation 
has no place. 
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affirmation. There is an affirmation that is more accurate than rational 
affirmations. This affirmation is, however, at best tacit in the present chapter. It 
nevertheless seems to have been presented in a formulation dealt with in Moses' 
ascent: empirical purification in terms of rational illumination in terms of 
transcendent perfection (union). The kataphatic way leads from the most accurate 
affirmations (theses) down to the least accurate affirmations: the movement is 
epistemologically, linguistically and ontologically, away from transcendence 
toward reason and sense-perception, i.e. toward divine immanence. The apophatic 
way, requiring the opposite movement, commences its ascent toward the 
transcendent from the empirical to the rational. It is now requisite that the 
movement proceed apophatically into the rational and affirm the transcendent: 
again the movement epistemologically, linguistically and ontologically, has been 
away from ernpirical immanence toward rational immanence, and is now from 
rational immanence toward non-empirical and non-rational transcendence. This is 
the way Moses enters into the divine darkness by means of and in intimate relation 
with kataphasis and rational apprehension of the beyond-being. 
An initial reading of the final chapter of JvfT might well leave the reader a 
bit stunned: stunned by the quixotic wonder of what he is dealing with. It might, 
on the other hand, leave the reader a bit dismayed by the lack of precision and 
apparent contradictions (i.e. by the apparent nonsense of what he is affirming). It 
is a queer chapter, but as much can be said of the whole of lvfT. The text of tllis 
chapter is very short, and is here translated in its entirety. 
But again climbing higher we say this: it is neither soul nor mind; neither does it 
have imagination nor opinion nor logic nor mind; it is neither logic nor 
intelligence, nor is it spoken or discerned; it is neither number nor order nor 
greatness nor smallness nor equality nor inequality nor likeness nor unlikeness 
nor established nor moved nor does it take rest; neither does it have power, nor is 
it power nor light; it is neither alive nor is it life; it is neither being, nor eternity, 
nor time; of it there is neither anything rational nor scientific; it is neither truth 
nor a kingdom nor wisdom; neither one nor unity; neither divinity nor goodness; 
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it is neither spirit (as kno\vn to us), nor sonship, nor fatherhood, nor some other of 
the things known (by us or someone else) of beings; it is neither something 
among non-beings, nor is it something among beings; it is neither known to 
beings, as it is, nor do beings know it, as beings are; of it there is neither logic nor 
name nor knowledge; it is neither darkness nor light, nor error nor tmth; of it 
there is on the whole neither thesis nor negation; we neither establish it nor 
negate it, since the all-perfect and singular cause of all things is beyond every 
thesis, beyond every denial: the excess of that which totally transcends all things 
and is beyond the whole of things (MTV, 1045d-1048b). 
This chapter is in some ways the most confounding of all in the CD. For it seems 
as though everything that has been affirmed has now been denied; nothing but 
ignorance and silence remains. What is it then that we are now conceiving of and 
talking about? Denys' answer would be rather terse and cryptic, possibly 
something like this: 'Nothing, because we are now no longer conceiving and 
speaking.' Although this might seem absolutely ridiculous as a response, it does 
seem to be implied by Denys' apophatic process: the height of the process of 
knowing is the stillness of unknowing. And the highest peak of apophasis is not a 
speakable peak: it is silent praise, there remaining nothing that can be understood 
or talked about, either empirically or rationally. The hyper-Cause is now being 
conceived of (if the usage of this term has any vestige of semantic value left) as 
being completely other than being: no perception or conception is in the final 
analysis at all accurately applicable to it. It is a mystery about which to wonder. 
This is the point of 'unknowing union' with God, and it is the purpose of the 
apophatic process of Denys' theory of knowledge. However, it does not follow 
from Denys' apophatic process that the kataphatic process is ultimately deemed to 
be a vain attempt to rationally apprehend God. For in this, i.e in knowing God, it is 
successful. It is rather deemed to be a vain attempt at trans-rationally and trans-
empirically apprehending God. The kataphatic process, then, is purposeful in 
rationally and empirically apprehending the self-revelation of the transcendent 
God in the created order: it is a ladder of Divine descent. And the apophatic 
process is purposeful in trans-rationally and trans-empirically apprehending the 
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nature of the immanent God in God's self: it is a ladder of Divine ascent. There 
seems then to be only one epistemic and linguistic ladder: its function, use and 
telos being two-fold. Apophasis begins in the empirical where the kataphatic 
becomes verbose, moving upward toward the rational, easing beyond it with each 
successive negation: kataphatic analogy forms the seed-bed for the apophatic 
ascent of unknowing. Kataphasis, however, begins with the most accurate 
affirmations and moves to the least accurate, while apophasis proceeds from the 
least accurate affirmations to the most accurate denials. This movement implies a 
notion of degrees as regards truth-conveyance: certain affirmations become more 
accurate than certain negations; and certain negations turn out to be more accurate 
than certain affirmations. 
3. Summary 
Denys' position is amenable to prepositional calculus. If God is both 
transcendent and immanent (G), then the most appropriate epistemic and linguistic 
method would need to employ both kataphasis and the apophasis (M): G B M The 
employment of logic at this stage is not, however, an effort to vindicate the 
Dionysian position logically, but an eiTort lo show how logic in Ute Dionysian 
position necessarily releases into a trans-logic or a hyper-logic, which is beyond 
that system of symbols, and also precedes it. For Denys, logic is firmly fitted 
within a metaphysical framework that is trans-logical. It is an effort, therefore, to 
evince the presuppositional error that is made when theism is constructed 
exclusively within the boundaries of reason, empiricism and logic. The logical 
contradiction is quite clear: God is both above logical norms and contained by 
them. But what does this mean? Is God totally ineffable and illogical? God is 
knowable and speakable, for Denys, 'through a glass darkly', as it were -i.e. 
through the 'glass' of being-as-ikon, as I have argued. Thus, from a Dionysian 
perspective, Christ's words to his disciples in the eighth chapter of the Gospel of 
John, namely "If you abide in my word, then you are truly disciples of mine; and 
you shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free" can be taken in this 
sense. The logos theou is the thing to be known for Denys, but this 'knowing' 
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cannot be subtracted from our humble offering of ourselves, i.e. of giving 
ourselves to become 'partakers of the divine nature.' The 'freedom,' therefore, 
which is sought from the epistemic tyranny of ignorance (as the antithesis of 
knowledge, not as the fulfillment, as with Denys' position), for example, is 
achievable not by containing God in our theistic philosophical systems, but by 
being contained in him, i.e. by 'abiding', and allowing our theistic 'systems' this 
same freedom. The adventure of knowing and speaking God is caught-up in the 
ontological mystery of God giving himself to being and in the ontological mystery 
ofbeing giving itself to him: epistemology, ethics, metaphysics are knit together in 
a mystical fabric of ikon and communion (the process of relational beauty). This 
cryptic and philosophically convoluted process, the center point of which is his 
notion of ikon, is the way that the metaphysical rubber ultimately hits the 
epistemological road in the ethical traffic of everyday life, the way faith in the 
Messianic person of Jesus is actualized. This at least seems to be what Denys 
wants to suggest to his friend. 
* * * 
From the discussion of Denys' philosophical theology, I shall take the 
notion of being-as-ikon and apply it to some related issues in western philosophy. 
In the chapter immediately following, I shall apply this notion to the problem of 
varieties of mystery, specifically in relation to rational-ikon, empirical-ikon and 
language-as-ikon. Such an 'application', as I see it, is general in comparison to my 
treatments in chapters Four-Six, but shall serve to initiate, as it were, a shift in our 
discussion from Denys' position per se to a kataphatic discussion of his notion of 
ikon in relation to western philosophical thought. In the ensuing chapters (i.e. 
Four-Six), I shall apply the same notions, namely rational-ikon, empirical-ikon 
and language-as-ikon, respectively, albeit apophatically. Furthermore, for the two 
reasons that I have enumerated here, namely that it is a 'general' application (for 
the purpose of shifting the discussion) and a 'kataphatic' one as well, the next 
chapter, though it too shall treat the notions of rational-ikon, empirical-ikon and 
language-as-ikon has been set apart, in contradistinction to the ensuing ones, as an 
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Intermezzo. Let us turn, then, to a treatment ofthe problem of varieties of mystery 
in relation to the notion of being-as-ikon. 
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PART II 
Denys' Mystery of Being-as-Ikon And Issues in Western 
Philosophy 
3 
Intermezzo: Mystery in Contemporary Philosophy and Denys' Notion of Ikon 
I. Prolegomenon 
My interest here is to briefly examine three claims of mystery regarding, 
respectively, 'mind', 'matter' and 'language', and to suggest a Dionysian 
approach to them. The result of this chapter is that, by means of Denys' notion 
that mystery is an inherent aspect of being, i.e. via his notion of being-as-ikon, I 
offer an approach that suggests that these mysteries of being could be viewed in 
something of a univocal manner. 
Denys' interest in mystery, together with his suggestion that the beyond-
being is manifested through dissimilar as well as similar ikons, e.g. the 
presentation of him in the Old Testament as a 'drunkard', motivates an interest in 
investigating how this perspective might be brought to bear on other claims of 
mystery, and particularly claims which, first of all, are not themselves univocal, 
and which, secondly, are apparently quite dissimilar to Denys' own position. Can 
Denys' position treat examples of mystery which are dissimilar to it as well as 
dissimilar amongst themselves? 
The mysteries to which we shall shortly turn could be classed togetl1er as 
mysteries of being because they each claim, for different reasons, a limitation with 
regard what can be known concerning the nature of being. Furthermore, because 
they treat the nature of being as such, they, therefore, seem to be approachable 
through the notion of the mystery of being-as-ikon. In this way, then, to respond 
to the question iliat I have just posed, I think that Denys' position can treat 
examples of mystery which are dissimilar to it as well as dissimilar amongst 
themselves. Beyond this, i.e. as in some sense revealing the mystery of being, I do 
not intend to claim that these mysteries are similar or related in anyway apart from 
viewing them in terms of Denys' notion of the mystery ofbeing-as-ikon. 
Denys' notion of the mystery of being qua being-as-ikon incorpomtes a 
metaphysic as well. I find this notion of being to be helpful because it implies that 
all being, both beings which are 'dissimilar' as well as beings which are 'similar' 
to the beyond-being, ikonically manifests the beyond-being. If being is ikonic in 
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this manner, then each instance of being, according to Dionysian thought, can 
count as being either a dissimilar ikon or a similar ikon of the beyond-being, 
which provides a kind or hermeneutical context, as it were, for dealing with the 
mystery of being. I suggest, therefore, that his notion of being-as-ikon provides a 
context within which one might view these distit1ct mysteries of being in a 
univocal sense. 
Let us tum, now, to these mysteries of being. 
2. Mystery of Being 
2.1. lvfystery ofi\r!ind 
What is referred to by the notion/term 'mind'? Colin McGinn's The 
Mysterious Flame offers a plausible materialistic argument for conceiving of mind 
as an ambiguous reality that cannot be fully known. 
In the first chapter of tllis text, McGinn offers a science-fiction parable 
which points out well, for him, the truly queer nature of mind: 
"They're made out of meat." 
"Meat? ... " 
"There's no doubt about it We picked up several from different parts of the 
planet, took them aboard our recon vessels, probed them all the way through. 
They're completely meat." 
"That's impossible. What about the radio signals? The messages to the stars?" 
"They use the radio waves to talk, hut the signals don't come from them. The 
signals come from machines." 
"So who made the machines? That's who we want to contact." 
"They made the machines. That's what I'm trying to tell you. Meat made the 
machines." 
"That's ridiculous. How can meat make a machine? You're asking me to believe 
in sentient meat?" 
"I'm not asking you, I'm telling you. These creatures are the only sentient race in 
the sector and they're made of meat." 
"Maybe they're like the Orfolei. You know, a carbon-based intelligence that goes 
through a meat stage." 
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"Nope. They're born meat and they die meat. We studied them for several of their 
lifespans, which didn't take too long. Do you have any idea of the life span of 
meat?" 
"Spare me. Okay, maybe they're only part meat. You know, like the Weddilei." 
"But I told you, we probed them They're meat all the way through " 
"No brain?" 
"Oh, there is a brain all right. It's just that the brain is made out of meat!" 
"So ... what does the thinking?" 
"You're not understanding, are you? The brain does the thinking. The 
meat!" 
"Thinking meat! You're asking me to believe in thinking meat!" 
"Yes, thinking meat! Conscious meat! Loving meat. Dreaming meat. The meat is 
the whole deal! Are you getting the picture?" 1 
The reality of consciousness, McGinn argues, is for most probably simply 
assumed. It "is so familiar" McGinn says "that it's hard to appreciate what an odd 
phenomenon it is. We tend to take our consciousness for granted and not wonder 
about its origins and grounds." Brain science and psychology in their own 
respective ways attempt to remedy this problem, namely how is it that 'meat' and 
'thought' are connected? On the one hand, there is this material stuff that is, or 
can be made to be,2 empirical. On the other, there is this mental-ness that we 
experience individually from the inside. Empirical analysis yields data about the 
former; and by means of introspection, we know something about the latter. But, 
McGinn asks, how does the body affect the mind, or the mind affect the body? For 
McGinn, tllis is not a philosophical problem. There is no solution to the quandary, 
he argues; but more importantly, for llim, there can be no solution. In terms of the 
mind-body problem, McGinn contends that there is some 'property of the brain' 
1 Colin McGinn T11e lvfysterious Flame (New York: llasic llooks, 1999), 6-8. The quote comes 
from a story written by Terry Bisson, which Steven Pinker uses in his How the Mind Works (New 
York: Norton, 1997). 
2 The brain under normal circwnstances is not something that is an empirical object like a desk or a 
tea cup; it is contained within the skull. This is what I mean by 'is, or can be made to be': it is an 
empirical object by virtue of being a material thing; but it is not simply experienced as such under 
normal circumstances. 
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that is the source of consciousness, but tllis 'property' is unknowable; and, in tllis 
sense, for McGinn, knowledge has limits. If the mind were an empirical object, 
McGinn contends, then the problem in principle could be solved. There is a brain 
property that governs the data received from the five senses, but this cognitive 
faculty is incapable of divining the connection between the mind and tl1e brain. 
Likewise, if the faculty of introspection could be used to determine the mind's 
outer relations, rather than only its inner conditions (as it seems to be the case), 
then the problem in principle could be solved. Hence, for McGinn, if either 
empirical analysis could do what it cannot do, or if introspection could do what it 
cannot do, then the problem in principle could be solved. 
[W]e need an additional faculty if we are going to understand the mind-brain link. 
The faculties we have provide us with both terms of the mind-brain relation, but 
they do not give us what binds the two terms together Hence my contention that 
no matter how much we learn about the brain, we will never be able to forge an 
explanatory link to consciousness. 3 
Short of 'an additional faculty', however, the reality of conscious mind, for 
McGinn, appears to be a mystery. The perennial 'mind-body' problem, then, is not 
a problem at all, for McGinn; it is a mystery. Thus, for him, the profound dismay 
that the one interlocutor expresses in tl1e above story, is a philosophically 
important dismay, namely that conscious meat is incoherent, but it is, and this, for 
him, is an unavoidable mystery. 
2.2. Mystery of Matter 
What is referred to by the notion/term matter (or 'meat', as the above 
parable would have it)? What follows is a brief survey of one aspect of quantum 
physics which has engendered the view, for some, that matter is mysterious, 
namely quantum measurement. 
3 McGinn, op cit., 52. Italics mine. 
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2.2.1. lvfacro-Jvfeasurement 
Contemporary science inherited the notion that material objects are 
composed of very tiny atoms, small bits of matter known as particles. This view 
was, for Newton, paradigmatic. He himself speaks of it in this way: 
It seems possible to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, 
hard, impenetrable, moving particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such 
properties, and in such proportion in space, as most conduced to the end for 
which he forme.d them. 4 
But this paradigm proved to be insufficient for the quest of contemporary science 
to understand what the sub-atomic particles are. 
2.2.2. Micro-Measurement 
Heisenberg's work with Bohr led him slowly to a very important 
distinction regarding the electron data that he was attempting to evaluate. The 
data, Heisenberg observed, was evidence of the electron's final location, which 
revealed nothing of the actuality of intennediate trajectories. Thus, Heisenberg 
could determine empirically that the electron is actual at the point of departure 
from the electron gun and at the final location on the screen; but in the interim 
stage, he determined, the electron no longer exists as a certain actual entity. This 
interim stage came to be referred to as a 'field of potentialities. ' 
Heisenberg was able, furthermore, to determine that unless there is some 
sort of interference (something external that interacts with the field), then it 
remains a field of potentialities. In this state, then, what is called an 'electron' 
does not exist as an actual entity, it is simply a set of ontological potentialities: it 
could become a dot here or there on the screen, but it is nowhere right now. One 
such source of interference could be a physicist's act of measurement. 
Measurement in the Newtonian sense was understood to be an 
experimental task which conveys purely phenomenal data about the thing or 
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things being measmed. Quantwn measmement, however, according to 
Heisenberg's position, creates the phenomenon. Shimon Malin puts it like this: 
There is a profound difference between ordinary measurements and quantum 
measurements. In ordinary life, and in classical physics, a measurement gives 
information about the state of the measured system, a state that is not 
significantly affected by the measurement process. In quantum physics, however, 
measurements are creative. They literally create the electron as an actual thing, 
where, before the measurement, no thing existed. 5 
An interesting paradigm shift has occurred with quantum measmement. And one 
of the most interesting aspects of this shift is what Malin speaks of here as the 
creative effect of physical measurement. Packaged in this new tmderstanding of 
measurement is also a new understanding of matter, and of the two modes of 
being that matter seems capable of attaining in a scientifically verifiable sense: the 
potential and the actual. 
Heisenberg describes this act of measurement as follows: 
Now the theoretical interpretation of an experiment starts with the two steps that 
have been discussed. In the first step, we have to describe the arrangement of the 
experiment, eventually combined with a first observation, in terms of classical 
physics and translate this description into a probability function This probability 
function follows the laws of quantum theory, and its change in the course of time, 
which is continuous, can be calculated from the initial conditions; this is the 
second step. The probability function combines objective and subjective 
elements. Tt contains statements ahout possibilities or better tendencies 
("potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy), and these statements are completely 
objective, they do not depend on any observer; and it contains statements about 
our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they 
4 Issac Newton quoted in Shimon Malin "Waves of Nothingness" in Nature Loves to Hide: 
Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality, a Western Perspective (New York: Oxford, 200 1), 13-
14 and 47. 
5 Malin, op cit., 49. 
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might be different for different observers. In ideal cases the subjective element in 
the probability function may be practically negligible as compared with the 
objective one. The physicists then speak of a "pure case."6 
There is an inaccessible aspect to the measurement process, for Heisenberg. The 
element that is inaccessible is an element of matter itself Matter, therefore, 
imposes a limit on our tm.derstanding of itself, and quantum measurement, 
therefore, discloses a certain epistemic closure that is due to the nature of matter. 
The 'collapse of the quantum states' is the process of actualization: the action by 
which the external interference of a scientist's measuring apparatus creates the 
entity being measured. This process seems to have three different stages (from 'set 
of potentialities', to 'specific potentiality', to 'actual elementary quantum event' -
each of which occurs as a 'choice') and is atemporal.7 It is this process that 
Shimon Malin refers to when he says "the mystery .. .is the process."8 
2.3. Mystery of Language 
What is referred to by the notionltenn 'language'? Heidegger's lecture 
"Language" begins with a few thoughts on the way that the act of cmmnunication 
assumes the medium of language: 
Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and we speak in our dreams. We are 
always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely 
listen or read, and even when we are not particularly listening or speaking but are 
attending to some work or taking a rest. We are continually speaking in one way 
or another. We speak because speaking is natural to us. It does not first arise out 
of some special volition. Man is said to have language by nature. It is held that 
man, in distinction from plant and animal, is the living being capable of speech .. 
. only speech enables man to be the living being that he is as man. 9 
6 Werner Heisenberg Physics and Philosophy (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1999), 52-53. Malin 
~uotes a portion of this passage, op cit., 50. 
cf. Malin op cit., "In and Out of Space and Time", 111-24, esp. 113-4. 
8 Malin, op cit., 87. 
9 Martin Heidegger Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 189. 10 
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Is speech really the distinguishing characteiistic of man? What Heidegger seems 
to be saying here is that language is incessantly used by man, but it is not simply a 
tool that he uses to achieve some end. Man speaks because he is a linguistic being: 
he speaks because that is what it is to be human. Speech seems, for Heidegger, to 
be the essential, rather than an accidental quality. Furthennore, for Heidegger, 
language is not the sort of thing that we can observe from the outside. Man uses 
(or better, man is used by language), studies or theorizes about it as an incessant 
patron of it, rather than as its proprietor. It is, for Heidegger, a faculty that, once 
developed, is ever-present in a way that defines what it is to be human. Man is a 
language-speech laden creature, in a language-speech laden world. Man, for 
Heidegger, is linguistic; he indwells language. 
In the first lecture of the three lectures which he titles "The Nature of 
Language," Heidegger makes tltis point a bit differently. TI1e matwer in which 
man is linguistic is not a matter that is for discursive analysis alone: language is 
experienced non-discursively as well. 
To undergo an experience with something -be it a thing, a person, or a god-
means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and 
transforms us. When we talk of "undergoing" an experience, we mean 
specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means 
that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. .. Tf it is tme 
that man finds the proper abode of his existence in language ... then an experience 
we undergo with language will touch the innermost nexus of our existence . 
. [O]ur relation to language is vague, obscure, almost speechless. 10 
For Heidegger, an important aspect of language is that we inextricably experience 
it. The manner of this experience is such that through it one understands language 
to be 'vague, obscure, almost speechless.' Tills sort of experience one might also 
(at least at certain times), call a 'poetic experience'. Heidegger himself seems to 
suggest something sintilar: 
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What is it that the poet reaches? It is not mere knowledge. He obtains entrance 
into the relation of word to thing. This relation is not, however, a connection 
between the thing that is on one side and the word that is on the other. The word 
itself is the relation which in each instance retains the thing within itself in such a 
manner that it "is" a thing. 11 
This 'experience', for Heidegger, is of the relational nature of language: (it might 
even be said that it is the relation). Speech is man's way of experiencing and 
expressing his relational being. One assumes that it is such an experience that 
would lead to Heidegger's statement: 'language itself is language.' 
He continues as follows: 
The understanding that is schooled in logic, in thinking of every thing in terms of 
calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty 
tautology ... We do not wish to get anywhere. We would like only, for once, to get 
to just where we are already. 12 
Language is where we are, for Heidegger; we participate in it, we do not merely 
meet it as a difficulty or a puzzle. But in an unlikely manner, the nature of being 
for man is closely aligned with the nature of language. Both matter and mind are 
common aspects of being in general. Language, however, for Heidegger, is a 
definitive aspect of the being of man. It is not something which we simply define, 
but something which also defines us. Thus, handling it improperly might not be 
evidence merely of an intellectual danger, but of an existential danger as well. For 
to deal with language improperly, for Heidegger, might well be to deal with 
human nature improperly as well. 
To Heidegger, then, language is to be treated with humility and respect. He 
speaks of the reality of language in an intellectually cautious manner: 
11 Heidegger, op cit., 66. 
12 Heidegger Poetry, Language, Thought, 190. 
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We do not wish to assault language in order to force it into the grip of ideas 
already fixed beforehand. We do not wish to reduce the nature of language to a 
concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful view of language that 
will lay to rest all further notions about it. 13 
A mathematical approach to studying language, to establishing language on a 
logically complete and sound basis, for example, might well engage language in 
such an assaulting, forceful and reductive manner. 
In "Language," Heidegger makes an interesting appeal to St. John's 
Gospel that touches this matter well: 
According to the opening of the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John, in the 
beginning the Word was with God. The attempt is made not only to free the 
question of origin from the fetters of a rational-logical explanation, but also to set 
aside the limits of a merely logical description of language. 14 
This 'attempt' which StJohn makes in his Gospel is one with which Heidegger is 
sympathetic. For him, 'a merely logical description of language' will not suffice. 
If 'a merely logical description of language' will not suffice, then language, 
though rational and logical, is, for Heidegger, something of a mystery it would 
seem. 
3. Being-as-Ikon 
In the first chapter, we noted a close relation between knowing and being, 
namely that Denys' notion of knowledge is of beings and in beings and 'has its 
limit in beings'. Furthermore, it was noted that a response to the question 'What is 
knowledge?' must treat the nature of being-as-ikon. In relation to his 'Sun 
analogy', it was noted that tllis treatment entails, for Denys, a process of 
'receiving the world as gift and ikon, and relating it back to Him'. 15 '[A]ll things', 
13 Heidegger, op cit., 190. Italics mine. 
14 Heidegger, op cit., 192-3. 
15 Marion The Idol and the Distance (Fordham, New York: 2001), 178. Quote from DN, IV, 4, 
697 b-e. Marion's rendering of the Greek alr{a with the French Requisit, which Carlson 
maintains as Requisite, insightful1y captures Denys' notion that being having come from this 
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for Denys, 'whatever is and whatever becomes, is and becomes through the 
Beautiful and the Good. All things look to it, and are moved and maintained by it. 
.. all beings ( ra ovra) are from the Beautiful and the Good ... Therefore all things 
are aiming for, desiring and loving the Beautiful and the Good' (DN IV, 705D-
708A). Being, for Denys, then, as we noted, is inherently relational because it is 
from the Beautiful and the Good, and aims for, desires and loves the Beautiful and 
the Good. Thus, each instance of being as an ikon confronts us, according to 
Denys, such that to know it properly is to know it in relation to its Cause. And, 
therefore, it follows from this conception of being, as we noted, that knowledge, 
according to Denys, is being-as-ikon-of-beyond-being in communion (i.e., 
participation) with being-as-ikon-of-beyond-being. This process of participation I 
have called the process of relational beauty, which implies a Dionysian 
epistemology of beauty that defines 'to know' in terms of 'ikon' and 
'participation'. I argued that being a 'knowing-being-as-ikon', seems to mean that 
I participate with the Beauty of the beyond-being by means of the beauty of the 
known-being-as-ikon. Furthermore, knowledge conceived of as such implies a 
hierarchical conception, nan1ely that every ikon (rational or empirical) participates 
'according to its capacity' in the process of relational beauty. Discerning these 
empirical and rational ikons as the manifold immanence of the unified 
transcendent seems to be, for Denys, the focus of the knowledge process, namely 
to participate with the manifold rrllUlifestation of the beyond-being in/through the 
differential ikonic nature ofbeing. 
What does this mean in relation to these mysteries of 'mind' 'matter' and 
'language'? 
If being is conceived of as hierarchically ikonic in a manifold manner 
(which would include dissimilarities), and if knowledge is a process of 
participation of a certain beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being with some 
other beautiful-being(s)-as-ikon(s)-of-the-beyond-being, both of which manifest 
the beyond-being in accordance with their 'capacity', then these positions could 
Cause requires it for the purpose of returning to it (cf. Carlson's note 21, 151). Marion's notion of 
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be conceived of as manifesting, by means of the process of relational beauty, the 
mystery of the beyond-being as known in the beautiful-being-( of-matter, -mind, -
language )-as-ikon-of-the beyond-being. Denys' position, in my opinion, provides 
a context that suggests that these mysteries of being, if they can be conceived of in 
tem1s of being-as-ikon, could be conceived of as being univocal when they are, at 
face value, in fact quite different. But how do we get from these mysteries of 
being to the mystery ofbeing-as-ikon? Let's look at this particular issue a bit more 
closely. 
3.1. The Mystery of Being qua the lvfystery of Being-as-ikon 
Each of these positions expresses and maintains a specific position 
regarding the nature of being, which I take to be a common element of these 
mysteries that suggests, therefore, a certain commonality between them, i.e. the 
mystery ofbeing. 
McGinn's contention, for example, that the 'mind-body' problem is not a 
problem, but a mystery, addresses, for him, the ambiguity of the mind-body 
relation, and it does so in a way that affirms that there is an aspect of the mind that 
is simply unknowable. His position, therefore, suggests the mystery of the being 
of mind, fundamentally, and of the mind-body relation, as well. 
Furthermore, Malin's interpretation of Heisenberg which results in his 
conclusion that the process of quantum measurement is a mystery of the being of 
matter. This is because the in determinability of the position of a particle when it 
becomes a 'field of potentialities' expresses a position that, for him, describes the 
fundamental nature of matter. That is, the mystery of quantum measurement, for 
Malin, uncovers a fundamental mystery of matter itself Thus, the scientific effort 
to know matter experimentally, at least at the quantum level, affinns, for him, that 
it is a mysterious process because a 'field of potentialities', apart from 
measurement or some other form of interference, is unknowable. 
The position that the being of language, because of its relational nature 
with the being of man, resists a 'merely logical description' implies, for 
distance remains by his own admission necessarily undefined. 
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Heidegger, that language is experienced in a 'vague, obscure, almost speechless 
manner', and expresses a position that language as such is, therefore, in some 
sense an unknowable mystery. 
The mystery of the being of mind, the mystery of the being of matter and 
the mystery of the being of language, thus, each expresses a specific aspect of the 
mystery of being. Furthermore, each of these cases appeals to the mystery of 
being in a way that suggests unknowability, i.e. in a way that intends to describe, 
in a specific sense, the way that being is, and the way, thus, that being can (or 
cannot) be known. 
If each of these positions does indeed reveal in some sense the mystery of 
being, and, thus, in some sense, being's unknowability, then it would seem to be 
the case that such mysteries are related at least insofar as they each concern the 
nature ofbeing. Furthennore, if being is taken in terms of being-as-ikon, then each 
respective mystery of being is thereby related to the others in the context of the 
process of relational beauty. The notion of being-as-ikon, as such, provides a 
context within which these mysteries of being can be understood in a tmivocal 
sense. These mysteries of being, therefore, as I see it, are amenable to a single 
approach, i.e. to being interpreted in tenns of being-as-ikon, because, 
fundamentally, they each seem to exhibit something of the mystery of being, and 
of its unknowability. 
I take the 'mystery of being', and thus, the notion of being's 
unknowability, then, to be fundamental to my suggesting an approach to these 
positions in terms of Dionysian thought which maintains that being has an ikonic 
nature. For me, each of these positions is persuasive to some extent. My interest 
here is in suggesting an approach that respects and maintains the value of these 
positions with regard to their describing in some sense the mystery of being, while 
ultimately diverging from them in terms of incorporating the notion of beyond-
being as an integral aspect of the mystery of being through the notion of the 
mystery of being-as-ikon. Tims, while, for example, I fmd McGinn's treatment of 
the mystery of mind to be persuasive, I do not find his materialistic conclusions to 
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be acceptable in the same way that he seems to. I am able, however, through the 
notion of being-as-ikon to redefine the notion of mind in terms of mind-as-being-
ikon, and therefore, to part company with him regarding his materialism. For 
mind-as-being-as-ikon, from a Dionysian perspective, while being a mystery of 
being, as it were, is not solely a mystery of being, but is also a mystery of the 
beyond-being as well. The mystery of matter and language, respectively, I take in 
a similar manner, namely by taking these mysteries of being to be likewise 
suggestive of the plausibility of the notion of being-as-ikon because they seem to 
reveal, in some sense, the nature of being as mystery. Such an approach seems to 
me to be warranted for the following line of reasoning. 
If being is in some sense mysterious, then this would seem to imply that 
the notion of being-as-ikon is plausible. I suggest, with these three mysteries, that 
being is in some sense mysterious. Therefore, the notion of being-as-ikon seems to 
be plausible. 
Put differently: If being is not mysterious in some sense, then there would 
seem to be no support for Denys' notion ofbeing-as-ikon. If it can be determined 
that being is indeed mysterious (i.e. not not mysterious), at least in some sense, 
then it is plausible to assume that being is ikonic, which would thereby provide an 
explanatory context for the mystery of being. 
Either way, i.e. either positively or negatively presented, the mystery of 
being seems to lend credence to the notion of being-as-ikon because if being is 
indeed ikonic, then one would expect, at the very least, to find that being is indeed 
mysterious, at least in some sense. Hence, because I find that being is indeed 
mysterious, at least as regards 'mind', 'matter' and 'language', I therefore find 
Denys' particular notion of being, i.e. being-as-ikon, able to affirm tl1ese various 
mysteries of being in a univocal sense. 
4. Conclusion 
Mystery of being does not necessarily imply metaphysical mystery; nor do 
various mysteries of being, such as the ones that I have suggested here, 
necessarily imply some univocal sense ofmystery. Thus, although there might be 
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a mysteiy associated with the nature of 'mind', 'matter' and 'language', 
respectively, this would not seem to imply anything specifically about the nature 
of mystery. But, from a Dionysian perspective, given the notion of being-as-ikon, 
mystery of being does necessarily imply metaphysical mystery, and so does 
necessarily imply a univocal sense of mystery. This is the case because, for 
Denys, ikon is both the mystery of being, by nature, and the mystery of beyond-
being, by manifestation, and so to know being by nature is to know beyond-being 
by manifestation. For Denys, the mystery of the beyond-being is, nevertheless, 
anterior to the mystery of being, and so, his position recognizes the univocal 
nature of the mystery of the beyond-being in being even before it discerns the 
manifold manifestations of mystery in being. 
4.1. Final Thoughts 
In some ways, this may seem like an easy way of importing Christian 
thought into philosophical dialogue. But for one whose Weltenschaung, like 
Denys', is characterized by a cosmic vision of procession and return, it would be 
simply a logical (or more properly a hyper-logical) way of viewing such claims. 
Furthennore, my usage of Denys' thought, while it does indeed import a Christo-
centric perspective, because his version of procession and return, as opposed to 
that of the neo-Platonists, Proklos for example, is Christologically conceived, 
offers a kind of apologia for Dionysian thought because his thought is generally 
(though inaccurately in my opinion) thought of in tenus of apophasis alone. My 
attempt to bring his thought into philosophical discussions does not deny his 
interest in apophaticism, but here I have shown that his emphasis on kataphaticism 
can be applied beneficially to discussions that affirmatively maintain a sense of 
the mystery of being, i.e. the mystery of bei11.g is affinned in the mystery of being-
as-ikon. Thus, while what I have done here is primarily a kind of kataphatic 
defense of Denys' notion of being-as-ikon, the following chapters offer an 
apophatic defense of this notion. 
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* * * 
The line of reasoning that I have offered here concerning the mystery of 
being and the interpretive context of the mystery of being-as-ikon also provides, 
in my opinion, a way of responding to the problems of the relationship between 
theistic proof and theology, the relationship between science and theology and the 
relationship between language and theology. These issues I shall treat in tum, 
beginning with an examination of Descartes' 'ontological argument' in the chapter 
immediately following, and the final two chapters will treat, respectively, beauty 
in science and silence as a defining element of language and li11.guistic meaning. 
Let us, now, tum to a treatment of the first of these issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Descartes' program of methodological doubt leads him to "innumerable 
ideas of certain things which, ... have their own true and immutable natures."' 
Such ideas he specifies in the Fifth Meditation as being, first, 'figures, numbers, 
arithmetic, geometry and pure mathematics. ' 2 These 'ideas', he maintains, are 
"the most certain ones of al1."3 What, then, is the role of such 'mathematical 
truths' in the 'ontological' argument of the Fifth Meditation? My response to this 
question refers us to Dionysian thought. The outcome of the chapter, then, is 
twofold. First of all, it defends Denys' notion of rational-ikon from an apophatic 
perspective. Secondly, from this Dionysian perspective, it defends the 
'ontological' argument' ofthe Fifth Meditation. 
1.1. Structure of the Chapter 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section is an examination of 
the Fifth Meditation. The third section presents the argument in three different 
formulations and an analysis of the usage of 'existence' in the second premise of 
the argument. The final section addresses the charge of 'circularity', and, drawing 
from Denys' notion of being-as-ikon, offers an apophatic interpretation of 
Descartes' reasoning in the Fifth Meditation, which I suggest, creates a larger 
context within which to view the 'ontological' argument, one which allows for 
'certainty' to be conceived of as a kind of'unknowing'. 
1. 2. Overview of My Argument 
I argue that Descartes' usage of 'mathematical truths' requires that 'God' 
be conceived of as an abstract entity because they form, I argue, the paradigm for 
Descartes' 'clear and distinct ideas', and, thus, 'certainty' in the Fifth Meditation. 
It is not my intent, however, to argue that, for Descartes, 'God' exists as 
1 Descartes, op cit., 65. 
2 Ibid., 66. 
3 Ibid. 
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'mathematical truths' exist. I acknowledge that for Descartes, 'God' exists in 
some higher manner, as it were, which is what his 'ontological' argument intends 
to show. However, I argue that the argument does not achieve this goal; it fails on 
account of what I call the 'abstract' nature of' mathematical truth', which is, as I 
just stated, the paradigm for 'clear and distinct ideas' and 'certainty', and, thus, 
the only paradigm offered in the Fifth Meditation for how to understand the 
'certainty of the clear and distinct idea of the existence of God'. According to my 
reading, however, the 'ontological' argument might be deemed to be sound, 
nevertheless, if it is granted, as I do for the sake of the discussion, that 'existence' 
is a 'perfection'. But be this as it may, it might well still be deemed to be unsound 
because of 'circular' reasoning. In response to this charge, I offer an apophatic 
interpretation, which, in my view, could relieve it of this criticism. 
I turn here to a review of the Fifth Meditation to give the immediate 
context of Descartes' 'ontological' argument. 
2. The Meditation 
The Fifth Meditation begins with the stated intent to examine whether or 
not certain 'ideas' of material things are 'distinct' or 'confused,' an intent which 
is more basic than an investigation into the notion of certainty as regards 'material 
things' alone. 
2.1. 'Material things' and 'Clear and Distinct Ideas' 
[A]nd nothing seems to be more urgent now ... than that I might try to emerge 
from the doubts into which I have gone in the previous days and that I might see 
whether something certain concerning material things could be had. And before I 
shall inquire as to whether any such things would exist outside of me, I must 
surely consider the ideas of these things, in so far as they are in my cogitation, and 
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see which of these ideas would be distinct and which of them would be 
confused. 4 
The question of the possibility of rational certainty precedes the question of the 
possibility of empirical certainty because that which is outside of 'me' physically, 
for Descartes, is of secondary epistemological importance to that which is 'in my 
cogitation.' 
What is certainty for Descartes? His is a concern with a notion of certainty 
that is a priori. The Meditation, however, begins to take flight in the third 
paragraph by means of referring to the empirical phenomenon of the 'continuous 
quantity' in terms of 'extension in length, breadth and depth.' Why is this? It is 
because the ideas of these things are either, for Descartes, 'distinct' or 'confused'. 
The notion of physical extension, for example, gives way, for Descartes, to a 
perception of the a priori truth value of 'figures and number'. 
And what I think is maximally to be considered here is that I find within me 
innumerable ideas of certain things which, even if they would perhaps exist 
nowhere outside of me, still cannot be said to be nothing. And, although they 
would in a certain manner be cogitated by me at will, they are not feigned by me, 
but rather do they have their own true and immutable natures. So that, when I 
imagine a triangle, for example, even if such a figure would perhaps exist 
nowhere in the world outside my cogitation- nor would it have ever existed -, 
there still is, in fact, a certain determinate nature or essence or form of it, 
4 Descartes, op cit., 64. cf Heisenberg "Development of Philosophical Ideas Since Descartes in 
Comparison with the New Situation in Quantum Theory" in Physics and Philosophy (Prometheus: 
1999), 76-92. Here Heisenberg argues that Descartes' distinction between 'res cogitans' and 'res 
extensa,' the latter of which having become the primary focus of modem science, is indefensible 
according to the contemporary developments in quantum theory which show that nature and mind 
are connected in the work of natural science in such a way that the one cannot be removed from the 
other except on pain of incoherence. Descartes' position, of which this chapter endeavors to 
examine only a very small portion, seems to pose a formidable epistemological problem which 
results from this view of reality, a problem which was addressed by the bent toward the empirical in 
Locke, Berkley, Hume, Kant and contemporary forms of analytic thought, particularly by the bent 
toward mathematical logic as evidenced in logical positivism 
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immutable and eternal, which has not been feigned by me, nor does it depend on 
my mind: as is obvious from thence that various properties could be demonstrated 
about this triangle, namely, that its three angles be equal to two right ones, that 
the maximum side be opposite to its maximum angle, and similar things, which 
properties - whether I would want to or not want to - I now clearly recognize, 
even if I previously would in no way have then cogitated about them when I have 
imagined the triangle, nor would they therefore have been feigned by me. 5 
The paradigm of certainty arising from that which is outside of 'me' concerns the 
'clear and distinct ideas' of the 'mathematical truths' which "have their own true 
and immutable natures." Independent of empirical reality and even of one's 
cognitive abilities, the 'mathematical truths' tum out to have "a cettain 
determinate nature or essence or form" which is "immutable and eternal." No 
amount of empirical awareness or rational reflection is required for the nature and 
attributes of a triangle, e.g., to be precisely what they are; nor is any perception or 
discernment effective to the end of changing the nature and/or attributes of a 
triangle. This then, as I see it, is the paradigm for the notion of 'clear and distinct 
ideas': the immutability and etemality of the 'mathematical truths'. Therefore, 
Descartes' aim in offering an 'ontological' proof of the 'existence' of 'God', in 
my opinion, must be viewed from the vantage point of the 'mathematical truths' 
as, for him, being paradigmatic of what certainty is.6 
In the following section, Descartes seems to be suggesting that the a priori 
'mathematical truths', having been drawn from 'cogitation', act as the means by 
5 Descartes, op cit., 65. a 
6 For a contrary view see D. E. Flage and C. A. Bonnen "Meditation Five: The Beginning of 
Descent" in their Descartes and Method (Routledge: 1999). The argument suggests a consistency 
throughout the Meditations and particularly between Meditation 5 and Meditations 3 and 4. As a 
result the 'ontological' argument of Meditation 5 is viewed as an "interlude" in a reflection on 
geometry. Descartes' "true and immutable natures" are spoken of in what seems to be 
Whiteheadean tem1inology as "ideas in the mind of God," thus suggesting a crucial element for how 
the consistency of this position is to be established. 
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which whatsoever is properly related to them in terms of 'cogitation' bears the 
same sense of immutability and etemality, by virtue of this relation. 
But now, if from thence alone that I could draw ihe idea of something from my 
cogitation, it follows that all the things that I clearly and distinctly perceive to 
pertain to that thing do really and truly pertain to it, then cannot therefrom also an 
argument be had by which the existence of God might be proved?7 
By means of the certainty of 'mathematical truths', Descartes seems to argue, it 
would seem possible that a proof for the 'existence' of 'God' could be formulated. 
Or, to put this same point a bit differently: if the idea of 'God' is distinct in the 
way that 'mathematical tmths' are distinct, not to say in an identical manner, then 
a proof for the 'existence' of 'God' could be constructed. The 'idea' of 'God', 
however, (it would seem) would not be properly 'clear and distinct' but 
derivatively so. 
The 'truths of mathematics' have been found by way of reflection on the 
notion of material extension, and the truth of these ideas are deemed to be 'the 
most certain ones of all.' The notion of 'clear and distinct ideas' as related to 
'God' is presented in terms of the 'clear and distinct ideas' of 'mathematical 
truths'. The notion of 'clear and distinct ideas' seems, therefore, to be delineated 
solely in terms of 'mathematical truths.' Thus, when he makes use of this concept 
in terms of his 'ontological' argument, the reader, it seems, only has this context 
within which to understand him. 
2.2. 'Clear and Distinct Ideas' and the 'Ontological' Proof 
His initial stated aim is to 'consider the ideas of material things' for the 
purpose of determining the clear and distinct ideas which are related to them. The 
Meditation now proceeds by introducing the notion of 'God', i.e. 'a most highly 
perfect being,' and with Descartes proclaiming thai he 'clearly and distinctly' 
7 Descartes, op cit., 66. 
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tmderstands 'that it pertains to his nature that he always exist'. These assertions 
form the two premises of his 'ontological' argument. Thus, the Meditation now 
turns from a consideration of the question of 'clear and distinct ideas' of material 
things to the question ofthe 'clear and distinct (non-empirical) idea' of'God.' 
I certainly find within me the idea of God, namely, the idea of a most highly 
perfect being, no less than I do the idea of some figure or number. Nor do I 
understand less clearly and distinctly t.IJat it pertains to his nature that he always 
exist than that which I demonstrate of some figure or number also pertains to the 
nature of this figure or number. And, therefore, even if not all the things on which 
I have meditated in these previous days would be true, the existence of God must 
be within my reach at a minimum in the same grade of certainty in which 
mathematical truths have hitherto been.8 
Disregarding for the moment the notion of 'existence', the idea of 'God' seems to 
be presented here as just one more abstract entity like that of a triangle. If this is 
the case, then the subject 'God' in this passage would seem to be commutable 
with the subject 'triangle' in the above quoted section. Descartes seems to make 
this move in his reply to Caterus. But I shall treat this issue in the following 
section. 
But these ideas seem to be conceived of differently in at least one respect, 
namely that 'mathematical truths' are presented as being prima facie certain, 
which, apparently, require no proof of the sort that the idea 'God' requires. Brief 
reflection on the nature of material extension has provided the certainty of the 
ideas of mathematics. The idea of 'God' apparently needs more; thus he provides 
a proof for this idea, namely that the idea 'God' exists, or that existence pertains 
8 Descartes, op cit., 66. cf Anselm Proslogium, chs. 2-3; and J-L Marion "Is the Argument 
Ontological? The Anselmian Proof and the Two Demonstrations of the Existence of God in the 
Meditations" in Cartesian Questions (Chicago: 1999), 139-160 and concerning his notion of 'onto-
theo-logy' which is crucial for his treatment of the ontological argument, see "Onto-theo-logy" in 
On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism (Chicago: 1999), 67-127. 
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to the nature of 'God.' The proof is necessary because of the notion of existence 
that pertains to 'God'. But Descartes 'clearly and distinctly' perceives the idea 
'God' and he 'clearly and distinctly' perceives that existence pertains to this idea 
('God'). So what is going on here? 
Why do we need a proof for the 'existence' of 'God'? 
The certainty of the 'existence' of 'God', it seems, is not prima facie, as 
with, e.g., the angles of a triangle equaling 180°. How, then, is certainty 
achievable concerning the 'existence' of 'God'? Descartes establishes that the 
idea of 'God' is cogitated like the ideas of 'mathematical truths,' namely that it is 
'clear and distinct.' His reasoning seems to be that if the 'clear and distinct idea' 
of 'God' is 'clear and distinct' in tl1e way that the ideas of 'mathematical truths' 
are 'clear and distinct', then the 'clear and distinct idea' ofthe 'existence ofGod' 
is certain. Hence the 'ontological' proof rests, it would seem, on a notion of 
abstract likeness: 'God' is like 'mathematical truths', it would seem, according to 
Descartes' reasoning, in that it is a 'clear and distinct idea.' 'Existence' pertains 
to the 'clear and distinct idea' of 'God' as 'the maximum side of a triangle is 
opposite to its maximum angle.' But with the 'ontological' proof, the 'clear and 
distinct idea' of 'God' as 'a most highly perfect being' is distinguished by means 
of the derivation of' existence'. 
But how has Descartes offered a proof of the 'existence' of 'God'? 
The proof treats the idea of 'God' as a most highly perfect being. The 
notion of a 'most highly perfect being' distinguishes 'God', for Descartes, from 
'mathematical truths'. It would seem that,for Descartes, 'God' is, therefore, not 
pure idea, as with the abstract nature of 'mathematical truths', but that it has a 
determinant existential nature. But the actualization of this existential nature, 
however, is in no way guaranteed by establishing only that the idea of 'God' is 
'clear and distinct', namely that it exists in the mind in the same manner that the 
'mathematical truths' exist in the mind. If this is all that is meant by 'existence', 
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then 'God' is not reified in any sense external to the reality of mind, and it 'exists' 
only in the mind, i.e. its existential nature, then, is simply conceptual. A triangle, 
too, might never 'exist' objectively outside ofthe mind, but this is because there 
is nothing in the notion of triangle that suggests that it need ever be actual in any 
objective sense. 'Triangle' is free of the notion of 'existence' except that it is 
found to 'exist' in the mind. However, Descartes means to accomplish more than 
this when he aims to prove the 'existence' of' God', i.e. the 'existence' of' a most 
highly perfect being.' 
2.4. Descartes' Defense: Inseparability 
Central to the success of his proof, as he VIews it, then, is the 
inseparability of the 'essence' and 'existence' of'God'. 
For, since I be accustomed to distinguish the existence from the essence in all 
other things, I easily persuade myself that the existence can also be separated from 
the essence of God, and hence that God can be cogitated as not existing. But to 
one who is paying attention more diligently it still becomes manifest that the 
existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than it can be 
separated from the essence of a triangle that the magnitude of its three angles is 
equal to two right ones, or than the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea 
of a mountain -so much so that it would be just as contradictory to cogitate God 
(that is, a most highly perfect being) in whom existence would be lacking (that is, 
in whom a perfection would be lacking) as to cogitate a mountain from which a 
valley would be missing9 
It would be purely nonsensical to speak of a triangle which has only two angles, or 
of a mountain which is valley-less. This seems to be commonsense. But it does 
not seem to be commonsense that the 'essence' and 'existence' of'God' would be 
inseparabie in the idea of 'God'. This might not seem to be commonsense because 
9 Descartes, op cit., 66. Italics mine. 
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it requires that one assume that 'existence' is a 'perfection', 10 which Descartes 
does, i.e. an attribute of'God' as the sum of a triangles' angles equaling 180° is an 
attribute of a triangle. The idea of a triangle contains certain other ideas which are 
inseparable from the idea itself, none of which however is the idea of' existence'. 
The essential attributes of a triangle are contained within the idea 'triangle.' 
Contained in the idea 'God' is the notion of' existence' because it is an idea of' a 
most highly perfect being', a being which could not fail to be less than maximally 
perfect regarding all of its attributes. In each instance, however, save that of 
'God', the 'existence' of a thing is distinct from the 'essence' of the thing: the 
mere thinking of a thing in no way determines or effects the 'existence' of the 
thing, except in the case of the idea 'God.' It cannot fail to be contradictory, for 
Descartes, to separate the idea 'triangle' from its contained attributes, nor 
likewise can it fail to be contradictory to separate the idea 'God' from its 
contained attributes. Thus, for Descartes, if the attribute 'existence' is contained 
in the idea 'God', then it would be inconsistent to affirm the idea but exclude one 
of the ideas' defining characteristics. 
Descartes, then offers his 'ontological' proof as he does because he 
assumes that 'existence' is a 'perfection' which 'a most highly perfect' being 
would not be lacking. 
2.4. Descaries 'Defense: Necessity 
But, he recognizes that there seems to be a problem with 'thinking' being 
the stimulus for 'God's' existence: 
Granted, however, that I could not cogitate God except as existing, just as from 
thence that I could not cogitate a mountain without a valley: yet, just as from 
10 cf Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason Pt.2.2, bk.2.3.4 [incidentally T. W. Adorno suggests 
that this is a central passage to the whole Critique in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Polity: Bonn, 
2001), 41-2)]; Norman Malcolm "Anselm's Ontological Arguments" in Knowledge and Certainty: 
Essays and Lectures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); A. Plantinga's The Ontulugical 
Argument; G. Dicker "Meditation V: The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God" in 
Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (Oxford: 1993). Note 6 also. 
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thence that I would cogitate a mountain with a valley, it certainly does not follow 
that there is any mountain in the world, so also from thence that I would cogitate 
God as existing, it does not seem therefore to follow that God exists. For my 
cogitation imposes no necessity on the things. And just as it is permitted to 
imagine a winged horse, even if no horse would have wings, so also can I perhaps 
feign existence of God, although no God would exist. 11 
The thinking of a mountain does not require its 'existence' in the world, nor 
would the thinking of 'God' require that 'God' 'exists' (noticeably absent here in 
Descartes' Meditation is the prepositional phrase 'in the world' with regard to the 
manner in which 'existence' might be assumed to be required by the thinking of 
'God'. Thus, I take it that he does not mean to imply that 'God' 'exists' in the 
world 12). Apart from this point it seems nevertheless to be the case that merely 
thinking of an idea is not grounds for assuming its objective 'existence' as an 
externally real entity outside of the mind. This seems to be acceptable as regards 
mountains and triangles because they are ideas which are essentially devoid of the 
attribute of 'existence' (except that they exist in the mind in so far as they are 
cogitated). Mountains and triangles are ideas that might as it happens be 
represented by things which actually do 'exist' in the world; but they could be 
ideas as they are without ever becoming actual in terms of 'existence' outside of 
the mind. The subject 'mountain' in no way contains the attribute of 'existence' 
(in the world) because there is no necessity in the thing itself which determines 
the specific cogitation of mountain as being an idea that necessarily exists. The 
fact that a mountain 'exists' (in the world) is an accidental rather than an essential 
11 Descartes, op cit., 66-7. 
12 Incidentally, Descartes does not hold that triangles could ever be empirical data: "'I do not agree 
that these [geometrical figures] have ever fallen under our senses, as everyone normally believes, 
because though there is no doubt that there could be in the world figures such as the geometers 
consider, I deny that there are any around us, unless perhaps they be so small that they make no 
impression on our sense; because they are for the most part made up of straight lines, and I do not 
think that any part of a line has touched our sense which was strictly straight' ... (AT VII 381)"; 
quoted in Kenny, op cit., 179. 
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attribute of the idea 'mountain.' One can freely think of such a thing as a Pegasus, 
a Unicorn or a Satyr completely apart from the question of the 'existence' of such 
things, except that in so far as they are thought they 'exist' in the mind. 
But, for Descartes, the case with the idea of 'God' is different since it does 
contain the 'perfection' of 'existence'. In so far as the idea 'God' is cogitated, 
then 'God' necessarily exists outside of the mind: "not that my cogitation would 
effect this, or that it would impose any necessity on anything, but rather, on the 
contrary, because the necessity of the thing itself, namely, the existence of God, 
determines me to cogitate this.'' 13 The idea 'God' is constrained, as it were, by the 
necessity of its perfection and so, for Descartes, does not enjoy this freedom from 
'existence' as if it were a pure idea of mathematical reflection or the fancy of a 
fairy tale. Necessity accompanies the idea 'God' in a way unique to itself; none of 
the other ideas, according the Descartes, implies the objective 'existence' of its 
subject (but the mathematical ideas are spoken of as being immutable and eternal; 
surely this implies some notion of existence distinct from the mutable and 
temporal nature of mind? Indeed, in my view, this does imply such a notion of 
existence, namely 'abstract existence'). But how exactly are we to conceive of the 
'existence' of'God'? 
The persuasive element of Descartes' proof as he says is "solely the things 
that I clearly and distinctly perceive."14 What again are these things? As I 
understand the Meditation, these are initially and fundamentally the 
'mathematical truths.' At the outset of the Meditation, it is determined that ideas 
of 'mathematical truths' are most certain, and then it is determined that 'God' is a 
'clear and distinct' idea and that 'existence' 'clearly and distinctly' pertains to it. 
Yet having now proved the 'existence' of 'God' by this means, it now seems, for 
Descartes, that the certainty of this idea is more basic than even the certainty of 
'mathematical truth.' 
13 Ibid., 67. 
14 Ibid., 68 
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But, as for what pertains to God, if I were not overwhelmed by prejudices, and if 
the images of sensible things did not beset my cogitation from every side, I would 
certainly recognize nothing prior to, or more easily than, him. For what is more 
overt from out of itself than that the highest being is, or that God -to whose 
essence alone existence pertains- exists?15 
The rationally arrived at idea of 'God', if it were not for limitations placed on the 
mind by the empirical world, would be, for Descartes, the most fundamental and 
basic of all 'clear and distinct ideas'. And, for Descartes, 'existence', pertains 
only to this idea. I shall show in the next section that this is not the case if 
'mathematical truths', i.e. those truths which Descartes speaks of as being 
independent ofthe mind, 16 are conceived of as existing abstractly. 
I now intend to present three versions of the 'ontological' argument, and to 
analyze what it is that Descartes is able to achieve with this appellation of 
'existence' to the idea 'God'. The first version is my own formulation. The second 
was presented by Caterus; and the last was presented by Descartes in response to 
Caterus. I shall focus my analysis on my own formulation; but my analysis, since 
it focuses on the notion of 'existence', can be applied to the other two 
formulations as well. The result of my analysis is that Descartes succeeds only in 
proving that God exists outside of the mind in an abstract manner. 
3. Three Formulations of the 'Ontological' Proof 
The argument, as I see it, should be formulated as follows: 
(i) The idea of God as a most highly perfect being exists in my mind as does 
the idea of a figure or a number. 
(ii) I perceive clearly and distinctly that a most highly perfect being always 
exists as with the demonstration of an attribute of a figure or number. 
15 Ibid., 68. 
16 Ibid., 65. 
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(iii) Therefore, the existence of God is at least as certain as mathematical 
truths. 17 
I derive this formulation from the following text: 
(i) I certainly find within me the idea of God, namely, the idea of a most highly 
perfect being, no less than I do the idea of some figure or number. (ii) Nor do I 
understand less clearly and distinctly that it pertains to his nature that he always 
exist than that which I demonstrate of some figure or number also pertains to the 
nature of this figure or number. (iii) And, therefore, even if not all the things on 
which I have meditated in these previous days would be true, the existence of 
God must be \\rithin my reach at a minimum in the same grade of certainty in 
which mathematical truths have hitherto been. 
But Caterus in his objection presents it this way: 
(i) God is a supremely perfect being. 
(ii) And a supremely perfect being includes existence, for otherwise it would 
not be a supremely perfect being. 
(iii) Hence he actually exists. 
This formulation is drawn from the portion of the text wherein Descartes is 
defending what he dubs an 'apparent sophism' concerning the notion that the 
'essence' of 'God' indeed implies the 'existence' of 'God' (which comes after the 
above quoted section from which I draw my fonnulation). In this passage, 
Descartes seems to be presenting his reasoning for the purpose of defending 
premise two of my formulation. 
17 
cf Heffernan's "Introduction" to his translation of Meditations, op cit., 5; a presentation similar 
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Descartes' reply to Caterus' objection yields another formulation: 
My argument however was as follows: 'That which we clearly and distinctly 
understand to belong to the true and immutable nature, or essence, or form of 
something, can truly be asserted of that thing. But once we have made a 
sufficiently careful investigation of what God is, we clearly and distinctly 
understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable nature. Hence we can 
now truly assert of God that he does exist.' 18 
It was suggested in the previous section (p. 93) that the term 'God' in 
Descartes' proofwould seem to be interchangeable with the term 'triangle.' Such 
a substitution could work out something like this: 
(i) The idea of a rectilinear figure whose angles' together equal two right 
angles exists in my mind. 19 
(ii) I perceive clearly and distinctly that the idea of a triangle always exists. 
(iii) Therefore, the existence of a triangle is certain. 20 
to Caterus'. 
18 Cottingham's translation of the Meditations published with selections from Objections and 
Replies (Cambridge: 1986), 100. There are also other formulations. Of note is Descartes well 
known geometrico proof in Objections and Replies, II. Willis Doney argues that this argument is 
different from that to which it is supposed to correspond in Meditation Five, and to the argument in 
Discourse on Method (AT VI 36). See also Peter Dear "Mersenne's Suggestion: Cartesian 
Meditation and the Mathematical Model of Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century" in Descartes 
and His Contemporaries (Chicago: 1995), 44-62. 
19 Disregarding the development of non-Euclidean geometries which Descartes at that time would 
not have known about. 
20 cf A Kenny "Descartes' Ontological Argument" in Descartes' lvfeditations, ed. Vera Chappel, 
where he argues (in the context of a larger argument which suggests that Descartes' principles of 
the cogito and the existence of God cannot both be maintained) in what seems to be an effective 
manner for the notion of 'existence in thought.' In a contrived reply to a criticism that Hobbes had 
raised against Descartes concerning the necessity of a triangles' existing somewhere rather than 
having no existence at aiL Kenny presents this line of reasoning which seems to be in keeping with 
Cartesian thought on the matter: "What exists nowhere, neither in the world, nor in thought, can 
have no nature, perhaps; but the triangle exists in thought, and has a true and immutable nature 
which persists whether or not any triangles outside thought exist or cease to be" (179). This 
argument is revised on 180 to include the givenness of a triangle. On the Descartes-Hobbes 
dialogue see Tom Sorrel "Hobbes's Objections and Hobbes's System" and Edwin Curley "Hobbes 
Versus Descartes" in Descartes and His Contemporaries, op cit., 83-% and 97-109, respectively. 
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This was suggested to imply that Descartes' reasoning for the 'existence' of 'God' 
is reliant upon his reasoning concerning ideas such as triangles, not, however, to 
imply thatfor Descartes 'God', therefore, exists in the same manner as triangles 
exist. 
Interestingly, the passage that has just been quoted from Descartes' 
'Reply' to Caterus seems to do just this. Descartes structures this argument from 
the reasoning that he presents in the fifth paragraph concerning the nature of 
mathematical ideas: 
[5.] (iii) And what I think is maximally to be considered here is that I find within 
me innumerable ideas of certain things which, even if they would perhaps exist 
nowhere outside of me, still cannot be said to be nothing. And, although they 
would in a certain manner be cogitated by me at will, they are not feigned by me, 
but rather do they have their own true and immutable natures. (i) So that, when I 
imagine a triangle, for example, even if such a figure would perhaps exist 
nowhere in the world outside my cogitation- nor would it have ever existed-, 
there still is, in fact, a certain determinate nature or essence or form of it, 
immutable and eternal, which has not been feigned by me, nor does it depend on 
my mind: (ii) as is obvious from thence that various properties could be 
demonstrated about this triangle, namely, that its three angles be equal to two 
right ones, that the maximum side be opposite to its maximum angle, and similar 
things, which properties - whether I would want to or not want to - I now clearly 
recognize, even if I previously would in no way have then cogitated about them 
when I have imagined the triangle, nor would they therefore have been feigned by 
me. 
A formulation of which could be: 
102 
'Mathematical Truths' and the 'Existence' of 'God' in Descartes' 'Ontological' 
Argument: In Defense of Denys' Notion of Rational-Ikon 
(i) When I imagine a triangle there is a certain determinate nature or essence 
or form of it, immutable and eternal, which has not been feigned by me 
(i.e. a 'clear and distinct idea), nor does it depend on my mind. 
(ii) From this idea various properties could be demonstrated about this 
triangle: its three angles' equal two right ones, the maximum side is 
opposite to its maximum angle. 
(iii) Hence a triangle is not nothing because it has a true and immutable nature 
in my mind. 
Descartes' argument from the 'Reply' again is: 
(i) That which we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the true and 
immutable nature, or essence, or form of something, can truly be asserted 
of that thing. 
(ii) But once we have made a sufficiently careful investigation of what God 
is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true 
and immutable nature. 
(iii) Hence we can now truly assert of God that he does exist. 
What I find Descartes doing in his reply is precisely what I have suggested. He 
replaces the notion of 'triangle' with the notion of 'God'. In my opinion, this 
formulation seems to suggest that Descartes was unclear as to what he had in fact 
argued, and it also seems to support my claim that Descartes' 'ontological' proof 
is conceptually reliant on his notion of 'mathematical truth' .21 I do not take this to 
imply, however, that for Descartes 'God' and triangles exist in the same manner. 
But in the following, I shall argue that Descartes' reasoning shows does indeed 
seem to allow only that 'God' 'exists' abstractly because his notion of 'existence' 
21 
cf. W. Doney "Did Caterus Misunderstand Descartes's Ontological Proof?" in Essays on the 
Philosophy and Science of Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss (Oxford: 1993), 75-84; Jean-Robert 
Armogathe "Caterus' Objections to God" in Descartes and His Contemporaries, op cit., 34-43. 
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is defined by what can be inferred from the abstract nature of 'mathematical 
truth'. 
I turn now to an examination of my fonnulation of the argument, and, 
more precisely, to the notion of' existence'. 
3.I. Premise (i) of My Formulation: 
'The idea of God as a most highly perfect being exists in my mind as does the 
idea of a ji gure or a number. ' 
This premise has three parts. First, it states the definition which Descartes 
attaches to the term 'God', i.e. 'a most highly perfect being'. Secondly, it affirms 
that the idea 'God' 'exists' in the mind. Thirdly, it clarifies that this idea 'exists' 
in the mind like a figure or a number, i.e. it exists 'clearly and distinctly'. 
Contained in Descartes' definition of 'God' is the implication that such a 
'being' would be in possession of 'perfection' in all possible manners. The 
'perfection' that is central to his argument is that of 'existence'. This premise 
establishes this 'perfection', however, only in terms of' existence' in the mind as a 
'clear and distinct idea'. Thus, this premise is accepted on the grounds that it 
seems basically to be his definition of tl1e term 'God', and claims only that the 
idea 'God' 'exists' 'clearly and distinctly' in the mind. 
I do, however, think that this premise is not adequately defended in the 
Meditations. In both the Third as well as the Fifth Meditation, Descartes assumes 
tl1at 'God' is 'a most highly perfect being'; but the Fifth Meditation, I shall argue, 
provides a context within which to interpret what this could imply. This notion 
plays an important role in his argument from 'perfection' (Third Meditation), 
wherein he claims that 'God' is the 'ultimate cause'. But nowhere in this 
Meditation (or anywhere else in the Meditations) does he present an argument in 
support of it. It is my contention that he comes closest to doing so with his 
reliance on 'mathematical truths' in the Fifth Meditation. These 'tmths', if they 
are taken to be paradigmatic as I argue, delineate what Descartes is able to claim 
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with his notion of'perfection'. In my view, the notion remains abstract, and so his 
argument in the Third Meditation, which attributes a causal nature to 'God', taken 
together with his reasoning in the Fifth Meditation, would not be sound. It would 
not be sound because, in my opinion, his usage of 'causal' turns out to be 
equivocal. Interpreted in terms of the Fifth Meditation, 'causal' would seem to 
imply some abstract perfection. Here is an example of what I mean: Given an 
indeterminately extended line that intersects both points A and B, this 
indeterminately extended line is, therefore, the 'cause' of the line segment AB. 
But in the Third Meditation, Descartes clearly uses causal in a different manner, 
namely as 'creator' and 'preserver' of himself and all things. 
This first premise, however, claims only that the idea 'God' as 'a most 
perfect being' 'exists' in the mind, as I stated above, and so, for the 'ontological' 
proof of the Fifth Meditation it is acceptable, at least for my purpose. I want to 
focus now on his notion of' existence'. 
3.2. Premise (ii) of My Formulation: 
'/perceive clearly and distinctly that a most highly perfoct being always exists as 
with the demonstration of an attribute of a figure or number. ' 
The second premise claims that 'God', i.e. 'a most highly perfect being', 
'exists' 'always'. This is the case because 'a most highly perfect being' would 
only be 'most highly perfect' if it 'always exists', rather than not existing or only 
existing for a certain duration. Descartes is therefore .claiming, in this premise, the 
'perfection' of 'existence' in a manner distinct from his claim in the first premise. 
The previous premise, we might say, claims a conceptual form of 'existence'; 
whereas this premise claims, I shall argue, an abstract form of 'existence'. We 
have already discussed in the first section the manner in which Descartes views 
'existence' as a perfection. But this notion is important to Descartes' defense of 
the second premise. So we shall review it here. 
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Descartes defends this premise in the following manner. He argues that 
"existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than it can be 
separated from the essence of a triangle that the magnitude of its three angles is 
equal to two right ones ... it would be just as contradictory to cogitate God (that 
is, a most highly perfect being) in whom existence would be lacking (that is, in 
whom a perfection would be lacking) as to cogitate a mountain from which a 
valley would be missing." Thus, assuming that 'existence' is a 'perfection', then, 
'existence' could noi not be part of what is meant by 'God.' 
The subjects 'triangle,' 'mountain,' 'horse' seem to be similar types of 
subjects in one respect, whereas 'God' seems to be quite different in exactly this 
respect. More precisely, in neither of these former cases does the thinking of the 
thing require the 'existence' of the thing, which is the requirement ofthe thinking 
of the subject 'God.' Just in case a triangle actually 'exists', then it will have three 
angles; its angles will be equal to two right angles (assuming it is Euclidean); just 
in case a mountain 'exists', then it will have a valley; just in case a horse 'exists', 
then it will not have wings. These subjects can be thought whether they 'exist' or 
not. Thus, according to Descartes, there is a certain freedom realized in the 
thinking ofthese subjects that does not extend to the thinking of'God': "I am not 
free to cogitate [Him] without existence (that is, a most perfect being without the 
highest perfection)", Descartes argues, "as I am free to imagine a horse with 
wings or without wings. "22 These subjects, in other words, can 'exist' in the mind 
alone, but the subject 'God' cannot. 
The problem that I see with Descartes' reasoning here is that he only 
allows for 'existence' in the mind and 'existence' in the world with regard, 
specifically, to the 'mathematical truths', even though he has already implied a 
third type of 'existence'. The 'mathematical truths' he speaks of earlier in the 
Meditation as being independent of the mind, immutable and etemal,23 and holds 
22 cf Ibid., 67. 
23 cf Ibid., 65. 
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as well that we do not have empirical experiences of such things.24 It seems, then, 
that, on the one hand, Descartes maintains that these 'truths' don't exist only in 
the mind, and, on the other hand, that they do 'exist' only in the mind. My claim 
is that this is inconsistent, and that his earlier description of these 'truths' as being 
immutable, eternal and independent of the mind implies a type of 'existence' that 
is neither empirical, nor conceptual. The present defense of the second premise, 
then, as I see it, is not successful. It is tmsuccessful because the inseparability of 
'existence' from 'essence' argument applies not just to 'God', as he argues, but to 
'mathematical truths' as well because implied in Descartes' reasoning concerning 
the 'mathematical truths' is the notion that they are necessary in an abstract 
manner. 'And, although they would in a certain manner be cogitated by me at 
will,' Descartes maintains, 'they are not feigned by me, but rather do they have 
their own true and immutable natures. So that, when I imagine a triangle, for 
example, even if such a figure would perhaps exist nowhere in the world outside 
my cogitation -nor would it ever have existed-, there still is, in fact, a certain 
determinate nature or essence or form of it, which has not been feigned by me, nor 
does it depend on my mind'. I understand Descartes' affirmation of 'their own 
true and immutable natures' and 'a certain determinate nature or essence or form' 
together with his denial that 'such a figure would perhaps exist nowhere in the 
world outside my cogitation' to imply that the 'mathematical truths' indeed do 
'exist' outside of the mind, though not in the world. Thus, this 'existence outside 
ofthe mind' I understand to be a kind of necessary ('immutable and eternal') and 
abstract ('nor does it depend on my mind') 'existence'. 
3.2.1. Abstract Nature of 'Mathematical Troth· 
I want to put aside the question of whether 'existence' is a 'perfection', 
however, and look at what type of 'existence' Descartes, in any case, is actually 
able to claim. I have said already that this premise claims an abstract form of 
24 See note 13 above. 
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'existence' for 'God'. I shall explain here why this is the case. Here, then, I tum to 
what I deem to be the central aspect of my reading of Descartes' Fifth Meditation, 
and particularly the 'ontological' argument. 
For Descartes, 'God' contains the 'perfection' of 'always existing'. If we 
understand this claim in terms of the paradigm of 'mathematical truth', which I 
believe we must, then it seems to be the case that 'always exists' can be taken to 
mean only 'always exists like figures and numbers'. A 'figure or number', for 
Descartes, 'always exists' independently of whether or not it is cogitated, 
'immutably and eternally'. Thus, the second premise, while not equating 'God' 
with 'mathematical truth', is only able to further the 'perfection' of' existence' by 
means of affirming an abstract 'existence' which is 'more perfect' than 
conceptual 'existence'. This 'more perfect' form of 'existence', as I have just 
called it, is, therefore, what is ultimately implied by Descartes' conception of 
'God' as 'a most highly perfect being'. Thus, the 'ontological' argument requires 
a conception of' God' as an 'abstract being'. 
it is not my contention that this conception, though, is what Descartes 
intends to affirm. He seems to intend to imply that 'God' is a 'most highly perfect 
being' in a general sense: most highly perfect than all perfect 'being' (including 
what we could dub 'abstract being'). His reasoning seems to imply, however, only 
that 'God' can be understood to mean 'a most highly perfect being' in terms of the 
abstract 'being' of 'mathematical truth', as I have just shown. Thus, my claim is 
that this understanding of 'most highly perfect being' is tl1e only consistent 
interpretation of what Descartes can show with his 'ontological' proof. His usage 
of 'existence' to imply more than this is, according to my reading, therefore, 
equivocal. 
3.2.1.1. Conceding 'Existence' as a 'Perfection' 
It seems, then, that 'existence', understood in this manner, would not 
result in the same existence as a perfection problem: for the proof establishes, 
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according to my reading, only that 'God' exists conceptually and abstractly. There 
would indeed, however, still remain a problem with conceiving of' existence' as a 
'perfection' even in this sense; but I have shown that the question, now, is 
whether or not 'abstract existence' adds anything to the notion 'God'. Assuming 
'abstract existence' to be objective in some sense, then it would seem to be the 
case that it does. Descartes' argument, if we grant the claim that 'abstract 
existence' is a 'perfection', however, seems effective in proving the 'existence' of 
'God', a 'God' which is only an abstract entity. This implies that 'God', according 
to Descartes' 'ontological' proof(though not necessarily for Descartes), is devoid 
of a 'personal' nature, i.e. a nature to which might pertain characteristics such as 
'omnipotent', 'omniscient', 'omnibenevolent', 'omniproductive', 'omnipresent', 
or as 'longsuffering', 'loving', 'mighty', 'creator', 'redeemer' and 'sanctifier', 
'trinity', 'incarnate'. 
Returning to the issue of causality, it follows from this line of reasoning as 
well, therefore, that if Descartes' proof can show consistently only that 'a most 
highly perfect being' 'exists' abstractly, then Descartes' claim in the Third 
Meditation that 'God' is the 'ultimate cause', again, seems to be equivocal. Above 
I suggested that this claim would be equivocal on the grounds that it is used in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the notion of 'perfection' that Descartes' Fifth 
Meditation seems to require. My suggestion here is that it would be equivocal 
because it would not correspond with what he is able to show in the Fifth 
Meditation concerning the 'existence' of 'God'. 
3.3. Conclusion of My Formulation: 
'Therefore, the existence of God is at least as certain as mathematical trnths. ' 
The forgoing discussion (from 3.1. on) demonstrates that this conclusion 
can be accepted (i) if it is granted (as I wish to do for the sake of this discussion) 
that 'abstract existence' is a perfection and (ii) if the 'perfection' of 'existence' is 
here taken to mean 'conceptual and abstract existence'. 
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4. Circularity and Apophasis 
It might be argued that implicit in my analysis of Descartes' 'ontological' 
proof is the further claim that Descartes' argument is circular. At the end of the 
first section, however, I suggested that Descartes' position could be taken in an 
apophatic sense. This, I think, would be a more charitable approach to Descartes' 
reasoning. Here I shall show, first, how the argument could be viewed as being 
circular. Secondly, I shall show how Descartes' reasoning could be interpreted in 
an apophatic manner. 
4.1. Circularity 
The following line of reasoning exposes the apparent problem with 
Descartes' reasoning: 
[13) And, although an attentive consideration has been needed for me to perceive 
this [i.e. the existence of God] itself, yet now not only am I equally as certain of it 
as of all else that seems most certain, but also I notice, in addition, that the 
certitude of the other things so depends on this itself that nothing could ever be 
known perfectly without it. 25 
If this last clause is taken seriously, then what was affirmed about the certainty of 
mathematical truths, namely that they are the 'most certain', becomes 
problematic. I have said that if we grant that 'abstract existence' is a perfection, 
then Descartes' 'ontological' argument is successful in proving the 'existence' of 
an abstract 'God'; but his reliance on 'mathematical truth', nevertheless, might 
result in circular reasoning. 
Descartes seems to view the essence-existence problem as the only issue 
that might affect the soundness of his argument, and having become certain of its 
role in the second premise -'as certain of it as of all else that seems most certain'-
25 Ibid, 69. 
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he then determines that 'the certitude of the other things so depends on this itself 
that nothing could ever be known perfectly without it.' The certainty of the most 
certain trutl1s of mathematics are no longer the most certain truths; for they are 
dependent upon the truth of the 'existence' of 'God'. But the notion of the 
'existence' of 'God' has been arrived at within the context of the certainty of 
mathematical truths. For if no 'perfect knowledge' (i.e., certainty) is possible 
apart from this 'one cognition of the true God', then this 'one cognition of the true 
God' is itself impossible to arrive at certainly because the 'most certain' truths of 
mathematics have been necessary for doing so. That which was indubitable for the 
discerning of this 'one cognition of the true God' is now dubitable except for this 
'one cognition.' 
If 'existence' can be understood consistently only in terms of the abstract 
nature of 'mathematical truth', then his overarching line of reasoning seems to be 
something like this: if 'mathematical truth' always exists (abstractly), then 'God' 
always exists (abstractly); if 'God' always exists (abstractly), then 'mathematical 
truths' always exist (abstractly). Therefore, if 'mathematical truth' always exists 
(abstractly), then 'mathematical truth' always exists (abstractly).Z6 
If this syllogism accurately characterizes Descartes' thought, then it 
amounts to nothing more than 'if A, then A'. Thus, Descartes' 'ontological' 
argument relies on circular reasoning. 
4.2. Denys' 'Sculptor Analogy' and Rational-Ikon 
Is it the case that Descartes' reasoning evinces an overt circularity? It 
seems to me to do so. But, as I see it, one could interpret Descartes' present 
26 
cf Objections and Replies, op cit., 102-3. Caterus argues that Descartes equivocates by affirming 
that nothing can be clearly known apart from a certain knowledge of God, but that he knows 
himself clearly and distinctly to be a thinking thing. Descartes' rather ineffective reply is this: ''When 
I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared 
that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no 
longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them Now awareness of first 
principles is not normally called knowledge by dialecticians." First principles presumably would be 
things like his cogilo and the truths of mathematics; both of which he speaks of in terms of 
epistemic certainty. 
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affirmation of the certainty of the idea of 'God', apart from which nothing else 
could be certain, as a slightly veiled form of apophatic thought. It is apophatic 
thought of a different order than that of Denys' because it is purely philosophical, 
whereas Denys' approach is avowedly theological. But more importantly, it is 
different because it is utterly natural in its approach and makes full use of rational 
proof, whereas Denys is, according to his own estimation, concerned solely with 
revelation and never addresses proof directly. And finally, it is different because 
of its insistence upon the acquisition of certainty, a notion which is foreign to 
Denys' position. But since I think that Descartes' 'ontological' argument seems 
only to affirm an abstract entity which is called 'God', I think that it is important 
to consider whether or not it is more plausible, nevertheless, i.e. even though 
Descartes is not attempting such a thing himself, that 'God' is unknowable. It is 
my contention that this is, implicitly suggested by the inadequacy of his 
'ontological' argument. The inadequacy of the proof, again, is rooted, for me, in 
its conception of 'God' as an abstract entity, not with the question of 'existence' 
as a predicate (at least in terms of the present discussion). Thus, I have conceded 
the latter, and here I shall offer an alternative interpretation of the former, which 
will address the charge of circularity as well. 
4. 2.1. From Cartesian Apophasis to Dionysian Apophasis 
Descartes' own estimation of the certainty ofthe 'clear and distinct idea' 
of' God' seems itself to suggest a certain degree of apophatic thought. 
[14] For, even if I be of such a nature that, so long as I am very clearly and 
distinctly perceiving something, I could not not believe that it is true, ... Other 
reasons can still be offered which -if I were ignorant of God- would easily throw 
me off from the opinion, and thus I would never have true and certain knowledge 
of anything, but rather would I ever have only vague and changeable opinions on 
everything. .But, after I have perceived that there is a God, because I have 
simultaneously also understood that all the other things depend on him and that 
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he is not a deceiver -and I have therefrom gathered that all those things which I 
clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily true-, even if I were no longer to be 
paying attention to the reasons of which I have judged that this is true, if only I 
would remember that I have clearly and distinctly perceived it, no contrary reason 
can be offered that might impel me to doubt it, but rather do I have true and 
certain knowledge of it. .. And thus do I plainly see that the certitude and truth of 
all knowledge depends on the one cognition of the true God -so much so that, 
before I would know him, I could have perfectly lrJlown nothing about any other 
thing. But now innumerable things -both of God himself and of other intellectual 
things, as well as, too, of all that corporeal nature which is the object of pure 
mathematics- can be fully known by, and certain to, me. 27 
For the truth and certainty at one time thought to be thorough and sure with regard 
to 'mathematical truths' now seems to require constant attention to demonstration 
for the sense of truth and certainty to be a persuasive element.28 'Ibis sense of 
tmth and cettai.nty Descattes seems to conceive of now as being inferior to a 
greater sense of truth and certainty which is occasioned by the perception of the 
'clear and distinct idea' of 'God'. It seems only to be required that the truth of 
'God' be remembered, however, not that the mind remain fixed on the 
demonstration of this truth, for this sense of truth and certainty to be effective 
when 'doubt' arises. Furthermore, this sort of truth and certainty though resident 
in the mind and determinable thereby seems also to be unconstrained by the 
inherent weaknesses of the mind which are occasioned at least by sense 
perception. Thus, the 'mathematical truths' no longer seem to be the 'most true' 
because he seems to deny his former claim that 'mathematical truths' are the most 
certain truths. Nevertheless, his own concern with the 'existence' of 'God' has 
explicitly to do with guarding against 'changeable opinions' and foundationalizing 
all knowledge; apophasis is, therefore, implicit. 
27 Ibid., 69-0. 
28 
cf 69, the example of'considering the nature of a triangle.' 
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Furthermore, in the first section of this chapter, I pointed out that his 
initial aim in the Meditation is to examine whether or not certain 'ideas' of 
material things are 'distinct' or 'confused'. There I pointed out that, by means of 
empirical phenomena, Descartes investigates the 'clear and distinct' ideas of 
'material things', and, by this means, ultimately affirms the 'existence' of 'God'. 
We have, therefore, it would seem, the lineaments of a Dionysian paradigm in 
Descartes' reasoning even prior to his claim concerning the certainty of 
'mathematical truths'. There is a progression from the empirical, to the rational 
to ... and here the analogy falters because for Denys 'unknowing' ensues, but for 
Descartes, certainty is achieved. If I am correct in suggesting that apophasis seems 
to be a tacit element of Descartes' reasoning, then his notion of 'certainty' seems 
to suggest a tacit sense of 'unknowing'. 
A Dionysian apophatic interpretation of Descartes' implicit apophasis 
which might circumvent the charge of circularity, begins with rational-ikon. For 
example, Descartes' denial of the affirmation that 'mathematical truths' are the 
most certain alone seems to suggest that 'mathematical truths', while necessary 
for getting to the truth of the 'existence' of 'God', must ultimately be removed in 
order to reveal the 'existence' of 'God'. If we take this denial in terms of what I 
have dubbed Denys' notion of rational-ikon and his 'sculptor' analogy, then this 
tacit apophatic move, while reevaluating the role of 'mathematical truths', namely 
that they are necessary but not sufficient, would seem also to suggest, at least for 
the sake of consistency alone, the need for the same type of apophatic 
reevaluation of the notion of the 'abstract existence of God'. 
Furthermore, we determined in chapter Two that, according to Denys, 
whatever becomes known by means of sense-awareness and reason is spoken of 
kataphatically, and according to the method of unknowing such statements are 
apophasized. TI1is process was treated in tenns of Moses' Sinaitic ascent (MT I 
1000c-100la). It was argued that Moses' ascent accents three existential elements 
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of unknowing: purification, illumination and union. These, I suggested, together 
form an epistemic ethic of unknowing. But the Moses example is, in comparison 
with Descartes, rather explicit. His endeavor, moreover, is quite different from 
Descartes'. With Moses we have an explicit context of religious sentiment and 
worship, and so Moses 'purifies himself of the empirical elements of worship. By 
means of empirical phenomena he goes into empirical things to contemplate the 
One who dwells within them, and so is united with the beyond-being. Descartes' 
Fifth Meditation, though different from Moses' Sinaitic ascent, can be viewed, 
nevertheless, in an analogous manner, though devoid of a context of religious 
sentiment and worship. 
Denys' 'sculptor analogy', suggests, as we noted, that the theologian, like 
Moses, would be 'just as the ones creating (JTotoffvr£{,) a statue of natural things, 
removing everything that is an obstruction to the true sight of that which is 
hidden, and revealing this hidden beauty by means of negation alone' (MT II, 
1025b). It was suggested that this analogy could be taken to refer to the creative 
process in general, although the analogy seems explicitly to refer to the creative 
process of sculpting. Furthermore, the analogy seems to emphasize effectively, as 
we noted, that apophasis is a necessary methodological element of the creative 
process. I argued that Denys' interest in the analogy lies in what we called his 
notion of 'theological' creativity, rather than in an artistic or scientific form of 
creativity. However, I also argued that his theory seems to recognize these other 
forms to be ikons of the theological; in other words, according to his position, 
other forms of creativity, e.g. artistic or scientific, would in one way or another 
employ apophatic thought as well. Here, I suggest, that Denys' position seems to 
imply that philosophical creativity, for Descartes, seems to do the same. 
The question arises, therefore, as it did in chapter Two regarding Denys' 
position, as to what it is that might be taken to be Descartes' medium of 
philosophical creation? Denys' medium is himself (or, more properly, the denial 
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of himself), but the sculptor's is marble, metal, stone; the painter's is paint; the 
writer's is words; the musician's is music; the scientist's is nature. The obvious 
answer might be that Descartes' medium is reason; and this, it seems to me, is 
accurate, but could be defined a bit more precisely. We noted that his discussion 
began with an interest in the 'clear and distinct ideas' of 'material things'. Given 
this interest, we might then want to suggest that his medium is, rather than the 
general notion of reason, a specific aspect of reason, namely 'ideas'. More 
specifically, Descartes' medium could be taken to be the 'clear and distinct idea' 
ofthe 'existence' of'God', which I have argued is an abstract notion. 
Another question, then, arises. What is it that Descartes is supposed to be 
understood to be producing? The theologian, according to Denys, produces 
(synergistically) a 'deified' person; the sculptor produces a sculpture; the painter a 
painting; the writer a written work; the musician a musical composition; the 
scientist (ideally) a natural law, or some aspect thereof We have noted in the 
course of this chapter that Descartes' interest is in achieving certainty. Thus, 
conceived of in terms of the above analogy, this goal would imply that his aim in 
the Fifth Meditation is to produce certainty as regards the 'existence' of'God'. 
I argued, in the second chapter, that the sculptor, the scientist, the poet, the 
musician and the painter, for example, each creates the thing of which it is his/her 
occupation's purpose to produce, namely a sculpture, a physical law, a poem, a 
piece of music, a painting, respectively. And, in the context of Denys' thought, I 
argued that each of these types of 'creations' reveals a beauty that prior to the 
creative process was hidden. These types of 'creation', to put it differently, reveal 
a beauty that is empirical and rational (at least partially so), because beauty in 
these instances is mediate-able through material, language and mathematics. The 
theologian, on the other hand, (Moses e.g.) in one sense has nothing to show for 
his labors because beauty in the theological sense is not mediate-able. Moses' 
apophatic efforts, according to Denys' position, can never result in some piece of 
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writing, art or music, e.g., that has captured the fullness of the beauty of the 
beyond-being, as a sculptor, writer, or scientist might well be said to have 
captured the beauty of his/her subject. Moses, we noted, meets not with a certain 
aspect of the process of relational beauty, but with the Source and End of the 
process Itself. Denys envisions this goal as being that of becoming a purified, 
illuminated and wholly united ikon of the infinite presence of the process of 
relational beauty. Descartes' goal of certainty, however, seems to be completely at 
odds with Denys' goal of union. 
But taken in terms of being-as-ikon, Descartes' medium and his aim of 
producing certainty, as it were, results in a position that, as opposed to what 
Denys claims concerning Moses, realizes a certain aspect of the process of 
relational beauty, rather than its Source and End. Furthermore, it is this 'certain 
aspect', I suggest, that the 'ontological' argument dubs 'God' in an implicitly 
apophatic manner. According to Denys' theory of being-as-ikon, the problem of 
the claim of' certainty', then, is that it distorts the ikonic nature of being by means 
of reducing it to an aspect of itself, and affirming this aspect to be the defining 
characteristic of being. In this particular instance, the 'existence' of 'God' in 
Descartes' 'ontological' argument is an isolation of being's rationally-ikonic 
nature, which, as such, distorts the nature of being by affirming that a certain 
aspect of being alone, namely the rational aspect, can fully manifest 'God'. Such 
an 'isolation', from a Dionysian perspective, removes one element from the 
process of relational beauty, and, therefore, thwarts the possibility of legitimate 
participation with being, and, therefore the possibility of union with the beyond-
being. 
But how might this line of reasoning be used to rescue the 'ontological' 
proof from the charge of circularity? From a Dionysian perspective, Descartes' is 
a position that engages the infinite presence of the process of relational beauty in 
terms of rational-ikons, as the scientist's work, from a Dionysian perspective, 
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would tell the story, at least in some sense, of this process from the perspective of 
empirical-ikons. The 'circularity' of his reasoning, therefore, from a Dionysian 
perspective, is a rational interpretation of 'ideas' as rational-ikons of the beyond-
being. From a Dionysian perspective, then, his reasoning, rather than being 
viewed as going in a 'circle', goes into its idea-ikons, and, thus, into that which 
indwells them, by a sculpture-like negation process. My suggestion, then, is that, 
to rescue the 'ontological' proof from the charge of 'circularity', according to 
Denys' position, it must be seen not as standing alone in its effort to achieve 
certainty of the existence of God, but as being part of a relational network of 
rational-ikons which each reveals, according to its capacity, the beyond-being by 
means of the process of relational beauty. In this way, my claim that the 
'ontological' argument can only show that 'God' exists abstracily, is an 
acceptable conclusion because, as a rational-ikon, it too must ultimately be 
negated. 
Such an interpretation of Descartes' reasoning implies, moreover, a re-
evaluation of his notion of 'certainty'. Seen in the context of Denys' process of 
relational beauty, a claim of certainty is a kataphatic rational-ikon that, according 
to Denys' position, would itself require apophasis. Insofar as 'certainty' is viewed 
in this manner, according to a Dionysian perspective, then it, as a rational-ikon of 
the beyond-being, manifests the mystery of beyond-being as well as the mystery of 
being, and so can be interpreted as a kind of 'unknowing' on account of its ikonic 
natm·e. Put differently, the 'certainty' that 'God' 'exists' conceptually and 
abstractly, if a Dionysian position is solicited, becomes certainty-as-ikon, and so 
the acknowledgement of the ikon as presence of tl1e beyond-being relativizes the 
possible scope of 'certainty'. Thus relativized, it manifests the 'rays of the Divine 
splendor', as Denys would have it, and so is an occasion of 'unknowing'. But 
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insofar as it is not viewed in this manner, according to Denys' position, 'certainty' 
becomes an idol.29 
5. Conclusion 
5.I. Summary of the Main Argument 
'Existence' is a 'perfection', for Descartes, if and only if the essence-
existence distinction does not hold with the subject 'God'. This distinction, he 
argues, does not hold. I have argued that even if we grant this point, the argument 
is still only able to show that 'God', at the most, exists abstractly because it 
presents 'most highly perfect being' in such a way that it can only be consistently 
understood in the Fifth Meditation in terms of what I have called the abstract 
being of 'mathematical truth'. Thus, though the argument might be taken to be 
sound, as it were, if grant this point, there remains a gap between theistic proof 
and theology. My reading of Descartes' Fifth Meditation implies as well that a 
'circular' line of reasoning seems to plague his tlrinking. But I have suggested 
alternatively that this situation could be interpreted as a form of 'apophatic' 
thought, and that, taken in a Dionysian sense, his could be seen as a position that 
treats the rational ikons of ideas, in which case his notion of' certainty' becomes a 
form of 'unknowing'. Such an interpretation, in my opinion, bridges the gap, as it 
were, between theistic proof and theology. 
5.2. Final Thoughts 
I find it difficult to VIew the Fifth Meditation as offering a way of 
conceiving of 'clear and distinct ideas' except by means of 'mathematical truths.' 
For since I see 'mathematical truths' as the initial and only example of 'clear and 
distinct ideas' (except for the idea of 'God' and the cogito, which is assumed), 
29 This case could be made, as I see it, from the perspective of Denys' notion of the hierarchy of 
knowledge, namely that empirical being is hierarchically anterior, according to Denys' notion of 
participation, to rational being. If the case were to be made beginning with Denys' notion of 
kataphasis in this way, then it would progress into the kind of case that I have just presented 
because, as I have argued with the previous chapters, kataphasis, according to my reading of Denys, 
necessarily implies apophasis, and apophasis necessarily assumes kataphasis. But I have not made 
the above case in this manner; I have focused attention on Denys' 'sculptor analogy'. 
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then I, therefore, find it difficult to distinguish between 'clear and distinct ideas' 
and 'mathematical truths' finely enough to be able to think of 'clear and distinct 
ideas' independently of 'mathematical truths.' In my opinion, if Descartes had not 
offered any other 'clear and distinct ideas' apart from the 'clear and distinct idea 
of the existence of God', then, given that the cogito is not appealed to, his 
'ontological' argument would suffer from incoherence because the notion of 
'clear and distinct ideas' would be too vague; his appeal to 'mathematical truths', 
however, in my opinion, makes it clear what the argument is able to show in terms 
of conceiving of 'God' as a 'clear and distinct idea'. And, furthermore, this 
'appeal' as an affirmation over against the denial of certainty with regard to 
material things alone taken together with his subsequent denial of this 'appeal' in 
the face of the certainty of the 'existence' of'God', suggests that his reasoning in 
the Fifth Meditation is apophatic, rather than circular. 
Descartes' position is one to which I am personally attracted, though I find 
it difficult to reconcile it with a traditional notion of God. My Dionysian approach 
to his 'ontological' argument, I believe, provides a way of affinning the role of a 
priori proof as an important element of the theological endeavor, and, thus, of 
reconciling Descartes' line of reasoning with a traditional notion of God. 
* * * 
The following chapter, in a similar manner, provides a way of affirming 
the role of science as an important element of the theological endeavor. The 
notion of empirical-being-as-ikon, in my opinion, offers a plausible response 
when applied to the question of the origin of the sense of the beautiful. We shall 
turn now to this discussion. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall use Weinberg and Heisenberg's treatments of beauty 
to develop a notion of the sense of the beautiful. I shall then suggest that this 
notion seems to exhibit a sense of apophaticism. Denys' position, for me, then 
provides a plausible interpretative framework. 
2. Scientific Discovery: The Influence of Beauty 
2.1. Mercury and Einstein's GTR 
Steven Weinberg, in the context of making his argument for the 
probability ofthe discovery of a 'final theory', argues that 'beauty' or 'a sense of 
the beautiful' plays a significant role in the toil of scientific discovery. 1 In his 
chapter entitled "Tales of Theory and Experiment", he recounts a 'tale' of 
Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
Since 'the mid-1920's', just a few short years after having introduced it to 
the world, Einstein's theory of gravitation had begun to affect broadly physicists' 
understanding of gravity. It seemed that, suddenly, Newton's position was no 
longer viable; what had once seemed to be a fundamental assumption concerning 
gravity suddenly was relegated to the level of an apparent scientific error. This 
was not, however, a total surprise. There had been an on-going difficulty with 
Newton's system which was recognized at least among specialists. The problem 
had to do with "a difficulty in understanding the orbit of the planet Mercury." 
During this time, Weinberg tells us, it was determined "that the orbit of the planet 
Mercury changes its orientation about 57 5 seconds in a century" (or a little less 
than 1/6 of a degree). This was more precession than Newton's theory would 
allow. Astronomers were able to detennine that within Newton's system, Mercury 
would predictably precess at a rate of '43 seconds per century' slower, that is it 
'should precess by 532 seconds per century'. Although this difference might seem 
negligible, it was well known that Newton's theory might well become untenable 
1 Steven Weinberg Dreams of a Final Theory (New York: Vintage, 1993), 90-165. 
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on the basis of the resolution of this 43 second discrepancy? Einstein's theory, 
according to Weinberg, was taken by many at the time as having dealt the leveling 
blow. But the available evidence would not have supported such a conclusion. 
2.2. Light Rays and Einstein's GTR 
Weinberg reminds us of the difference between a prediction and a 
retrodiction. The former, although important for scientific theories, provides a 
weaker degree of support than does the latter. The reason for this, Weinberg 
argues, is that retrodiction deals with an 'already-known' at1omaly, whereas a 
prediction suggests 'a new effect. ' 3 Einstein's general theory of relativity, for 
example, predicts that "[t]he photons in a ray of light are deflected by 
gravitational fields. "4 TI1is was shown to be the case; but the experiments had to 
be conducted. In the case of Mercury's precession, the experiments had been 
done; the empirical data was available, and Einstein's theory explained the data. 
But this was not the case with the deflection of photons by a gravitational field. In 
this case, the theory suggests a certain type of empirical data that might be 
discovered. With an anomaly that is dealt with retrodictively, the theory either 
solves the empirical problem or it does not. However, a new effect that is 
predicted by a theory needs empirical data to support it, and, according to 
Weinberg, data that is gathered in this manner should always be treated as suspect 
because the experimenters might well have a theoretical ax to grind, the 'grinding' 
of which might well be accomplished with the 'rock' of empirical data. It is less 
likely, however, that a theorist would develop his/her theory to explain some 
existing anamoly, according to Weinberg, than it is that an experimenter would 
tweak his/her evidence to support a very attractive and useful theory. 
2 Weinberg points out that "[a] theory like Newton's theory of gravitation that has an enormous 
scope of application is always plagued by experimental anomalies." So even though this problem 
existed and was well known, it was not until Einstein's theory solved it that the importance of the 
anomaly was accurately evaluated (Weinberg, op cit., 93-4). 
3 Ibid., 96. 
122 
The Sense of the BeautifUl in Scientific Discovery as Apophatic Thought: In 
Defense of Denys' Notion of Empirical-Ikon 
2.2.1. Experimental Support: Retrodiction and Prediction 
The general theory of relativity was able to garner both retrodictive and 
predictive support; but while the retrodictive treatment of Mercury's precession 
provided more support, according to Weinberg, it is, nevertheless, important to 
understand that "it is not that experimentalists falsifY their data." He continues as 
follows: 
To the best of my knowledge there never has been an important case of outright 
falsification of data in physics. But experimentalists who know the result that 
they are theoretically supposed to get naturally find it difficult to stop looking for 
observational errors when they do not get that result or to go on looking for errors 
when they do It is a testimonial to the strength of character of experimentalists 
that they do not always get the results they expect. 5 
The interesting thing here is that, until the advent of radar and radio astronomy (in 
the 1930's), which provided indisputable evidence for the prediction of the 
deflection of light passing the sun as well as for the motion of Mercury and other 
bodies as well, this was the only evidence supporting the general theory of 
relativity, i.e. it was supported by an anomaly and a prediction. Thus, the general 
theory of relativity became the scientific ground-swell that we have already 
mentioned on the basis of two bits of evidence. One would imagiile that it might 
have taken a lot more. Newton's theory had served well for so long; why, 
Weinberg asks, would we want to abandon it so quickly?6 
2.3. Einstein 's Belief in GTR 
Einstein himself, corresponding with Arnold Sommerfeld in 1916, "three 
years before the eclipse expedition,"7 says this: "Of the general theory of relativity 
you will be convinced, once you have studied it. Therefore I am not going to 
4 /bid, 92. 
5 Ibid., 97. 
6 cf. Ibid., 96-8. 
7 Ibid., 102. 
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defend it with a single word." This is an exceedingly high degree of confidence; 
and Einstein refers Sommerfeld to no evidence whatsoever. 8 
Why did Einstein feel such a high degree of confidence? 
Vv'hat was it about the theory itself that was convincing upon studying it? 
In Weinberg's estimation, the beauty ofthe theory alone was convincing. 
Einstein's theory was so compelling in terms of its aesthetic appeal that belief in 
it, Weinberg contends, was preserved until further proof became available. Thus, 
it seems that, according to Weinberg's account, a certain scientific faith in 
theoretical and cosmic beauty allowed Einstein (and other physicists) to wager on 
its ultimately being justified by experimental data. 
Of Einstein's own stamina regarding his theoretical labors, Weinberg says 
tllis: "sometlling must have given him enough confidence in tl1e ideas that underlie 
general relativity to keep him working on it, and this could only have been the 
attractiveness of the ideas themselves. "9 Before Einstein came across a geometry 
tl1at would accommodate his theory, working fundamentally on the basis of two 
guesses or assumptions, ( 1) "that gravitational and inertial forces were at bottom 
the same thing ... the principle of the equivalence of gravitation and inertia" 10 and 
(2) "that gravitation is nothing more or less than the effect of the curvature of 
space and time", when reason would have justifiably resisted further pursuit, he 
persevered in his work because tl1e beauty of the ideas was so awe-inspiring and 
so captivating. Neither reason, nor experinlental data, according to Weinberg's 
account, compelled Einstein to press-an, but the pursuit of beauty. 
2.4. Scientific Community's Belief in GTR 
The mere fact that 'from 1916 on' Einstein was nominated for Nobel 
prizes is telling of the broad manner with which this theory was accepted. Before 
the 1919 expedition, and literally fresh on tl1e heels ofhaving been presented with 
8 cf. Ibid., 101-2. Weinberg admits that Einstein himself may have been influenced by the 
measurements of Mercury's precession; but, importantly, he does not draw Sommerfeld's attention 
to this data. 
9 Ibid., I 02. 
10 Albert Einstein The Theory of Relativity ~ew York: MJF, 1950), 5-12. 
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the theory (in 1915), the scientific community was ready to honor him for his 
labors. 11 
2.4.1. Planck: Imagination and Scientific Belief Formation 
Max Planck has argued, as well, that neither reason alone, nor empiricism 
alone accounts for scientific developments: 
The man who handles a bulk of results obtained from an experimental process 
must have an imaginative picture of the law that he is pursuing. He must embody 
this in an imaginary hypothesis. The reasoning faculties alone will not help him a 
step, for no order can emerge from that chaos of elements unless there is the 
constructive quality of mind which builds up the order by a process of elimination 
and choice. Again and again the imaginary plan on which one attempts to build 
up that order breaks down and then we must try another. This imaginative vision 
and faith in the ultimate success are indispensable. The pure rationalist has no 
place here. 12 
This would seem to hold as well for the evaluation of a fresh new theory: an 
'imaginative vision and faith,' fueled by reason and experimental data must have 
informed the community of physicists and their critical evaluation of the theory. 
"The reception of general relativity," Weinberg continues, "depended neither on 
experimental data alone nor on the intrinsic qualities of the theory alone but on a 
tangled web of theory and experiment."13 However, it behooves us to recognize 
that "[t]he important thing for the progress of physics is not the decision that a 
theory is true, but the decision that it is worth taking seriously -worth teaching to 
graduate students, wortl1 writing text books about, above all, worth incorporating 
into one's own research."14 To put it differently: Weinberg's contention, like that 
of Planck's, seems to be that the important thing is that the decision is made, 
11 Weinberg, op cit., 102-3. 
12 Max Planck, "The Mystery of our Being," in Ken Wilber, ed., Quantum Questions (Boston: 
Shambala Press, 1984), 162. 
13 Weinberg, op cit., 104. 
14 Ibid., I 03. 
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regardless of rational or experimental support, that it is compelling enough for 
physicists to be personally affected by it. 
2.4.l.I. Heisenberg's Analogy and Dirac's Advice 
Heisenberg uses an analogy that can be useful here. "To be sure," he 
argues, "this rational thinking and careful measurement belong to the scientist's 
work, just as the hammer and the chisel belong to the work of the sculptor. But in 
both cases they are merely the tools and not the content of the work."15 The 
content, according to Weinberg's position as we have been looking at it, would 
seem to be beauty because, for him, whether it is contained in a chunk of marble 
or a tangled web of theory and data, beauty powerfully affects the human psyche 
in a way that stimulates commitment to the research. 
Taken with Planck's notion of 'an imaginative vision and faith' this 
analogy offers a description of Weinberg's position because, for him, the physicist 
is committed in a kind of irrational and non-empirically sound manner to an 
aesthetic vision. Dirac, Weinberg says, was so influenced by the scientific search 
for beauty that he concluded a talk at Harvard on his work in the development of 
quantum electrodynamics with this advice to the graduate students: he "advised 
them to be concerned only with the beauty of their equations, not with what the 
equations mean. "16 
3. Weinberg's Description of Beauty 
After dealing with two more examples of the effect of beauty on the 
scientific endeavor, (1) "quantum electrodynamics -the quantum-mechanical 
theory of electrons and light," 17 and (2) "the development and final acceptance of 
the modem theory of the weak nuclear force," 18 Weinberg moves in the next 
chapter, "Beautiful Theories," to a discussion of what is meant by 'beauty' in 
terms of physical phenomena. Early in the chapter, he makes a telling concession: 
"I will not try to define beauty, any more than I would try to define love or fear. 
15 Werner Heisenberg, "Science and the Beautiful," in Wilber, ed., op cit., 69. 
16 Weinberg, op cit., 132. 
17 Ibid., 107-116. 
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You do not define these things; you know them when you feel them. Later, after 
the fact, you may sometimes be able to say a little to describe them, as I will try to 
do here."19 This is such an unscientific way of characterizing the work of science 
that one could n1istake these comments as having been offered by an artist, a poet 
or a religious, which might seem odd at face value. But an indubitable fact 
remains, one which I believe no one would want to dispute; that fact is simply that 
scientists, even great minds such as Einstein, are merely human. Weinberg's 
comments, his confession as it were, characterize science as something that it 
indeed really is: a human endeavor. And this characterization seems to reveal 
another aspect of science that Max Planck has presented well: "Science cannot 
solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we 
ourselves are part of nature and, therefore, part of the mystery that we are trying to 
solve. Music and art are, to an extent, also attempts to solve or at least to express 
the mystery. But to my mind, the more we progress with either, the more we are 
brought into harmony with all nature itself. And this is one of the great services of 
science to the individual."20 This description seems, in my view, to be in accord 
with Weinberg's 'description' ofbeauty. 
There are, as Weinberg describes, three aspects of the discernment of a 
beautiful physical theory: ideational simplicity, epistemological inevitability and 
logical rigidity. 
3.1. Ideational Simplicity 
One of the ideational moves that Einstein made in his development of the 
general theory of relativity was, as we noted above, his 'guess' (as Weinberg puts 
it) "that gravitational and inertial forces are at bottom the same thing."21 Also, 
Einstein's treatment of gravitation and curved space, namely 'that gravitation is an 
effect of the curvature of space and time,' 22 exemplifies tllis aestl1etic aspect as 
13 Ibid., 116-131. 
19 Ibid., 134. 
20 Planck, op cit., 163. 
21 Weinberg, op cit., 100. Cf. 134ff. 
22 Ibid., 101. 
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well. It is difficult not to hear Ockam's voice at this point, or at least the sound of 
his razor slicing. Simplicity as a notion has an innate appeal, I think, and 
Weinberg's point here is well received because it is readily understood by analogy 
in other fields. At the risk of being too general, it seems not unkind, for example, 
to characterize any systematization, or systematic thought (I'm thinking 
particularly of systematic theology) as an effort in or towards ideational 
simplicity. Furthermore, this is an interesting element of the scientist's aesthetic 
judgment because simplicity is a bridge notion between the arts and the sciences, 
though it may well manifest in different manners. A haiku evinces a different sort 
of simplicity than does the general theory; but each is beautiful, at least in part, 
because of its simplicity. Heisenberg emphasizes this point as well: "l11e Latin 
motto "Simplex sigillum veri"- "l11e simple is the seal of the true"- is inscribed in 
large letters in the physics auditorium of the University of Gottingen as an 
admonition to those who would discover what is new; another Latin motto, 
"Pulchritudo splendor veritatis" -"Beauty is the splendor of truth"- can also be 
interpreted to mean that the researcher first recognizes truth by this splendor, by 
the way it shines forth. "23 
3.2. Epistemological Inevitability 
Epistemological inevitability plays a different role in describing what 
beauty of a physical theory is. Weinberg speaks of tins aspect as having intimately 
to do with the specialist's evaluation of a theory; there are theories which just 
seem right, and which seem perfectly balanced just as they are. l11is aspect might 
be discernible in a beautiful work of art as well; whether it presents in a physical 
theory or a sculpture, poem or play, however, does not alter the epistemological 
impact that it has on our minds. We have all experienced some piece of music, 
Handel's Messiah, for example, or some other piece of art that has impressed 
itself on our minds in such a way that we conclude, almost in an irrational (or one 
23 Heisenberg, op cit., 62. 
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might want to argue trans-rational) manner, that it could not be otherwise by one 
note, one brush stroke, one word and still be the beautiful work that it is. 24 
Although there are probably better examples, an experience of this ilk that 
I had as a teenager in St. Peter's Basilica stands-out in my mind because of the 
effect that it had on me. I was sixteen; one of the ladies with whom my friend and 
I had been traveling had recently lost two of her boys in a tragic school bus 
accident in southern Texas. But I didn't learn this until after the experience. We 
were mulling through the Basilica, when quite suddenly I fmmd myself becoming 
rather struck by Michelangelo's La Piela. I was struck by the representation of 
Mary holding her son, mourning over his dead body. It seemed to capture 
beautifully the tender anguish of human sorrow. Later that day I learned of the 
death of our female companion's two sons. For me, there was no better way to 
imagine her sense oflose and grief than to remember Michelangelo's La Pieta. It 
was one of the first times in my life that I felt the communicative power of beauty; 
what Michelanglo uncovered in that chunk of marble connected, for me, the 
hmnanity of human sorrow with its reality. 
So it is, according to Weinberg, with the specialist and certain beautiful 
theories such as the general theory. 25 As we noted above, Einstein's conviction 
concerning the accuracy of the general theory was great, but he was utterly aware 
ofthe delicacy ofhis theory; and it is just this delicacy, as in a piece of fine china, 
that distinguishes it and makes it beautiful, at least partly. Weinberg quotes him as 
follows: "The chief attraction of the theory lies in its logical completeness. If a 
single one of the conclusions drawn from it proves wrong, it must be given up; to 
modify it without destroying the whole structure seems to be impossible." The 
term 'logical completeness' does not show up often, if ever, in discussions about 
poems, plays, sculptw-es, etcetera. But the tenor of Weinberg's argument seems to 
imply that Einstein's use of this term is not necessarily in agreement with the 
manner in which logicians, for example, do proofs of soundness and completeness 
24 Weinberg, op cit., 148. 
25 Ibid., 135ff. 
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on, say, predicate logic. In a looser sense of the term, we might say that William 
Carlos Williams' poem "The Red Wheelbarrow"26 is logically complete because 
of the simplicity and focus of the poem. It is an agreeable description of a wet 
wheelbarrow and the meaningfhl importance that it holds for some. The general 
theory uses the creativity of mathematics as its language for describing 
gravitation. Poetry uses the linguistic creativity of common language to describe 
life. Both, though in different manners, are types of mental play that lead us to 
descriptions which seem to be inevitable. Weinberg puts it like this: 
The beauty that we find in physical theories like general relativity of the standard 
model is very like the beauty conferred on some works of art by the sense of 
inevitability that they give us -the sense that one would not want to change a 
note, or a brush stroke or a line. But just as in our appreciation of music or 
painting or poetry, this sense of inevitability is a matter of taste and experience 
and cannot be reduced to formula 27 
3.3. Logical Rigidity 
The last element that Weinberg describes, logical rigidity, is closely tied to 
the above aspects, and, as I understand Weinberg, it is something like the power 
of being myopic. Now certainly myopia is not always a power, but in the sense of 
focus and concentration it almost certainly is. Of his own endeavor as a physicist, 
and of the endeavor of "this kind of fundamental physics," he says this: "We are 
on the track of something universal -something that governs physical phenomena 
throughout the universe- something that we call the laws of nature. We do not 
want to discover a theory that is capable of describing all imaginable kinds of 
force among the particles of nature. Rather, we hope for a theory that rigidly will 
allow us to describe only those forces -gravitational, electroweak and strong- that 
actually as it happens do exist. This kind of rigidity in our physical theories is part 
26 The poem in its entirety is as follows: 'so much depends upon/a red wheelbarrow/glazed with 
rain water/beside the white chickens,' quoted in Williams' Selected Poems, ed., Charles 
Tomlinson, (New York: New Directions, 1985), 56. 
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of what we recognize as beauty."28 A theory is beautiful in terms of logical 
rigidity in so far as it describes an existing force or forces, either retrodictively or 
predictively, simply and inevitably, a beauty which does not mirror the 
complexity of nature as a whole but merely one of its aspects. Dy way of 
counterexample, Weinberg describes his point this way: "Shakespeare's plays are 
not spare perfect structures like general relativity or Oedipus Rex; they are big 
messy compositions whose messiness mirrors the complexity of life. That is part 
of the beauty of his plays, a beauty that to my taste is of a higher order than the 
beauty of a play of Sophocles or the beauty of general relativity for that matter." 
This aesthetic sense plays a crucial role in discovery and evaluation of 
theory. But, for Weinberg, "not only is our aesthetic judgment a means to the end 
of finding scientific explanations and judging their validity -it is part of what we 
mean by explanation. "29 This aesthetic judgment indwells the work as well as the 
workmanship of the theorist and the experimentalist, and, therefore, seems to be 
an indispensable element of the scientific endeavor, for Weinberg, especially with 
regard to discovery. 
With these three notions, Weinberg delineates a sense of the beautiful that 
is requisite for the work of scientific discovery. 
4. The Origin of the Sense of the BeautifUl 
But what is tl1e origin of the sense of the beautiful? 
"Where then does a physicist get a sense of beauty", Weinberg asks, "that 
helps not only in discovering theories of the real world, but even in judging the 
validity of physical theories, sometimes in the teeth of contrary experimental 
evidence?"30 
4.1. Weinberg's Evolutionary Theory: An Analogy 
Weinberg suggests tl1at it "has gradually evolved through a natural 
selection of ideas." "[T]he universe itself," he argues, "acts on us as a random, 
27 Weinberg, op cit., 148. Italics mine. 
28 Ibid., 147ff Italics mine. 
29 Ibid., 149. Italics mine. 
30 Ibid., 157. Italics mine. 
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inefficient, and yet in the long run effective, teaching machine." In this sense, the 
origin of the scientist's aesthetic sense, for Weinberg, is not unlike the many years 
of experience that a racehorse trainer acquires from witnessing the wins and loses 
of very many horses. "[H]e has come to associate, without being able to express it 
explicitly," Weinberg contends, "certain visual cues with the expectation of a 
winning horse."31 The story of the development of aesthetic judgment of physical 
beauty, Weinberg maintains, is not dissimilar to this case. It has been learned 
through blood, sweat and tears, as it were, inculcated through the intersection of 
curiosity and natural phenomena. 
This explanation, for Weinberg, provides a helpful step towards 
inductively affirming the probability of discovering a beautiful final theory, which 
is Weinberg's primary concern. He makes this point, interestingly, by means of 
another analogy -an analogy with Platonic and neo-Platonic thought. "Plato and 
the neo-Platonists," Weinberg says, "taught that the beauty we see in nature is a 
reflection of the beauty ofthe ultimate, the nous. For us, too, the beauty of present 
theories is an anticipation, a premonition, of the beauty of the final theory."32 But 
more importantly for our discussion, both of these analogies present the origin of 
the sense of the beautiful in a manner that seems to be tacitly apophatic. (A 
subject to which we shall turn in the next section.) 
4. 2. Heisenberg and the Genealogy of Beauty 
But in continuing our discussion of the origin of the sense of the beautiful, 
want to proceed by looking at Heisenberg's comments on the sense of the 
beautiful and his view of its growth historically. Then we shall turn to the notion 
of apophasis. We were asking ourselves this question: 'What is the origin of the 
sense ofthe beautiful? 
4.2.1. A Boyhood Experience 
I return here to Heisenberg's story of his experience of 'beauty' which we 
looked at in chapter One when we were discussing Denys' notion of beauty. 
31 Ibid., 158. 
32 Ibid., 165. 
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Heisenberg recounts a personal story about his interest in maths as a child. His 
father was wanting to encourage his Latin studies, so "he brought home to me one 
day from the National Library," Heinsenberg recounts, "a treatise written in Latin 
by the mathematician Leopold Kronecker."33 He studied the treatise and was 
much impressed by it. In it, Heisenberg tells us, Kronecker deals with "the 
properties of whole numbers ... in relation to the geometrical problem of dividing a 
circle into a number of equal parts."34 
Heisenberg continues: 
I sensed a quite immediate beauty in the fact that, from the problem of 
partitioning a circle, whose simplest cases were, of course, familiar to us in 
school, it was possible to learn something about the totally different sort of 
questions involved in elementary number theory ... The impression of something 
beautiful was, however, perfectly direct; it required no justification or 
I . 35 exp anatwn. 
Of obvious interest here is his conclusion that the beauty that he felt or 
experienced was not either a rational or an empirical experience. It was an 
experience, Heisenberg seems to be saying, which was beyond the need for proof: 
"it required no justification or explanation." TI1e beauty that he sensed was 
received on its own merit. Kronecker's work somehow manifested that beauty in a 
way that strongly affected Heisenberg. 36 
4.2.1.1. The One and the Many 
His reflection on the experience leads him to consider two ancient notions 
concerning the question of the One and the many: 
33 Heisenberg, "Science and the Beautiful," op cit., 56. 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid, 56-7. 
36 Kronecker apparently deplored the idea of irrational numbers and the notion of infinity. George 
Cantor was a former student of his, and so his forays into infinity developed ultimately into strong 
opposition from Kronecker, going so far as to accuse Cantor of being a "corrupter of youth" (Cf. 
Aczel, op cit., 131-7). 
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But what was beautiful here? Even in antiquity there were two definitions of 
beauty which stood in certain opposition to one another. .. The one describes 
beauty as the proper conformity of parts to one another, and to the whole. The 
other, stemming from Plotinus, describes it, without any reference to parts, as the 
translucence of the eternal splendor of the "one" through the material 
phenomenon. 
Heisenberg classifies his experience as being described by the first definition. 
"The parts here," he argues, "are the properties of whole numbers and laws of 
geometric constructions, while the whole is obviously the underlying system of 
mathematical axioms to which arithmetic and Euclidean geometry belong -the 
great structure of interconnection guaranteed by the consistency of the axiom 
system." The 'interconnectedness' of the parts presents itself as though the 
individual parts do indeed belong together, 'to this whole.' But this experience is 
unique because, as Heisenberg says: "without any reflection, we feel the 
completeness and simplicity ofthis axiom system to be beautiful." 
This same element of the sense ofthe beautiful was evident in Weinberg's 
description. He likened physical beauty, and the experience of it, to the experience 
of love or fear, saying: "You do not define these things. You know them when 
you feel them." The interesting epistemological enigma here, in my opinion, as I 
mentioned in chapter One as well, is that these knowledge claims seem to arise 
from sensation, feeling, emotive-based experience. 
Heisenberg's notion ofbeauty leads him to the conclusion that "[b]eauty is 
therefore involved with the age-old problem of the "one" and the "many" which 
occupied -in close connection to the problem of "being" and "becoming" -a 
central position in early Greek philosophy."37 And, for him, this describes the 
fundamental nature of the scientific endeavor. 
134 
The Sense of the Beautiful in Scientific Discovery as Apophatic Thought: In 
Defonse of Denys' Notion of Empirical-Ikon 
4.2.1.2. Beauty and 'First Principle' Thought 
This sense of the beautiful, is for Heisenberg, namely that which we know 
by feeling, void of any reflection, and for Weinberg, namely that about which we 
can speak, but only by means of description, central to science. Dut, Heisenberg 
argues, that the role that beauty plays in the scientific endeavor was misconstrued 
from Late Antiquity to the Early Modem era so much so that the significance that 
it had enjoyed since the time of the Pythagoreans and Plato began to slowly fade 
into insignificance with the influence of Aristotle, until ultimately thought about 
nature became increasingly purely empirical, while mathematics became 
increasingly more rational. 
The problem of the origin of the sense of the beautiful, according to 
Heisenberg, has its roots in the 'basic first principle' thought of the pre-Socratics 
and the problem of change. It was initially contemplated that a basic first principle 
would be a physical element --earth (Xenophenes?38), air (Anaximenes39), water 
(Thales40), fire (Heraclitus41 ), but the notion of process, change, alteration, 
becoming seemed perennially to disallow this prospect, a difficulty which is, as 
Heisenberg notes, "particularly apparent in the celebrated paradox of 
Parmenides,42" and the other Eleatics (Melissus and Zeno ). In the thick of antique 
thought, according to Heisenberg, even "[a]t the starting point of Greek 
philosophy of nature," therefore, we fmd, not surprisingly, "the roots of exact 
science" -the 'problem of the basic first principle' "from which the colorful 
variety of phenomena can be explained." 43 
37 Ibid., Italics mine. 
"~ cf. Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers, Vol. II, IX 18-20; Hippolytus Refutation ofAll 
Heresies I xiv 2-6. See also Early Greek Philosophy, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1987), 93-99, where these and other sources are cited. 
39 cf. Diogenes Laertius, op cit., Vol. I, II 3-5; Hippolytus, op cit., I vii 1-9; Aristotle On the 
Heavens 294b 13-21. See also Barnes, op cit., 77-80, where these and other sources are cited. 
40 cf. Diogenes Laertius, op cit., Vol. I, I 22-44; Aristotle On the Heavens 294a: 28-34; 
Metaphysics 983b 6-27. See also Barnes, op cit., 61-70, where these and other sources are cited. 
41 cf. Diogenes Laertius, op cit., Vol.z II, IX 1-17; Hippolytus, op cit., IX ix 1-10. See also 
Barnes,op cit., 100-26, where these and other sources are cited. 
42 cf. Plato Sopist 237a; Proclus Commentary on Parmenides 708.7-22. See also Barnes, op cit., 
129-42, where these and other sources are cited. 
43 Heisenberg, op cit., 57-8. 
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Underlying the quest for a 'physical first principle' lies the assumption, 
Heisenberg points out, "that understanding can never mean anything more than 
the perception of connections, i.e., unitary features or marks of affinity in the 
manifold. ,,44 That is, according to Heisenberg, the scientific endeavor assumes the 
kind of experience he himself had with the Kronecker text, namely an unjustified 
and unexplained recognition of beauty. 
4.2.1.3. The Parmenidian Problem: The Unified and the 
Man(fold 
A troubling element, however (as we just mentioned), soon became 
apparent: 'if there is a physical unitary principle of all, then how is change to be 
dealt with.' A physical unitary principle would require a static uniformity of 
nature, but the dynamic manifold of physical reality requires somefrting quite 
different. Parmenides, as Heisenberg argues, shifted the discussion into a black-
and-white, thesis-antithesis dialogue about Being and Non-Being, which disallows 
a synthesis and, hence, requires change to be viewed as an illusion, an unbearable 
paradox for most, the latter point being most emphasized by his disciple, Zeno. 
The following extract, which is attributed to Parmenides' own verse, would seem 
to support Heisenberg's claim: 
Nor from what is will the strength of trust permit 
it to come to be anything apart from itself. .. 
Decision in these matters lies in this: it is or it is not. .. 
How might what is then perish? How might it come into being? 
For if it came into being it is not, nor is it if it is ever going to be. 
Thus generation is quenched and perishing unheard of. .. 
For powerful necessity holds it enchained in a limit which hems it around, 
because it is right that what is should not be incomplete. 
For it is not lacking -if it were it would lack everything. 
The same thing are thinking and a thought that it is. 
For without what is, in which it has been expressed, 
44 Ibid., 51. 
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you will not find thinking. For nothing either is or will be 
other than what it is, since fate has fettered it 
to be whole and unmoving. Hence all things are a name 
which mortals lay down and trust to be true -
coming into being and perishing, being and not being, 
and changing place and altering bright colour ... 
Henceforward learn mortal opinions, listening to the deceitful arrangement of my 
words. 45 
The dissimilars, being and non-being, for Pannenides, do not both exist, only 
being exists; and those qualities which appear to be dissimilar aspects of being -
e.g.: coming-to-be and perishing, movement and cessation- express 
incompleteness. Being, however, is utterly complete. Thus, these qualities, 
expressing incompleteness, cannot be aspects of being. They are merely 'names 
which mortals lay down and tmst to be tme.' Not only is this untenable to most on 
purely common-sense grounds, it also decimates the possibility of empiricism. 
This perspective, indeed, as Heisenberg argues, would seem to make the 
possibility of science utterly inconceivable. 
4.2.1.4. The Pythagorean Solution 
The Pythagoreans46 offered another 'basic first principle,' mathematics, 
from which a complex numerology was developed, the center of which was the 
'tetractys': 
At the centre of the numerology was the tetractys or 'group of four', consisting of 
the first four numbers, which together add up to ten. Ten is the perfect number: it 
contains the important musical ratios, and it can be arranged to form a perfect 
triangle: 
45 Simplicius Commentary on Physics 144.25-146.27. What I have quoted here is selected portions 
of Barnes' translation of this text. On Zeno, see Plato Parmenides 127a-128d, Aristotle Physics 
233a 21-31; 239b 5-240a 18; Simplicius Commentary on Physics 138.3-6, 138.29-140.6, 140.18-
141.11. See also Barnes, op cit., 129-142 (Parmenides), 150-58 (Zeno), where these and other 
sources are cited. 
46 
cf. Aristotle Metaphysics 985b 23-986a 26, 986b 4-8 and 1092b 8-25; On the Heavens 290b 12-
29; Physics 203a 1-8 and 2l3b 22-27; Proclus Commentary on Euclid 379.1-16, 426.1-9; See also 
Barnes,202-13, where these and other sources are cited. 
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Tbis is a crucial aspect of Pythagoreanism (apparently for both Pythagorean sects, 
the 'mathematici' or the 'scientists', as well as the less philosophical 'acusmatici' 
or 'aphorists') because it is both the source and the end of pbilosophical 
reckoning. From it, the numerical ratios are derived, by means of which harmony 
is achieved. No matter how t11e Pythagoreans actually viewed numbers, though it 
seems that they understood them to be metaphysical realities, there occurs an 
important sbift away from physiCal elements and physical illusions, as occasioned 
by Paremenidian thought, toward "an ideal principle of form. "48 Aristotle 
comments as follows: 
At the same time as [Leucippus and Democritus] and earlier than them, the so-
called Pythagoreans touched on mathematics: they were the first to bring it 
forward and, having been brought up in it, to think that its principles were the 
principles of all the things that exist. Since numbers are by nature the first of 
these, and since they thought they observed in numbers many similarities to the 
things that exist and come into being (more so than in fire and earth and water)-
for example, that justice is such and such, opportunity something else, and so on 
for pretty well everything else (and they also saw that the modifications and ratios 
of harmonies depend on numbers): since, then, all other things appeared to have 
been modelled on number in their nature, while numbers seemed to be the first 
things in the whole of nature, they supposed that the elements of numbers were 
the elements of all things that exist, and that the whole heaven was harmony and 
number.49 
47 Barnes, op cit., 212; see also Tobias Dantzig "Number Lore" and 'The Unutterable" in Number: 
The Language ofScience (Free Press: 1954), 36-56, 99-103, respectively. 
48 Heisenberg, op cit., 59. 
49 Aristotle Metaphysics 985b 23-986a 3, quoted in Barnes, op cit., 208-09. Heisenberg quotes 
some of this passage as well. 
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The Pythagoreans, and later Plato, offer primarily a theoretical or rational 
approach to understanding nature, and so they do little for the advancement of 
science. Aristotle emphasizes the empirical, but to the detriment of the theoretical, 
which does little for the advancement of science as well. The problem that arose 
was, according to Heisenberg, that theory and practice, the parts, as it were, 
needed to be united into a whole. 
"Only from the tension," argues Heisenberg, "the interplay between the 
wealth of facts and the mathematical forms that may possibly be appropriate to 
them, can decisive advances spring." This tension, however, was not capitalized 
upon subsequent to Aristotle's influence until the modem era. He continues as 
follows: 
But in antiquity this tension was no longer acceptable and thus, the road to 
knowledge diverged for a long time from the road to the beautiful. The 
significance of the beautiful for the understanding of nature became clearly 
visible again only at the beginning of the modem period, once the way back had 
been found from Aristotle to Plato. And only through this change of course did 
the full fruitfulness become apparent of the mode of thought inaugurated by 
Pythagoras and Plato.~0 
There was an epistemological dissonance, then, which, according to Heisenberg, 
lasted from antiquity to the early modem era and the work of, for example: 
Copernicus (14 73-1543) -heliocentricity (contra Aristotle's 
geocentricity)51 
50 Heisenberg, op cit., 61. See also his essay "Scientific and Religious Truth," op cit., 40ff; and 
also his "Quantum Theory and the Roots of Atomic Science" Physics and Philosophy, op cit., 59-
75. 
51 Heisenberg begins with Galileo; I have mentioned Copernicus here, not to contradict 
Heisenberg, because Galileo was, ultimately, so influenced by him, and his person and work seems 
to be so defined by his connection with Copernicus. I have no idea why Heisenberg doesn't 
mention him. I presume that he had his reasons. However, in his essay "Scientific and Religious 
Truths," in Wilber, ed., op cit., 40ff., he does begin with Copernicus. 
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Galilee Galilei (1564-1642) -'laws offalling bodies' (contra Aristotle's 
different rates for different weights) 
Tyco Brahe ( 1546-160 I i 2 -his pretelescope observations showed 
Aristotle's view of the permanency of the celestial bodies to be erroneous 
and were instrumental in Kepler's own work with the motions of the 
planets 53 
Johannes Kepler (1573-1630) -his laws of planetary motion 
Issac Newton (1642-1727) -Newtonian mechanics and theory of 
Gravitation 
Even later, in the contemporary era, the revival of the Pythagorean-Platonic 
emphasis on munber and harmony together with the sense of the beautiful has 
resulted, Heisenberg argues, in "the emergence of relativity theory and the 
quantum theory." He maintains that: 
In both cases, after years of vain effort at understanding, a bewildering plethora 
of details has been almost suddenly reduced to order by the appearance of a 
connection, largely unintuitahle hut still ultimately simple in its substance, that 
was immediately found convincing by virtue of its completeness and abstract 
beauty -convincing, that is, to all who could understand and speak such an 
abstract language ... "Pulchritudo splendor veritatis" -"Beauty is the splendor of 
truth"- can also be interpreted to mean that the researcher first recognizes truth by 
this splendor, by the way it shines forth. 54 
Hans Riechenbach, in apparent agreement with Heisenberg's point, says this: 'The 
significance of Copernicus lies precisely in the fact that he broke with an old belief apparently 
supported by all immediate sensory experience. He could do it only because he had at his disposal 
a considerable amount of accumJJlated scientific thought and scientific data, only because he 
himself had followed the road of disillusionment in knowledge before he glimpsed new and 
broader perspectives." From Copernicus to Einstein (New York: Dover, 1980), 14-5. 
52 I am not aware of Heisenberg referring to Tycho Brahe; my reason for doing so I hope is 
obvious: Kepler rides his experimental coat tails. 
53 Planck I think would disagree with listing Brahe because he speaks of him as merely a 
"researcher" as opposed to Kepler whom he refers to as "the creator of the new astronomy." Cf. 
Planck, op cit., 163. 
54 Heisenberg, op cit., 62-3. 
140 
The Sense of the Beautiful in Scientific Discovery as Apophatic Thought: In 
Defense of Denys' Notion of Empirical-Ikon 
This sense of immediacy, of non-discursive, non-rational direct apprehension, to 
which Heisenberg refers here is crucial to the scientific developments which we 
have witnessed over the past five centuries or so. 
"lleauty" for Heisenberg, as we noted above, or at least beauty that 
describes his early experience with Kronecker's treatise, "is the proper conformity 
of the parts to one another, and to the whole."55 One rendering of the Greek 
harmonia is consonance (the conformity of the numerical ratios) as opposed to 
dissonance (the dis-conformity of the numerical ratios); on this definition, 
'beauty,' as Heisenberg construes it, and 'harmony' are synonymous. 56 
Here, then, according to Heisenberg, we have the seminal elements of 
modem and contemporary science: physical phenomena can be understood by 
means of the harmony or beauty of numbers. Mathematics was the language of 
choice for the Pythagoreans. But the scientific enterprise, Heisenberg tells us, was 
stifled because of the lack of 'empirical knowledge' and the over-abundance of 
'theoretical knowledge.' 
4.2.2. Images, Archtypes and the 'Relation' Paradigm 
Heisenberg quotes a passage from W. Pauli that I want to present here: 
The process of understanding in nature, together with the joy that man feels in 
understanding, i.e., in becoming acquainted with new knowledge, seems therefore 
to rest upon a correspondence., a coming into congntenc.e of preexistent internal 
images of the human psyche with external objects and their behavior. This view 
of natural knowledge goes back, of course, to Plato and was ... also very plainly 
adopted by Kepler. The latter speaks, in fact, of Ideas, preexistent in the mind of 
God and imprinted accordingly upon the soul, as the image of God. These primal 
images, which the soul can perceive by means of an innate instinct, Kepler calls 
55 Heisenberg, op cit., 58. 
56 The role of string theory and M-theory might well be the birthing of a beautiful 'final theory', 
bringing into harmony, e.g., antique convictions and contemporary data (e.g., '10' as the perfect 
number and 10 dimensions in string theory). Cf. Michio Kaku Beyond Einstein: The Cosmic Quest 
for the Theory of the Universe (New York: Anchor, 1995) and Weinberg's, op cit., especially chs. 
9 and 10. 
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archetypes. There is very wide-ranging agreement here with the primordial 
images or archetypes introduced into modern psychology by C. G. Jung, which 
function as instinctive patterns of ideation. At this stage, the place of clear 
concepts is taken by images of strongly emotional content, which are not thought 
but are seen pictorially, as it were, before the mind's eye. Insofar as these images 
are the expression of a suspected but still unknown state of affairs, they can also 
be called symbolic, according to the definition of a symbol proposed by Jung. As 
ordering operators and formatives in this world of symbolic images, the 
archetypes function, indeed, as the desired bridge between sense perceptions and 
Ideas, and are therefore also a necessary precondition for the emergence of a 
scientific theory. Yet one must beware of displacing this a priori of knowledge 
into consciousness, and relating it to specific, rationally formulable Ideas. 57 
This passage emphasizes the notion of hannony -the union of (or 
'correspondence') 'preexistent internal images' or 'archetypes' and 'external 
objects' or 'symbolic images', which, for Heisenberg, is beauty. "What's beautiful 
in science is that same thing that's beautiful in Beethoven ... There's a fog of 
events and suddenly you see a connection. It expresses a complex of human 
concerns that goes deeply to you, that connects things that were always in you that 
were never put together before."58 The implicit epistemology at work in the 
scientific endeavor seems to be an epistemology ofbeauty, an epistemology which 
utilizes reason and experimentation but is influenced by something that is neither 
rational nor experimental. Thus we hear, consistently, words such as these: "What 
we feel ' in such moments is the analogy of the part and the whole, object and 
other object, relation and relation. "59 And the following from Einstein about 
Planck: 
57 Ibid., 66-7. 
58 Victor Weisskopf quoted inK. C. Cole The Universe and the Teacup (San Diego: HB&J, 1997), 
185. 
59 Edward Rothstein quoted in Cole, op cit., 178. 
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The longing to behold harmony is the source of the inexaustable patience and 
perseverance with which Planck has devoted himself to the most general 
problems of our science, refusing to let himself be diverted to more grateful and 
more easily attained ends. I have often heard colleagues try to attribute this 
attitude of his to extraordinary will-power and discipline -wrongly, in my 
opinion. The state of mind which enables a man to do work of this kind is akin to 
that of the religious worshipper or the lover; the daily effort comes from no 
deliberate intention or program, but straight from the heart. 60 
The working metaphor for how someone knows or comes to know scientific 
truths, in the words of Rothstein and Einstein, is that of relationship: human-non-
human, human-human, human-divine. The mysterious characteristic( s) of 
relationship, the way that humans relate to animals, things, other humans and the 
divine and the way that humans experience these relationships, forms a 
meaningful metaphor for the way in which these instrumental thinkers understand 
and want their readers to understand the nature of the type of work to which they 
have given their lives. 
4.2.3. The Relationship of the Parts to the Whole 
Returning again to the definition of beauty around which Heisenberg has 
collected his thoughts, "the proper confonnity of the parts to one another, and to 
the whole," it is easy to distill this same idea from Heisenberg's position, not to 
mention from the ancient Greeks who flirted with the same idea: many parts 
connect, conform to one another, unite as one, and produce a harmony, a beauty 
which is reflective of the hannony and beauty which initially began the process. 
Both the process and the product are relational -the parts relate to form the whole, 
the whole is by virtue of having been united by means of relations. The leap from 
this definition of beauty to the other, more neo-Platonic definition which 
Heisenberg mentioned, "beauty is the translucence, through the material 
phenomenon, of the eternal splendor of the 'one,"' is not a great one: "In actual 
60 Einstein quoted in Wilber, op cit., 157. 
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fact, the two definitions are not so very widely removed from one another.'.61 For 
Heisenberg, the first definition is the "more sober" one, and he is reticent to say 
anything about the latter, being content to say that the first is "realized in natural 
science, and ... in exact science, no less than in the arts, it is the most important 
source of illumination and clarity."62 
5. A Dionysian Account of the Origin of the Sense of the Beautiful 
Although Heisenberg might have found it difficult to discuss the second of 
these definitions, though the two in his mind were "not so very widely removed 
from one another," the stage has been set, in my mind, with his insight, coupled 
with Weinberg's, to do just this. The desire to do so is justified, I believe, on the 
grounds that, having become persuaded of the efficacy of the first definition, all 
natural beauty must fit together into some natural whole (the same reason that 
drives Weinberg and other string-theorists toward a 'final theory'), which of 
course is what we call, very properly, the 'cosmos,' and this natural whole must 
itself be a mere piece in some other, greater whole. The analogy is there. But there 
is also something more semantically: the possibility of viewing science as a 
metaphor for theology. This is not merely a possibility, however, with St. Denys' 
Corpus. Here, we are able to develop an epistemology which is driven by beauty, 
is relational and leads ultimately to the apophatic nature of truth so that metaphor 
rises to the level of being more true than literal language, both naturally and 
supernaturally, an epistemology which, I suggest, makes sense of scientists and 
mathematicians speaking in very non-analytic, unphilosophical terminology such 
as 'feels' and using metaphors of 'worship' and 'fear,' e.g., to make sense of their 
work and to convey it to others. 
5.1. Semantics of 'Beauty': Aesthetic Judgment and Apophatic Troth 
I want to shift gears here and discuss the nature of apophasis. Apophatic 
thought can be traced, indeed, back the neo-Platonists (e.g., Plotinus and Proklos). 
But, even though our primary interest is in Denys' employment of it and the 
61 Heisenberg, op cit., 57 and 69. Cf. Plotinus Enneads (1, 6 [1], 4-9). 
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application of his position to the present discourse, I shall tum, first, to a 
Heraclitean notion of apophasis. 
Richard Geldard has recently published an insightful treatise on Heraclitus, 
Remembering Ilerac/itus, and very importantly he begins his treatise with a 
discussion of apophasis. He reminds us of the semantic roots of the term: "In the 
Greek, apophasis means denial or negation and is, therefore, a fitting place to 
examine the aversive thought of Heraclitus."63 Kataphasis, affirmation, is the 
antithesis of apophasis; though, the ultimate purpose of apophasis is kataphasis. 
But the fundamental nature of truth, according to Geldard, might well be properly 
understood as being apophatic. 
Geldard reminds us, as well, that the Greek aletheia "consists of a prefix a, 
and lethe, forgetfulness or forgetting." He continues as follows: "Thus even truth-
telling has an aversive cast, being a process of not-forgetting, as opposed to the 
more affirmative sense in the word knowing."64 'To know' is a verb that is used 
by a speaker to convey an affirmation of knowledge, understanding or truth to the 
hearer. In terms of contemporary epistemological theory, it is often very difficult 
to use this verb with any degree of persuasive power, or even with any degree of 
informational power, if it is used without proper argumentative support. Thus, for 
many, the term is used in opposition to the verb 'to believe'. One may believe 
anything he/she wiSt'les or fancies, so it seems, but one may know only what is 
provable. I might have a belief in unicorns, but because I lack evidence of their 
existence I do not have any knowledge of them. Knowledge, in other words, is 
understood primarily, as Geldard says, in an affirmative sense: I know that 'x' 
because I can support, or prove it by 'y' and 'z'. But if truth-telling, i.e. making 
knowledge claims, is 'a process of not-forgetting', then it takes on an apophatic 
element. The act of truth-telling, or knowledge-saying, becomes one "of 
62 Heisenberg, op cit., 69. Italics mine. 
63 Ibid., 23. 
64 Weinberg, op cit., 24. 
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uncovering or un-forgetting,',65 rather than of providing affirmative proof. Hence, 
we say 'Scientist so-and-so has discovered, i.e. uncovered, such-and-such a truth.' 
Furthermore, given this notion of apophatic truth, when Heraclitus says 
"Nature prefers to hide," 66 he uncovers, or un-forgets, according to Geldard, for 
us the nature of physical truth. And, for him, it implies that nature must be sought 
out apophatically. In this way, it could be said that Einstein uncovered the general 
theory of relativity, i.e. he was ultimately able to say what general relativity is by 
means of'not-forgetting' or 'uncovering' the hiddenness ofnature. 
In relation to Geldard's notion of apophasis, I want to look at the analogies 
that Heisenberg and Weinberg have offered. 
5.1.1. Heisenberg's Analogy 
We looked at Heisenberg's experience with the Kronecker text in the first 
chapter in terms of examining Denys' kataphatic notion of beauty. The 
perspective here, is to look at his 'sculptor analogy', which he presents later in the 
same essay, as an element of apophatic interpretation of the sense of the beautiful. 
The analogy, Heisenberg states as follows: "To be sure, tltis rational 
thinking and careful measurement belong to the scientist's work, just as the 
hammer and chisel belong to the work of the sculptor. But in both cases they are 
merely the tools and not the content of the work. "67 Science conceived of in this 
manner can be viewed as being analogous to tl1e work of a sculptor. Witl1 hammer 
and chisel, the sculptor chips away the stone to reveal the beautiful form that it 
contains. The chunk of rock initially appears to be merely a chunk of rock; but the 
aesthetic judgment of the artist is able to uncover a beauty that would have 
otherwise been unknown. So too, with reason and empirical data, tl1e scientist 
chips away at a certain chunk of physical reality, ultimately revealing -or hoping 
ultimately to reveal- a physical fonn that is beautiful to behold. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Richard Geldard Remembering Heraclitw (Lindisfarne: 2000), 157. qJVm~ xpWrn:a6at rptA.t:l 
'Nature/being loves to hide itself,' or 'Nature/being loves hiding itself.' 
67 cf. Plato Phaedrw 252d 7; Plotinus Enneads (1, 6 [1], 9); St. Denys Mystical Theology 1025A-
1025B. 
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5.1.2. Weinberg's Analogies 
In treating the origin of the sense of the beautiful, Weinberg also made use 
of analogy. First, he argues that the sense of the beautiful is like the expertise of a 
horse trainer: "he has come to associate, without being able to express it 
explicitly, certain visual cues with the expectation of a winning horse." And, 
secondly, he argues that the sense of the beautiful for the scientist is like the 
Platonic and neo-Platonic sense of beauty: "Plato and the neo-Platonists," 
Weinberg says, "taught tl1at tl1e beauty we see in nature is a reflection of the 
beauty of the ultimate, the nous. For us, too, the beauty of present theories is an 
anticipation, a premonition, of the beauty of the final theory." Both of these 
analogies, too, emphasize a non-rational, non-empirical perspective on the origin 
of the sense of the beautiful that seems tacitly to suggest a sense of apophatic 
thought in the sense of, to use Geldard's terminology, 'uncovering' certain visual 
cues, as it were, and of 'uncovering' the beauty of the ultimate (which for 
Weinberg is simply the anticipation of a 'final theory', not nous or beyond-being, 
e.g.). 
Geldard's reading of Heraclitus, then, can establish a connection between 
the sense of the beautiful and apophatic thought. But this notion of apophatic 
tl10ught remains tmdefined. Why, for example, might it be the case that the sense 
of tl1e beautiful leads tl1e scientist to 'uncover' empirical beauty? Geldards' 
position leaves this question unanswered. To address it, then, we shall turn to 
Denys, and particularly to his 'sculptor analogy' and the notion of empirical-ikon. 
5.2. Denys' 'Sculptor Analogy': Beautiful Empirical Being and 
Beautiful-Empirical-Being-as-Ikon-ofthe-Beyond-Being 
We return here to Denys' 'sculptor analogy'. Both in the previous chapter 
as well as in chapter Two, we have looked at this analogy. As we have seen, 
Denys uses the analogy to speak of the work of theology. The theologian, he 
maintains, would be 'just as the ones creating ( JrotoiJvrt:t:,J a statue of natural 
things, removing everything that is an obstruction to the true sight of that which is 
hidden, and revealing this hidden beauty by means of negation alone' (MT II, 
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1025b). I have argued in chapter Two and chapter Four that this analogy, though 
Denys uses it specifically with regard to Moses and the work of theology, could 
be taken to refer to the creative process in general. The central element that I have 
emphasized with this analogy is that of apophasis. 
Above, I suggested that if Einstein's discovery of the general theory of 
relativity is taken in Geldard's sense, then he can be seen as having uncovered the 
general theory of relativity by means ofhaving 'not-forgotten' the hidden-ness of 
nature, i.e. by means of having 'not-forgotten' the beauty of empirical being. 
Denys' notion of beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon adds a metaphysical 
explanation to such an interpretation. 
From a Dionysian perspective, it is not the case simply that 'nature loves 
to hide', i.e. that empirical-being loves to hide, and that knowledge of it must be 
sought apophatically, as Geldard's position suggests. Rather, the hidden-ness of 
empirical-being and knowledge of it is due to empirical beings' empirically-ikonic 
capacity. That it 'hides', as it were, then, is due to its capacity as an empirical-
ikon to 'aim for, love and desire' its Source and End. A scientific 'discovery' 
which reveals the beauty of empirical-being, Einstein's general theory, for 
example, then, 'un-forgets' the mystery of the beauty of gravity by means of 
apophatically sculpting, as it were, and, therefore, as ikon tacitly manifests the 
beyond-being because of the dual mystery of empirical-being-as-ikon. But 
because of the mystery of ikon, the general theory does not exhaustively 'un-
forget' the empirical being of gravity. Interpreted in terms of the ikonic capacity 
of empirical-being, the general theory 'un-forgets' the manifestation of the 
beyond-being in gravity, as well as the nature of gravity as empirical being. If 
beautiful empirical being is mysterious in its hiddenness, then it refers us, from a 
Dionysian perspective, to beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon because it affirms the 
mystery of empirical being. Thus, in this sense, i.e. in the sense of beautiful-
empirical-being-as-ikon, it could be affirmed from a Dionysian perspective that 
'nature loves to hide', as it were, and that, therefore, knowledge of it must be 
sought in an apophatic manner, i.e. by means of 'sculpting', as it were. 
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If the sense of the beautiful is interpreted in terms of Denys' notion of 
apophasis and empirical-ikon, then it suggests a position that would seem 
ultimately to view the work of science as a kind of theology. This would follow 
because empirical-ikon infers the mystery of beyond-being because of the mystery 
of being. 
And this is precisely where Denys seems to me to be quite helpful in 
treating the origin of the sense of the beautiful. His position, in response to the 
question that I posed above, suggests the process of relational beauty, namely the 
view that beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being both has the responsibility 
of kataphatically receiving the world as beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon-of-the-
beyond-being and apophatically 'aiming for, loving and desiring' (by means of the 
creative work of' sculpting', as it were) the beyond-being (705d-708a). According 
to Dionysian thought, then, the sense of the beautiful is the apophatic response of 
beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-being to the call of the beauty-of-the-
beyond-being through the medium of beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon-of-the-
beyond-being, according to its hierarchical capacity. This means, that beautiful-
empirical-being-as-ikon participates with the beyond-being by means of 
apophatically calling back to the calling of the beyond-being. For Denys, this 
'calling' on the part of being, is, as we have noted, the process oftheosis, so that, 
in the final analysis, empirical-being, qua beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon, itself 
becomes the responsive call. Nevertheless, although Denys' response resituates 
the question, as I have suggested, it agrees both with Weinberg's concern for a 
final theory and Heisenberg's notion of beauty as a part to whole relation. And so 
it seems to me, therefore, to provide a plausible explanation as to the origin of the 
sense of the beautiful. 
The notion of the manifold manifestation of the beyond-being in 
empirical-ikon suggests that both of the ancient notions of beauty which 
Heisenberg has offered, as I just suggested, namely the 'proper confomlity of 
parts to one another, and to the whole' and the 'translucence of eternal splendor of 
the 'one' through material phenomenon', are applicable to a Dionysian account of 
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the apophatic nature of the sense of the beautiful. This follows because the 
discerning of the manifold manifestation of the beyond-being in empirical-ikon is 
a process of discerning the beyond-being in the mystery of the beauty of empirical 
being as beautiful-empirical-being-as-ikon-of-the-beauty-of-the-beyond-being. 
Empirical-ikon, therefore, both manifests the beyond-being and is an empirical 
'part', as it were, that is put together to fonn one empirical 'whole', as it were. 
This 'whole', as it were, is the 'un-forgetting' of the laws of nature and, 
ultimately, the 'final theory', as Weinberg has suggested. 
Why is a Dionysian position plausible? 
A Dionysian perspective on the origin of the sense of the beautiful has an 
explanatory capacity, that, while reinterpreting the question of the origin of the 
sense of the beautiful in such a way as to suggest ultimately that science is a kind 
of theology, is able to maintain the integrity, I believe, of both science and 
theology. This explanatory capacity is, primarily, the result of his vision of being-
as-ikon, applied here in terms of the apophatic aspect of the process of relational 
beauty. Denys' position, therefore, affirms the role of science, at least in terms of 
Weinberg's notion ofthe final theory and Heisenberg's notion ofthe discernment 
of beauty in terms of a part to whole relation, as an important element of the 
theological endeavor. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have relied on both Weinberg and Heisenberg for a notion 
of the sense of the beautiful. I have suggested, furthermore, that this notion seems 
to be amenable to an apophatic interpretation. Denys' position, I have maintained, 
provides an interpretative framework that, while not being fully consonant with 
either Weinberg or Heisenberg, seems, nevertheless, to be a plausible option for 
treating the notion of the sense of the beautiful, particularly with regard to the 
question of its origin. The sense of the beautiful in science, then, my argument 
maintains, refers us to the mystery of beautiful empirical being, and the mystery 
of beautiful empirical being refers us to the mystery of beautiful-empirical-being-
as-ikon. 
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6.1. Final Thoughts 
In contradistinction to Karl Popper's approach, for example, I have been 
interested in examining what could be referred to as an aesthetics of scientific 
discovery, rather than the deductive method of justification and falsification of 
scientific theory that Popper is interested in.68 And the specific aesthetic that I 
have been interested in applying is of a theological sort which both effects and 
affects the possibility (as 'Source and End' of being, as Denys puts it) of theory, 
justification (or falsification) and discovery through the mystery of being-as-ikon. 
But in terms of Popper's distinction between justification and discovery, my 
position suggests, I believe, that the sense of the beautiful, from the perspective of 
being-as-ikon, is a constitutive, i.e. not a heuristic, element of the process of 
justification and discovery. This seems to follow because if being is ikonic, then 
the sense of the beautiful is an integral characteristic of being and its 
epistemological structure whether in terms of theorizing or justifying (or 
falsifying). So, for me, if the origin of the sense of the beautiful is in the mystery 
being-as-ikon, then the sense ofthe beautiful is an i11tegral epistemological aspect 
of the way that being theorizes, justifies and ultimately makes new discoveries. 
An examination of the relationship between justification and discovery from the 
perspective of the sense of the beautiful in terms of being-as-ikon, would, 
therefore, seem to be a promising one; but such a discussion is beyond the scope 
ofthis chapter. 
* * * 
In the next and final chapter, I argue that Denys' notion of language-as-
ikon provides a way of affirming the role of language as an in1portant element of 
the theological endeavor. I apply this notion in an apophatic manner to Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy of language, in general, and to his notion of silence as 
meaning, specifically. We shall turn now to this task. 
68 
cf Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson & Co.: 1968), 27-48, 251-284. 
151 
6 
Merleau-Ponty on Language and Silence: In Defense of Denys' Notion of 
Language-as-Ikon 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall show that meaning, for Merleau-Ponty, is 
characterized by his notion of 'silence'. Our approach to his position will begin 
with his comments on the 'algorithmic' approach to language (since this seems to 
play such an important role in his thinking about language). As an example of this 
approach, we shall look at D. Davidson's position, first, in the section 
immediately following, and then, in the follovving section, turn to Merleau-
Ponty's position per se. Then, in the final section, I shall offer a Dionysian 
interpretation ofMerleau-Ponty's suggestion. 
2. Davidson 's Semantical Theory 
In an essay published in the late 1960's, Davidson presents a theory of 
meaning that fonnally unites truth and meaning; this he does in agreement with 
the general thrust of analytic philosophy. A response to the question 'What is 
meaning?' must be focused, for him, on the manner in which word-meaning is the 
source of sentence-meaning. "It is conceded by most philosophers of language", 
he says, 
and recently by some linguists, that a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an 
account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meaning of words. 
Unless such an account could be supplied for a particular language, there would 
be no explaining the fact that we can learn the language: no explaining the fact 
that, on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finite set of rules, we are prepared to 
produce and to understand any of a potential infinitude of sentences. I do not 
dispute these vague claims, in which 1 sense more than a kernel of truth. Instead I 
want to ask what it is for a theory to give an account of the kind adumbrated. 1 
1 D. Davidson 'Truth and Meaning" in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language 
(Oxford:1996), 92. Cf G. Frege Grundlagen "Introduction", §29-§33ff; his treatment of the 
question 'is 'one' a predicate?': 'einheit' ('oneness', 'unity', unit'), 'ein' ('one'). 
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Davidson very clearly describes his project in the present essay as one that is fully 
sympathetic with the general perspective of analytic philosophy: 'a satisfactory 
theory ofmeaning must give an account ofhow the meanings of sentences depend 
upon the meaning of words.' The question he asks, though, is: 'what is it for a 
theory to give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the 
meaning of words?' 
The general answer to this question is: for a theory to give an account of 
how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words' is to give an 
account of what it is for a sentence to be true. Put differently: a formal semantical 
theory of meaning for a natural language becomes, in Davidson's position, 
intertwined with a logical theory of tmth. Davidson's position affirms that 
meaning is consequent to logical truth value: 'what it is for a theory to give an 
account of this kind' is fundamentally to give an account of a theory of truth. A 
theory of tmth provides the theoretical framework within which the meaning of 
words, and thus the meaning of sentences is discemable. Analytic thought, in 
general, has been interested in describing a theory of truth-me8.Iling in an 
'empirical' manner, the development of a formal method, a 'well formed formula' 
(wjj) as the logician would have it, which would act as an 'algorithm' as it were 
(to use Merleau-Ponty's phrase), a method into which sentences can be put and 
out of which we can get distilled forms of pure meaning and truth: a fonnalized 
system of natural language. Davidson offers such a method. 
A theory of meaning for Davidson (assuming the theoretical framework of 
a theory of truth) is an empirical theory: "[a] theory of meaning (in my mildly 
perverse sense) is an empirical theory, and its ambition is to account for the 
workings of a natural language." A Tarskian semantical theory of truth, he argues, 
provides the necessary theoretical framework. 2 Therefore, what is necessary for 
such a theory to be well-formed and adequate is known, according to Davidson. It 
is possible, Davidson suggests, to account for statements of the form 
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(1) sis T if and only if p 
This works out in natural language as a sentence of the form 'Sugar is sweet' is 
true i.ff(if and only if) sugar is sweet. Davidson continues: 
What we require of a theory of meaning for a language L is that without appeal to 
any (further) semantical notions it place enough restrictions on the predicate "is 
T' to entail all sentences got from schema T when 's' is replaced by a structural 
description of a sentence of Land 'p' by that sentence ... a theory of meaning for 
language L shows "how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of 
words" if it contains a (recursive) definition of truth-in-L. .. : the definition works 
by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence, and 
to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. To know 
the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence -
any sentence- to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to the 
phrase, to understanding the language. 
Language L is a thought-experiment language (a metalanguage) in which the 
semantical problem of natural language is to be worked out. The sentence form 
suggested [(1) sis Tifand only ifp] is 'schema Tin 'language L,' which defines 
the 'necessary and sufficient' conditions for the semantic value of 'every 
sentence' of a natural language. 
Near the end of his essay, Davidson says this: 
In this paper I have assumed that the speakers of a language can effectively 
determine the meaning or meanings of an arbitrary expression (if it has meaning), 
and that it is the central task of a theory of meaning to show how this is possible. 
I have argued that a characterization of a truth predicate describes the required 
2 cf Alfred Tarski "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics" in 
Martinich, ed., op cit., 61-83. And his "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" in Logic, 
Semantics and Mathematics (Oxford: 1956), 152-278. 
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kind of structure, and provides a clear and testable criterion of an adequate 
semantics for a natural language 
The fundamental job of a theory of meaning which shows 'how the meanings of 
sentences depend upon the meaning of words', according to Davidson, is to 
provide a method by which a speaker of a natural language can figure out the 
meaning of 'an arbitrary expression'; 'schema T provides the necessary 
equipment. For (drawing from the previous quote) it gives the 'necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence'. If the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of a sentence are determinable, then this gives 'the meaning 
of a sentence.' For Davidson, 'the semantic concept of truth' is the way to know 
the conditions for the truth of' any sentence'. 
He continues as follows: 
Since I think there is no alternative, I have taken an optimistic and programmatic 
view of the possibilities for a formal characterization of a truth predicate for a 
natural language Rut it must be allowed that a staggering list of difficulties and 
conundrums remains. To name a few: we do not know the logical form of 
counterfactual or subjunctive sentences, nor of sentences about probabilities and 
about causal relations; we have no good idea what the logical role of adverb is, 
nor the role of attributive adjectives; we have no theory for mass terms like "fire," 
"water," and "snow," nor for sentences about belief, perception, and intention, 
nor for verbs of action that imply purpose. And finally, there are all the sentences 
that seem not to have truth values at all: the imperatives, the optatives, 
interrogatives, and a host more. A comprehensive theory of a natural language 
must cope successfully with each of these problems.3 
3 Davidson, op cit., 102. 
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It is such an approach to language in general, and meaning in particular, that 
Merleau-Ponty has in mind when he refers to the 'algorithmic' approach to 
language. 4 
3. Merleau-Ponty 
3.1. 'Algorithm' and the Landscape of Language 
For Merleau-Ponty, the functional phenomenon of language tells a very 
different story than the one that Davidson wants to tell. His is a position that finds 
it necessary to take into account from the beginning not only what he calls the 
'paradigm'5 cases, but also the kinds of expressions that Davidson refers to in his 
'staggering list of difficulties and commdrums.' So his position is not one that 
begins with restrictions and formulae, but rather with a broad recognition of 
language's varied and queer functions. He speaks of language not as a vessel of 
meaning,6 but as a 'being' or a 'universe' in and through which meaning is 
accessed (or as though the accessing is the meaning). 7 
In his "Specter of a Pure Language", he speaks comparatively of the 
'algorithmic' approach and his own in an effort to sketch the problem as he sees 
it.8 His general characterization of the 'algorithmic' approach is like this: 
Men have been talking for a long time on earth, and yet three-quarters of what 
they say goes unnoticed. A rose, it is raining, it is fine, man is mortal. These are 
paradigms of expression for us. We believe expression is most complete when it 
points unequivocally to events, to states of objects, to ideas or relations, for, in 
4 Davidson, op cit., 95-6. For a favorable treatment of Davidson, see Bjorn T. Ramberg Donald 
Davidson's Philosophy of Language (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1989), "Convention T" and "What 
is a Language", 49-63 and 98-113 (respectively), esp. 52ff For a more able critical evaluation of 
Davidson see Kirk Lud'-Vig "Theories of Meaning, Truth and Interpretation" as well as Davidson's 
"Reply to Kirk Ludwig" in Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (Routledge: 1999), 
27-47. 
5 M. Merleau-Ponty "Specter of a Pure Language", trans. John O'Neil, The Prose of the World 
(Northwestern University Press: 2000), 3. 
6 Davidson's position, as was stated, is to 'ask what it is for a theory to give an account of how the 
meanings of sentences depend on the meaning of words'. The words seem to act as 'vessels'. 
7 
cf. "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" in Signs (Northwestern: 1964), 43. See also 
Don Ihde "Singing the World: Language and Perception" in The Horizons of the F7esh (SIU Press: 
1973), 70-1. 
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these instances expression leaves nothing more to be desired, contains nothing 
which it does not reveal, and thus sweeps us toward the object which it 
designates. 9 
His position, however, views the above as focusing on, presumably, only a quarter 
of the subject matter; the other 'three-quarters' he characterizes as follows: 
In dialogue, narrative, plays on words, trust, promtse, prayer, eloquence, 
literature, we possess a second-order language in which we do not speak of 
objects and ideas except to reach some person. Words respond to words in this 
language, which bears away within itself and builds up beyond nature a 
humming, busy world of its own. 10 
The 'algorithmic' approach, for Merleau-Ponty, seems simply to ignore much of 
what he sees as being essential. Language, for Merleau-Ponty, is expressive in a 
variety of ways: 'dialogue, narrative, plays on words, trust, promise, prayer, 
eloquence, literature.' Such forms of linguistic expression are more involved than 
'man is mortal', for example. Such language does not speak about a certain 
'thing', by which he seems to mean 'events, states of objects, ideas or relations', 
and to approach it as such is to act as if a 'perception' or an 'idea' bears a one-to-
one correspondence with a certain 'sign.' Tllis approach, for Merleau-Ponty, is 
something which we all 'secretly venerate'; but such veneration, for him, is 
unwarranted in the face of the variety of linguistic expression: "[i]t cannot account 
for the primitive fact of creative language."11 He emphasizes what he sees as the 
contradictory nature of this approach: 
Yet we still insist on treating this language as simply a variant of the economical 
forms of making statements about some thing. Thus expression involves nothing 
more than replacing a perc.eption or an idea with a conventional sign that 
8 cf. S. B. MallinMerleau-Ponty's Philosophy (Yale University Press: 1979), 183. 
9 Merleau-Ponty "Specter", Joe. cit. 
10 Ibid. 
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announces, evokes, or abridges it. Of course, language contains more than just 
ready-made phrases and can refer to what has never yet been seen ... We all 
secretly venerate the ideal of a language which in the last analysis would deliver 
us from language by delivering us to things. 12 
The 'paradigms' of the algorithmic approach allow us to assume that linguistic 
expression is 'unequivocal'; it is 'unequivocal' if one assumes that the 
fundamental job of linguistic expression is to replace a certain thought with a 
certain sign that clearly designates that certain thought and no other (i.e., the sign 
'red' for the thought red). But these paradigms, for Merleau-Ponty, on the one 
hand, do not reflect all linguistic expressions, and on the other hand, they take as 
their primary subject matter not language but thought (or more particularly the 
relation between thought and thing); as such linguistic expression as a whole (via 
the portion of expression which is focused on) seems to be ultimately 
unnecessary. A 'pure language' of the form that Merleau-Ponty criticizes is one 
that is linguistic in an accidental manner, only because it cannot fully divest itself 
of language altogether. Language understood in this manner, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, is language that is doubly reduced: first it is reduced to the paradigm 
cases, then it is reduced to insignificance. We are, thus, 'delivered from language 
by means of being delivered to things.' 
This approach, he argues, derives from the perspective of the 'exact 
sciences'. The assumption, he suggests, is that language as it is used in the exact 
sciences is 'well-formed', and as such it is a 'mature form oflanguage'. The exact 
sciences achieve clarity and precision by means of using certain signs that have 
been given conventional meanings; each sign has a certain signification. As such, 
there is an interconnected system of sign-signification relations; these relations are 
explicit and determined. Nothing in the system is to be added implicitly or 
accidentally. The 'algoritlunic' approach assumes the approach of the exact 
sciences to be the way to properly express thought and avoid ambiguity: language 
11 Mallin, toe cit. 
158 
Merleau-Ponty on Language and Silence: In Defense of Denys' Notion of 
Language-as-Ikon 
used in this manner, for Merleau-Ponty, is clear and precise because there is a 
kind of direct mapping from thought to sign to signification, or from signification 
to sign to thought. The goal of the 'algorithmic' approach, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, is to establish 'a single system of possible relations' between thought, 
sign and signification; such a 'system' would establish an unambiguous manner of 
thought-communication, so that speaker/writern can communicate unambiguously 
a certain thoughtx to any other speakerslwritersn+J. More plainly: the 'algorithm', 
for Merleau-Ponty, seeks to eliminate linguistic ambiguity. 
It is frequently repeated that science is a well-formed language. This means also 
that language is the beginning of science and that algorithm is the mature form of 
language. . .But if the algorithm is to do its job, if it means to be a rigorous 
language and to control its moves at every moment, nothing implicit should be 
introduced. All new and all old relations should form one family, derivable from 
a single system of possible relations, so that one never means to say more than 
one does say and no more is said than one means. 13 
In terms of an approach to meaning, this approach assumes, according to Merleau-
Ponty, that meaning is more easily determinable (both by way of emphasizing 
only a small portion of linguistic expression, and by assuming that language is a 
determinable system of signs which each have a certain signification) than it really 
is. "The algorithm, the project of a universal language," he says, "is a revolt 
against language in its existing state and a refusal to depend upon the confusions 
of everyday language. The algoritlm1 is an attempt to construct language 
according to the standard of truth, to redefine it to match the divine mind, and to 
return to the very origin of the history of speech, or, rather, to tear speech out of 
history." 14 The 'algorithm' sees thought as the source and goal of communication, 
a thought-to-thought form of communication, not the messy reality of actual 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 4-5. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
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htunan communication ('dialogue, narrative, plays on words, trust, promise, 
prayer, eloquence, literature'); in this way, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
'algorithm' is an 'attempt. .. to redefine [language] to match the divine mind'. For 
such an approach, "the internal word is the standard ofthe external word."15 By 
this, Merleau-Ponty seems to want to distinguish between a sort of thought-word 
on the one hand, and a language-word on the other hand: the former in a 'mature 
form oflanguage' ('algorithm') precisely fixes the meaning of the latter, so that it 
has a single conventional meaning. The 'sign' itself apart from its conventional 
meaning is meaningless; or more broadly, Merleau-Ponty sees the algorithm as an 
affinnation of the insignificance of language as a whole (as we have already 
noted). We use it only because we cannot communicate in a 'divine' manner by 
means of direct thought-to-thought communication. Merleau-Ponty's treatment 
would seem to imply this line of reasoning: since the 'algorithm' views thought 
rather than language as its subject, then it stands to reason that language would be 
viewed in a reductive manner by means of emphasizing only that portion of 
linguistic expression which indeed seems to function 'conventionally', by means 
of precise thought-to-sign-to-signification relations; linguistic expression in any 
other form is fully insignificant (because it is ambiguous and thought is, thus, not 
clearly determinable), whereas linguistic expression of this precise form is 
significant only because it establishes a link between the thought (of the 
speaker/writer) and the thought (of the hearer/reader). 
3.2. Mer/eau-Ponty 's General Comments Concerning His Own View 
For Merleau-Ponty, language is not an explicit and determined system of 
signs. 16 Language 'resembles' the 'objects' and 'ideas' which it expresses, and 
which are not conceivable apart from 'words', 17 not as a static predetermined 
system, but as something which "is the double of being. " 18 Linguistic expression 
IS Ibid. 
16 cf Ibid. He brings in the notion of' God'; but it is not clear what he intends by doing so. 
17 cf. LanganMerleau-Ponty's Critique of Reason (Yale University Press: 1966), 134. 
18 Merleau-Ponty, op cit., 5. See also Ihde, op cit., 70. 
160 
Merleau-Ponty on Language and Silence: In Defense of Denys 'Notion of 
Language-as-Ikon 
begins not in speech, but in muteness: 19 one strains "toward what he wants to 
convey, toward what he is going to say."2° From this 'place' of muteness 
(speechlessness) 
suddenly a flood of words comes to save this muteness and gives it an equivalent 
so exact and so capable of yielding the writer's own thought to him when he may 
have forgotten it, that one can only believe that the thought had been expressed 
before the world began. Language is there like an all-purpose tool. .. and it 
always responds to our call, ready to express anything because language is the 
treasury of everything one may wish to say -because language has all our future 
experience already written into it, just as the destiny of men is written in the stars . 
. . All that is required is to meet the phrase ready made in the limbs of language, to 
recover the muted language in which being murmurs to us. 
Language is necessary for us to conceive of things; but the process of expressing a 
certain conception has an initial stage that is speechless: it is a 'place' of 
muteness, or silence. What is going to be said has not yet been said; the saying is 
mute because nothing is being said. In this place of 'muteness', where language is 
silent, "everything that now exists or will exist prepares itself for being put into 
words."21 On the part of the speaker/writer, this effort of 'preparation' is 
experienced as though there is but a single expression that can adequately express 
this certain thought; the 'algorithm' has no place for such 'muteness'; for the 
thought-sign relation is predetennined. When the expression is expressed, when 
muteness becomes embodied in spoken word, it 'may seem that' the thing as it is 
presented in word must have had tllis word in it all along; there seems often to be 
a kind of seamlessness between the expression and that which is expressed, for 
Merleau-Ponty, an almost indistinguishable link between an 'expression' and that 
19 In getting to this point, Merleau-Ponty here cites Jean Paulhan Les F1eurs de Tarbes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1941), 128; Paulhan, he says, is citing La Bruyere. The quote reads: "Of all the possible 
expressions which might render our thought, there is only one which is the best. One does not 
always come upon it in writing or talking: it is nevertheless true that it exists.: 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Ibid. 
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which is expressed; these, he says, 'strangely alternate', and we 'falsely recognize' 
"that the word has inhabited the thing from all eternity. "22 An expression seems 
often to fully express that which the writer/speaker has intended; from that place 
of silence has come the 'flood of words', and one 'feels' that the word which 
embodies the expression (namely, that which is linguistically expressed) fits the 
'thing' so well that it seems to 'inhabit' the thing necessarily ('from all eternity'). 
The distinction between 'expression' and that which the expression 'expresses' 
begins to blur; 'what is expression?' and 'what does the expression express?' 
seem now to ask the same question. This however is an inaccurate assessment. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the expression is embodied in the word, and this embodied 
expression is what expresses; the word is not found within the thing, but in a place 
of muteness. Distinct, for Merleau-Ponty, are two languages: the 'muted 
language' of the place of silence, and the embodied language of expression (or the 
expressive language of embodiment).23 
To emphasize this 'false recognition that the word has inhabited the thing 
from all eternity' initiates an approach that sees 'communication' as 'involving no 
mystery', the "word possesses no virtue of its own"; communication becomes 
fundamentally a process of thought-coding', a 'visible or sonorous' replacement 
for thought, an 'appearance' that "never brings us anything new"; in such an 
approach novelty is a 'mirage' for communication: "Such a theory of language 
would result ultimately (as Paulhan says), in "everything happening between them 
as though language had not existed."24 Put differently: to emphasize this false 
recognition is, for Merleau-Ponty, to initiate the 'algorithmic' approach. 
3.3. Sub-Summary 
The position for which Merleau-Ponty argues regarding the 'algorithm' is 
one that sees language as being fundamentally insignificant, but practically 
necessary. Language analysis, therefore, emphasizes only that portion of linguistic 
expression that clearly expresses a thought. For Merleau-Ponty, the emphasis on 
22 Ibid. Italics mine. See also Langan, op cit., 136-41. 
23 
cf. fude, op cit., 71-4. 
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this type of analysis is interested in language only as a medium to the thought. 
Thus, language itself has no intrinsic value. 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of a 'place' of muteness from which words spring 
forth as embodied expression. It is this notion of muteness both as source of 
linguistic expression and as being present within linguistic expression that the 
next section will treat. My contention is that Merleau-Ponty seems to argue for a 
position that sees silence as the source of linguistic expression and as the content 
of linguistic expression as well. We turn now to an examination of some pertinent 
portions of his "Indirect Language and Voices of Silence. "25 
3.4. Sign and Silence: The Ambiguity of Meaning 
Merleau-Ponty draws some critical notions from Saussure, the most 
fundamental of which is that the 'sign' bears no meaning in and of itself. 
Secondly, he adopts the notion that each sign indicates a 'divergence' rather than a 
distinct meaning. Thirdly, a language is a system of such 'divergences' .26 These 
notions characterize an approach that, for Merleau-Ponty, is antithetical to the 
analytic assumption "that a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of 
how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meaning of words. ,m Above, we 
noted that Merleau-Ponty stresses that the 'algorithmic' approach sunders 
linguistic expression, and invalidates the role of language; this we could say is a 
functional analysis. Merleau-Ponty here emphasizes the assumptions of his own 
position (drawn from Saussure's) that substantiate his view that: (i) words are 
necessary; (ii) expression begins in muteness (the muted-speech); (iii) expression 
is embodiment (the expressive language of embodiment). 
For Merleau-Ponty, language is neither the sort of thing that we can rightly 
sunder in terms of its varied means of expressions, nor in terms of breaking a 
particular expression down to its constitutive words. According to his view of 
24 Merleau-Ponty, op cit., 7-8. 
25 In Signs (Northwestern University Press: 1964), 39-83. 
26 
cf. F. de Saussure Course in General Linguistics, ed. and trans. by Eiuske Komatsu and George 
Wolf (Pergamon: 1997). See also A. Rabil, Jr. Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World 
(Columbia University Press: 1967), 197-204. 
27 Davidson, op cit., 92. 
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'algorithm', expression (speech) is inextricably united to that which it expresses 
(speaks), and unity is inextricably united to the whole of language. Linguistic 
expression (speech), for Merleau-Ponty, is meaningful insofar as it expresses 
within this whole, not as part of the whole but as a part-whole, which could be 
said of the 'algorithmic' approach as well.28 But, for Merleau-Ponty, signs 
interrelate with one another in linguistic expression (speech) not only in a certain 
linguistic expression (speech-acts), but concurrently with the whole oflanguage as 
well. For Merleau-Ponty, this implies, contrary to tl1e algorithmic approach, that 
the meaning of expression (speech) begins with a certain expression (speech-act), 
but it 'is never completed'. To be 'completed' tl1e expression (speech) as part of 
the whole of language and the varied nature of both expression (speech) and sign 
would have to incorporate into itself the entirety of the whole. This for Merleau-
Ponty is impossible: "We always have to do only with sign structures whose 
meaning, being nothing other than the way in which the signs behave toward one 
another and are distinguished from one another, cannot be set forth independently 
of them. "29 Thus, a linguistic sign bears no meaning in and of itself. 
The interrelation of the signs with one another implies, for Merleau-Ponty, 
that linguistic meaning is the sort of thing that 'appears' at 'intersections' of 
divergence. Meaning is the effect of the negative interaction between signs; it 
arises not from this sign or t11atsign but from the 'intervals between' signs. It is 
the product of the 'lateral relation' of signs interrelating with signs: "Since the 
sign has meaning only insofar as it is profiled against other signs, its meaning is 
entirely involved in language. "3° From the source of language linguistic 
expression (speech) is produced; from the source of linguistic expression (speech), 
meaning is produced. The sequence is a kind of circle: the meaning is only 
meaningful within the interrelation of the signs of the expression (speech), and the 
signs of the expression (speech) are only meaningful within tl1e larger whole of 
language: the latter remains fully part of the first, the first fully part of the latter. 
28 But Merleau-Ponty's treatment doesn't seem to recognize this. 
29 Merleau-Ponty, op cit., 42. 
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Speech always comes into play against a background of speech; it is always only 
a fold in the immense fabric of language. . .There is thus an opaqueness of 
language. Nowhere does it stop and leave a place for pure meaning; it is always 
limited only by more language, and meaning appears within it only set in a 
context of words. Like a charade, language is understood only through the 
interaction of signs, each of which, taken separately, is equivocal or banal, and 
makes sense only by being combined with others. 31 
From the interrelatedness of signs we get the 'divergent' sense of meaning: 
meaning which is meaning by saying what it is not. 
There is no predetermined sign-signification relationship 'technique' 
because 'signification' is created "at the intersection of linguistic gestures."32 The 
process, for Merleau-Ponty, is like this: from the silence of thought arises the 
expressive language of embodiment (speech). For this process, though, there is no 
'model' which delineates the relation of this thought to these signs to that 
signification; it is describable in this general sense, but one cannot say how this 
'ciphering' occurs, or (on the other hand) how this 'deciphering' occurs; it does 
occur, for Merleau-Ponty, but by means of silence, as it were, not by 
preconditioned convention. Put differently: thought (i.e., the muted speech) 
"before it fmds the words which express it" is "a sort of ideal text that our 
sentences attempt to translate"33 into the expressive language of embodiment 
(speech); the genesis of speech is not a language to which the writer/speaker or 
reader/hearer is able afterwards to 'compare' what he has written/said or 
read/heard; an acceptable fonn of expression is reached by means of being 
conditioned by speech; it is a goal for which there is 'no model'. 
Language, for Merleau-Ponty, is not the sort of thing that we examine 
1:i'om the outside, detennine its rules and regulations, as it were, like a spmt that 
we are unfamiliar with, and then engage it after having studied the 'rule book' 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 42-3. 
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when we feel more comfortable with the game. We know the rules ofthe game, as 
it were, only by playing the game (but language, for Merleau-Ponty, is more than 
a mere game). We say tlus or that, using such-and-such signs to signify thus-and-
such not by model, but from the source of silence: 'signs' relate to 'signs' as 
beings relate to beings. We know tllls being from that being because of the way 
that it lives in contradistinction to other beings; so too do we know language only 
as it lives, only as its parts diverge in speech. Linguistic meaning is not separable 
from tlus "total movement of speech. "34 It is tills mysterious movement that is the 
actualization of meaning, and it seems that it could even be said that, for Merleau-
Ponty, tills movement is itself meaning. 35 Meaning for Merleau-Ponty cannot be 
reduced to the semantic value of tllls sign, the next sign and the next, and so on; a 
sign has no meaning if viewed in tllls manner: for it is abstracted from that context 
willch is its meaning. Meaning is not 'pure' in this sense: it is a messy affair; the 
inter-relation between signs willch is linguistic meaning is created out of silence. 36 
One speaks or writes and does not have recourse to a text with which he can 
compare what he has said or written (as we noted above): for speech is born of the 
travail of silence being spoken. What is meant by speaking or writing something is 
meant from silence into the confusion of the inter-relation of signs. In tills way it 
seems that Merleau-Ponty affirms that the 'being' of language speaks from 
silence. 
It seems consistent with Merleau-Ponty's thought to propose that meaning 
is the creation of speech from silence: and tllls, it seems, is not a clearly defined 
method, but a relational process. The process seems relational on two scores: (i) 
thought (muted speech) is related to sign; (ii) signs are related to signs (speech 
acts to speech acts). The first form of relation is the initial stage of embodying 
thought; the second is the expression (speaking) of embodied thought. Tills is, it 
seems, for Merleau-Ponty, what we could call the meaning making process. The 
t110ught is brought into tl1e 'being' of language, and it is made to become part of 
34 Ibid., 43. 
35 
cf. Ihde, op cit., 71. 
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this 'being' by virtue of embodying it in linguistic expression (speech): an 
embodied thought, for Merleau-Ponty, is a thought which has been made to be 
meaningful. An analogy suggests itself: as the body takes in sustenance and makes 
it part of itself, so too does language take thought into itself and make it part of 
itself. The body makes sense out of bread, fish and wine by uniting itself with 
these things, by transforming them into itself; thought is similarly consumed by 
language.37 This perspective on meaning implies that linguistic 'expression' 
(speech) can never fully actualize that which it intends to express: meaning is 
partial, never whole. 
Now if we rid our minds of the idea that our language is the translation or cipher 
of original text, we shall see that the idea of complete expression is nonsensical, 
and that all language is indirect or allusive -that it is, if you wish, silenr.e The 
relation of meaning to the spoken word can no longer be a point for point 
correspondence that we always have clearly in mind. 38 
What does Merleau-Ponty mean when he says 'all language is indirect or 
allusive'? This characterizes for him the defining character of language as a 
whole. But does it say anything? It certainly seems to, in my opinion. We speak of 
something as being 'indirect' or 'allusive' because of the way that it seems to act; 
language, then, we could say acts in indirect and allusive ways. As a 'being' or a 
'universe', language lives in secretive ways; its ethics are its own secrets; it does 
not tell of all its deeds. To borrow from Heraclitus, for Merleau-Ponty it seems 
that language 'prefers to hide'. In this sense, silence is the source of linguistic 
expression (speech) and also its sustenance: it is secretive in its 'translation' of 
thought into linguistic expression (speech), and remains secretive in the manner of 
its expression (speech). Language does not reveal its secret abilities; it tells no 
tales of how it embodies thought, or how signs diverge to reveal meaning. About 
36 Ibid., 7l. 
37 cf. Merleau-Ponty, op cit., 43. 
38 Ibid. 
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these language remains silent. Whatever meaning of a natural language is, it 
seems consistent with Merleau-Ponty's thought to suggest that it is kataphatic 
because it affinns, apophatic because it denies and silent because silence is 
anterior and essential to it: language affirms through the embodiment of thought 
into the form of certain signs and a certain linguistic expression (speech act), but 
at the same time it denies other forms of linguistic expression and others signs; 
likewise, signs deny signs while affinning what it is that they together are 
intended to mean. As has been noted, meaning is not something that is 
fundamentally linguistic in terms of being locatable in the atomic structures of 
sentences (words) nor in their connective logical structures. The 'confusions of 
everyday language', for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be left untreated if indeed an 
account of meaning is to be responsible, which, taken as he here suggests, implies 
that meaning is silence at least in part. 
There appears a comment in his "Dialogue and the Perception of the 
Other" that might be helpful for us to recall here. His comments here focus on the 
queer Wlitive nature of linguistic communication, and the effort of some to 
'silence' this inexplicable manner in which language acts. Here we have Merleau-
Ponty speaking of silence in a manner that is antithetical to the way that we have 
just observed; here 'silence' does not describe the secretive ways of language; but 
the philosophical effort to ignore these ways. 
In speech we realize the impossible agreement between two rival totalities not 
because speech forces us back upon ourselves to discover some unique spirit in 
which we participate but be~.ause speech concerns us, catches us indirectly, 
seduces us, trails us along, transforms us into the other and him into us, abolishes 
the limit between mine and not-mine, and ends the alternative between what has 
sense for me and what is non-sense for me, between me as subject and the other 
as object. It is well that some people try to set up obstacles to the intrusion of this 
spontaneous power and oppose it with their rigor and ill will. But their silence 
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ends in further words, and rightly so. There is no silence that is pure attention and 
that, having begun nobly, remains equal to itself. 39 
It would seem that what Merleau-Ponty affirms here could be put like this: 
language usage (speech) is the meeting of subject with subject, a meeting which 
itself is a creative aspect of who these subjects are becoming; one cannot abstain 
from this fray of inter-subjective linguistic communion; the attempt to abstain in 
silence, to be an individual subject apart from relating to other subjects yet 
witnesses to the nature of silence, which is communal and therefore must speak: 
"Language is not private -nor is it public- it is between subjects, intersubjective, it 
is "a synchronizing of my own existence, a transformation of my own being. [But] 
[w]e live in a world where speech is an institution.'-A0 Meaning it seems is a 
developmental process, for Merleau-Ponty: it is not an exact something.41 This 
inexactness seems to derive from his conception of the anteriority and essentiality 
of silence to language, and it suggests that language usage (speech) is an 
essentially creative endeavor that is always bound to the 'embodiment of word': 
meaning wears a textual garb as an 'incarnation.' But for Merleau-Ponty, the 
effort to 'silence' language as described here results only in further speech, which 
witnesses to the silence of language as Merleau-Ponty sees it because speech 
'ends the alternative between me and the other'; thus 'silence' even in this 
instance speaks. Either way, silence is meaning. Silence, for Merleau-Ponty 
denotes more of a presence rather than the usual notion of absence -the presence 
of meaning. 
4. Denys' 'Sculptor Analogy' and Language-as-Ikon 
Interrelatedness between signs is, for Merleau-Ponty, a relational process 
of linguistic-meaning creation from and by means of silence. This process, as I 
39 cf. "Science and the Expression of Experience" in Prose, op cit., 45-6. "We should be sensitive 
to the thread of silence from which the tissue of speech is woven." See also Indirect Language and 
Voices o.fSilence, op cit., 43-4. Quote from "Dialogue and the Perception of the Other" in Prose, 
of cit., 145-6. 
4 Ihde, op cit., 70. Quote from Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1962), 183-4. 
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have suggested, seems to imply a kind of kataphaticism as well as an 
apophaticism because the embodiment of thought affirms, on the one hand, certain 
signs and a certain linguistic expression, while concurrently denying, on the other 
hand, various ot.lJer signs and linguistic expressions. This notion of 
interrelatedness as the process of linguistic-meaning creation which is 
simultaneously kataphatic and apophatic, taken in terms of language-as-ikon, 
suggests a conception of language that seems to be analogous in some ways to 
Denys' conception of the creative work of theology as a kind of 'sculpting'. 
Language in speaking from silence inherently bears silence within its 
locutions, and this, for Merleau-Ponty, is the way that we communicate. There is 
always, then, the presence of the mystery of the ineffable,42 for Merleau-Ponty, 
residing in that which is spoken. Thus, when language speaks it does so in an 
explicit-implicit manner: it speaks yet in speaking it is silent.43 
Denys' view of the nature of language-as-ikon, implies that language 
speaks yet remains silent, as well; but it does so because the beyond-being reveals 
but remains hidden. His position offers an explanatory context for Merleau-
Ponty's theory oflanguage by means of interpreting the notion of interrelatedness 
in terms of the notion of language-as-ikon. This means that, Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of the 'ineffable', which is apparently purely phenomenological for him, is 
interpreted, from a Dionysian perspective, in tem1s of the manifold manifestation 
of the beyond-being in the ikon of language. 
Denys' 'sculptor analogy', as we have seen, describes a creative process 
that is both kataphatic and apophatic, which is, I suggest, the sort of thing that 
Merleau-Ponty's position seems to do. The medium here, however, as opposed to 
that of the theologian (chapter One and Two), the rationalist philosopher (chapter 
Three), the empiricist philosopher (chapter Four), for example, is language, and 
41 cf. "The Algorithm and the Mystery of Language" in Prose, 127-9. 
42 For Merleau-Ponty this does not seem to necessarily imply a sort of 'transcendental' ineffable; 
whereas in a Dionysian system it would imply this. The mysterious presence in a Dionysian 
srstem would be taken to mean the presence of the beyond-being. 
4 
cf. Ihde, op cit., 73. 
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that which is the aim of production, as it were, is meaning. The analogy is, by 
now, a familiar one, but we shall present it one last time. Denys maintains that the 
theologian would be 'just as the ones creating ( nowilvrt:') a statue of natural 
things, removing everything that is an obstruction to the true sight of that which is 
hidden, and revealing this hidden beauty by means of negation alone' (MT II, 
1025b). 
If we take Merleau-Ponty's notion of interrelatedness in terms of this 
analogy, the result is that 'the linguistic phenomenologist philosopher would be 
just as the ones creating ( notoffVT£') a statue of natural things, removing 
everything that is an obstruction to the true sight of that which is hidden, and 
revealing this hidden beauty by means of negation alone.' Such an interpretation 
seems to be wa.1anted because, as I have argued, Merleau-Ponty' s notion of 
interrelatedness is a relational process of linguistic-meaning creation that creates 
from and by means of silence in a kataphatic and apophatic manner. According to 
Merleau-Ponty's notion, one creates a linguistic expression with signs by 
removing the obstruction of other signs and expressions. This, in Merleau-Ponty's 
terminology, then, is the 'embodied thought', which is linguistic meaning as an 
inexact creation. The element of silence, for Merleau-Ponty, is the source of 
meaning's inexactness, and, as we have noted, this silence seems to be accepted as 
a phenomenological aspect of language. Denys' position, however, adds a 
theological interpretation to this phenomenological notion, namely the notion that 
language, since it is ikonic, speaks from and by means of silence because of the 
immanent presence of the beyond-being. On this reading, therefore, I am 
suggesting that Merleau-Ponty provides an attractive philosophical account of the 
being of language to which Denys' position offers a theological support through 
the notion of the being of language-as-ikon. I am not, therefore, suggesting that 
their respective notions of silence and ineffability are the same because (i) I take 
Merleau-Ponty' s notion of silence and ineffability to be an accurate description of 
language qua language; but (ii) I take Denys' notion of silence and ineffability as 
an accurate description oflanguage qua language-as-ikon. The first type of silence 
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and ineffability is, as Merleau-Ponty argues, an aspect of the way that we use 
language; Denys' notion of ineffability and silence speaks of the presence of the 
beyond-being. The notion of language-as-ikon, moreover, according to Dionysian 
thought, affirms Merleau-Ponty's notion of silence and ineffability, while bringing 
to it an explanatory context of the silence and ineffability of the presence of the 
beyond-being. Although the two notions are different, then, the first is, 
nevertheless, an ikon of the second in the sense of being, according to Denys' 
position, dissimilarly similar. Merleau-Ponty's notion of silence and ineffability, 
to put it differently, is a dissimilar linguistic-ikon of Denys' notion of silence and 
ineffability, i.e. as a mysterious element of the being of language, it affirms the 
mystery of the being of language, and in affirming the mystery of the being of 
language, it 'un-forgets' the nature of language. The nature of language, from a 
Dionysian perspective, is bound up with the manifestation of the beyond-being. 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of interrelatedness, creatively dependent as it is on silence 
and ineffability, if taken solely in terms of referring to the being of language, is, 
therefore, a philosophical position which seems to lend credence to Denys' notion 
of language-as-ikon. 
4.1. Language-as-Ikon and Denys' Notion of Praise 
For Denys, as we noted in chapter One, 'the inexpressible is bound up with 
what can be articulated' (589d-592a). The speaking of language, for Denys, is, 
therefore, as we argued in the first chapter, a speaking that speaks what cannot be 
spoken by means of what can be spoken. The beyond-being is 'bound up' within 
empirical and rational being, i.e. the beyond-being which is beyond the empirical 
and the rational, is 'bound' by it. In relation to this notion, I argued, that for Denys 
there is a distinction between showing and praising, and that his ultimate purpose 
is 'not to show the beyond-being, as it were, but 'to praise' it (DN, 5, 1, 816b ). His 
aim in speaking the beyond-being is not to explicate the essence of beyond-being, 
therefore, but to praise it in its manifestations by means of 'whatever appropriate 
ikons' (DN I, 592c ). This means, as I have argued in chapter One, that being 
(linguistic being, specifically, in terms of the present discussion) in all of its 
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various hierarchical manifestations, whether it, according to its capacity, manifests 
the beyond-being in a similar or in a dissimilar manner, is viewed as an 
'appropriate ikon of the Divine'. I argued that to speak of the beyond-being, for 
Denys, is 'to praise' it in two senses of the word: because language-as-ikon 
celebrates the beyond-being, and because it recites over and over the presence of 
the beyond-being. These 'senses' are distinct but inseparable whether speaking 
explicitly about the beyond-being or not because language-as-ikon itself is 
beautiful-being -of-language-as-ikon-of-the-beauty-of-the-beyond-being, I.e. 
language qua language-as-ikon by its nature as being and by its capacity for 
manifesting the beyond-being simultaneously celebrates and recites the beyond-
being. It can be said, then, in terms of Merleau-Ponty's thought that 'the 
inexpressible is bound up with what can be articulated', but taken in terms of 
Denys' notion of language-as-ikon, this 'inexpressible' aspect of language, is 
described in terms of the manifest presence of the beyond-being. Thus, Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy of language, understood ikonically, speaks in praise of the 
beyond-being because it 'enables one to see', as Denys argues in Ep. IX, 'the 
hidden beauty'. 'Mystery', Denys maintains, 'will be found, all divine, having 
been reformed from much theological light' (1104c-1105c). 
5. Conclusion 
Merleau-Ponty' s tl1eory of language apart from a Dionysian interpretation 
is, in my opinion, as I have suggested above, a very attractive one, and his 
evaluation of the 'algorithmic' theory, or analytic thought, though somewhat 
overstated at times, is in my estimation fundamentally accurate. But neither his 
criticism of analytic thought, nor his own theory per se necessarily implies the sort 
of metaphysic that Denys' notion of ikon requires. If my evaluation of his theory 
is accurate, however, with regard specifically to my claim that his thought is of an 
apophatic form in part, then interpreting his theory in terms of Denys' apophatic 
theory which requires the notion of ikon seems naturally to suggest itself. It also 
seems to provide a theoretical context by means of which, therefore, to defend 
Denys' notion of language-as-ikon. Seen through the lens of Denys' ikon, 
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Merleau-Ponty's theory of language can be accepted both as an apparently valid 
phenomenological analysis of the mystery of language, on the one hand, but also 
as tacitly manifesting the mystery of the beyond-being. Herein lies my defense of 
Denys' notion of language-as-ikon: if Merleau-Ponty's theory really does tell use 
something about the mystery of the 'being' of language, then it, according to 
Denys' position, necessarily tells us something about the beyond-being as well, 
though the theory itself might not do so explicitly. For, according to Dionysian 
thought, insofar as the mystery of being, in this case language, is revealed, so too 
is the mystery of the beyond-being revealed because of the nature of being-as-
ikon. 
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Atticus said to Jem one day. 'I'd rather you shoot at tin cans in the back yard, but I know 
you'll go after birds. Shoot all the bluejays you want, if you can hit' em, but remember it's 
a sin to kill a mockingbird. 
Harper Lee To Kill a Mockingbird 
1. Why Denys' notion of the mystery of being-as-ikon in the first place? 
Byzantine theology developed during a thousand year period, roughly 
from about A.D. 500 on into the 1500's. This period is for the Orthodox East an 
important time of theological development and synthesis. For it was during this 
era that philosophical, dogmatic and ascetical thought began to be drawn together 
as distinct aspects of a single theological system. Dionysius the Areopagite 
appears early in this tradition and is the first to offer a kind of 'systematic' 
theology in which the philosophical, the dogmatic and the ascetical are each 
equally important aspects of the whole system. His theology later influenced 
major Byzantine theologians, for example, John of Scythopolis, Maximos the 
Confessor, Jolm of Damascus, Gregory Palamas and the much lesser known 
philosopher/statesmen/theologian Michael Psellos. But his work was even more 
influential in the west. Among those indebted to him are: Gregory the Great, John 
Scotus Eriugena (who produced a Latin translation of the CD), Albertus Magnus, 
Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, the author of 
The Cloud of Unknowing, John of the Cross, and the structure of the hierarchies of 
Milton's Paradise Lost and Dante's Divine Comedy, for example. It is, therefore, 
for these reasons, first of all, namely because Dionysius is a 'source' for 
Byzantine theology, particularly, and for philosophical theology more generally 
(though this latter point has, in contemporary scholarship, been almost completely 
unexamined), that I have turned to his notion of mystery in this thesis. 
I have been interested, however, not in a 'historical', but in a 
'constructive' investigation of his thought, primarily from an epistemological 
perspective, which makes an effort at application to certain western philosophical 
issues. It has been necessary for me, therefore, to ignore fundamentally both his 
~pi logos 
philosophical and theological heritage as well as his 'Byzantine' and 'Medieval' 
legacy, and to focus my attention on a task that is, in my opinion, fundamentally 
Dionysian, as it were, namely that of interpreting contemporaneous philosophical 
thought in terms of his cosmic vision. 
Secondly, Denys' notion of being-as-ikon as 'an image which itself 
contains as a unity-in-distinction that of which it is an image', namely that being 
(as defined in chapter One) in every manifestation is such an image, provides a 
unique conceptual framework for a philosophical theology that is able to deal with 
various claims of mystery, theistic proof, the sense of the beautiful and the role of 
silence in language. It is unique, primarily, because of its adherence to an 
epistemology that is both rational and empirical and trans-rational and trans-
empirical, and as such, is able to draw together a well-defined theology with 
philosophical reflection by means of making sense of the latter as a discrete and 
manifold instantiation of a larger whole. Furthermore, this 'drawing together', or 
synaxis as Denys would call it, of philosophy and theology is accomplished 
through the notion of being-as-ikon without dealing with either of them 
unfavorably. 
Denys' notion of being-as-ikon envisions the cosmos and the Cause of the 
cosmos as being united, though not identical, and in constant participation via the 
process of relational beauty. Since I have approached Dionysian thought primarily 
as a 'philosopher', rather than as a 'theologian', my interests in terms of applying 
this notion have naturally tended toward philosophical, rather than theological 
thought. In this thesis the notion of being-as-ikon has been put to use primarily in 
terms of dealing with epistemological and linguistic mystery. 
I have not spent any time examining, for example, the question of Denys' 
doctrine of the Trinity or of a Dionysian Christology or Ecclesiology, though 
these notions are central to his conception of being-as-ikon. The incarnation of the 
second person ofthe Trinity (i.e., the 'Son') and the church, for Denys, are indeed 
the full manifestations of being-as-ikon. The transfonuation of being into a single 
organic whole is, for example, accomplished most fully in the incarnation, when 
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the beyond-being fully unites itself with being by means of becoming a hnn1an 
being; and the fullness of this work is carried out continuously in the ecclesial life 
of the church, most clearly manifest in the synaxis of the Eucharist. The need for 
such a transformation is the result of, according to Dionysian thought, being's dis-
union, which, as I understand it, is what 'evil' is for Denys (cf. DN IV 732c.3-
732d.15). This 'dis-tmion' is the state of un-purified, tm-enlightened being, i.e. 
being devoid ofthe purpose ofharmony and wholeness (i.e. beauty), like a song 
being sung out-of-ttme and out-of-order. Being's purpose, for Denys, is to 
pruticipate (i.e., 'to know being-as-ikon') and to praise (i.e., 'to speak being-as-
ikon'). More precisely: human being's purpose is to know and speak being-as-
ikon, by means of the process of relational beauty, as 'an image which itself 
contains as a unity-in-distinction that of which it is an image', and so, by this 
means, to become 'united', i.e. a 'divinized' human being, with the beyond-being. 
Being's participation and praise, as such, unites cosmos and creator, the image 
with its archetype, as it were, which, for Denys, is the proper purpose of being as 
ecclesia,1 i.e. ofbeing as an assembly of those calling back in response to the call 
of the beyond-being. The actualization of interdependent cosmic unity, therefore, 
according to Denys' position, is realized as being pursues its purpose of knowing 
and speaking the beyond-being, by means of beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-
beyond-being, in the assembly which is responsively calling back to the calling of 
the beyond-being. 
2. But given this framework, then, what is the purpose of the 'philosophical' 
chapters (i.e., Three-Six)? 
Denys speaks in Ep. IX of the two ways of doing theology, namely by 
demonstration and by silence. By the former, I understand him to mean what 
would commonly be referred to in contemporary discussions as 'philosophical 
theology'; by the latter, I understand him to mean 'mystical theology'. His own 
writings seem to emphasize the latter. My treatment has shown, however, that, 
1 From l:xxaA.tro (l:x 'from out of, 'away from' xaA.tro 'to call'): 'to call out of, 'to call forth'. In 
Dionysian terminology: 'to call being out of being qua being' or 'to call being forth to being qua 
being-as-ikon'. Usually translated as 'church' in Eng. 
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while one way may be emphasized, the two ways are not separable. TI1e 
actualization of interdependent cosmic unity, the nature of which I have just 
described, is realized, therefore, both in terms of 'mystical theology' and in tenns 
of 'philosophical theology'. Thus, the conclusion of the previous paragraph could 
be refommlated as follows: the actualization of interdependent cosmic unity is 
realized as human being philosophically pursues its purpose of knowing and 
speaking the beyond-being, by means of beautiful-being-as-ikon-of-the-beyond-
being, as an assembly which is responsively calling back to the calling of the 
beyond-being, the ultimate purpose of which is the mystical union of human being 
with the beyond-being. 
Chapter Three, therefore, addresses the problem of knowing and speaking 
the beyond-being in the face of a variety of philosophical claims of mystery by 
means of viewing these 'mysteries' as fundamentally theological in nature, or, 
more precisely, as ikons. Denys' notion of being-as-ikon is able to receive these 
claims as mysteries of being, and, thus, to affirm them as ikons. 
Chapters Four through Six each also present responses to philosophical 
problems of interest to philosophical theology in general and to Dionysian thought 
(or at least my interest therein) in particular. These problems, as was noted in the 
Prolegomena, conceived of in the most general terms, are: the problem of the 
relationship between theistic proof and theology, the problem of the relationship 
between science and theology and the problem of the relationship between 
language and theology. From the perspective of Denys' notion of ikon, these 
chapters address the problem of knowing and speaking the beyond-being in terms 
of'proof, 'science' and 'language'. The responses to these problems are put in a 
'theological' contexi, therefore, and, by this means, Denys' notions of rational, 
empirical and linguistic ikon are defended. 
My fundamental claim with regard to the application of Dionysian 
thought, is that by invoking the notion of being-as-ikon, a notion which at once 
maintains the mystery-of-being and the mystery of beyond-being as distinct but 
inseparable aspects of itself, these philosophical issues, or more particularly these 
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ce1tain responses, are 'illuminated' as mysteries of being which are interpreted in 
terms of the mystery ofbeing-as-ikon. 
But my treatment in chapters Four-Six is warranted, furthermore, because 
of the tacit element of apophaticism that I discern in them apart from Dionysian 
thought. And my defense of Dionysian thought, concerning these chapters in 
particular, lies in this discernment of apophaticism, which I interpret in the context 
of his notion of being-as-ikon in relation to the apophasis of 'sculpting' and the 
process of relational beauty. To invoke Denys' notion of being-as-ikon, using 
Marcel's terminology once more, is, therefore, to postulate the primacy of being-
as-ikon over knowledge ... to recognize that knowledge is, as it were, environed 
by the mystery of being-as-ikon. 
3. What is the outcome of the thesis? 
I have shown that my interpretation of Denys' theophanic notion of being, 
which I have spoken of as being-as-ikon, is a plausible view of being from which 
new lines of thought emerge, when applied to western philosophical thought, that 
uniquely address some important problems in philosophical theology. By 
examining this notion in the context of western philosophy, I have, therefore, 
offered a defense of Denys' notion of being-as-ikon by positing it as a plausible 
interpretation of the mystery of rational, empirical and linguistic being. In chapter 
three, I have done this kataphatically, and in the ensuing chapters I have done this 
in an apophatic manner. Thus, I have developed a Dionysian philosophical 
theology through the notion of being-as-ikon in dialogue with western philosophy. 
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